WHAT WILL BE THE OUTCOME OF THE DISMISSAL OF 22 OFFICIALS IN B&H
CUTTING THE LIZARD'S TAIL
Petritsch and Berry - the OHR and OSCE leading men in B&H - will continue with the replacement of disobedient personnel until the time of local elections. The next stage, in which some radical moves will be made, will depend on the election results.
AIM SARAJEVO, December 3, 1999
Petritsch's and Berry's decision on the replacement of 22 cantonal and local officials in both B&H entities did not cause any political shock. Such atmosphere best shows who is the real boss in B&H. However, this story also has a broader context: the replacement was set for the most suitable political moment (after the New York meeting dedicated to Dayton); the B&H leaders Jelavic, Izetbegovic and Radisic were forced to agree; the United States fully supported the dismissals (the American Berry is behind High Representative Petritsch); the decision is easy to implement as only weaker figures have been sacrificed; the public was expecting such a move ("There is no place for anti-Dayton forces, which advocate ethnic hatred and divisions, in the B&H policy" - from the New York statement of B&H Presidency members). The move was calculated to cause a shock as 22 men were replaced in the same day.
Irrespective of the official explanation (these officials were hindering the return), the Petritsch-Berry decision is manifold and can not be interpreted simply. At the same time, it is a punishment, a warning and a political direction.
No matter how hard the OHR tried to present this decision as a matter of individual responsibility, two things are evident: the national balance and the geography of the political whip of international representatives. Replaced were nine Serbian, seven Bosniac and six Croatian officials.
Naturally, there are no innocent parties in this story on the obstruction of Dayton Accords and the return of refugees, but the degree of guilt varies from name to name. According to the criteria applied any president of a commune in eastern parts of the Republic of Srpska could be replaced since the return process has not even started there. Very few prefects in federal communes could compare with the Banja Luka Mayor Djordje Umcevic, who has spent his entire term defying the international community with his customary chauvinistic statements. But, since this is not the matter of justice but rather of politics, the infamous national quota, efficiently applied in Bosnia by communists in the previous period, could not be sidestepped. Consequently, when prizes are awarded and punishments pronounced the people demonstrate their acquired reflex of counting the number of Serbs, Bosniacs or Croats. Since representatives of all three nations have been punished, the decision was received calmly.
The other characteristic is political geography. It is clear to the naked eye that the High Representative in the RS has focused his attention on the eastern parts of this entity - Foca, Bratunac, Vlasenica, Serbian Gorazde, Serbian Ilidza...These are politically neglected communes in which Serbian extreme nationalists are in power - the SDS and Seselj's Radicals. It is believed that these regions are under the influence of Momcilo Krajisnik, the closest associate of the most wanted man by the Hague Tribunal - Radovan Karadzic. In case of the Croatian officials, the elimination was mostly concentrated in the Neretva - Herzegovina Canton (Stolac, Capljina, Mostar - South-West Commune, Prozor-Rama). These communes strongly opposed the very idea of return by ignoring the return of non-Croatian population to socially-owned flats. Housing bureaus for the returnees were not even established in Stolac and Capljina. The Bosniac elimination had a broader geographical coverage
- it covered the Bihac-Mostar-Gorazde triangle. There the dismissals were executed much earlier when Westendorp replaced the chief of police, three prosecutors and placed eight cantonal ministers under investigation.
Political observers, politicians and journalists disagree on the effects of this personnel execution. The opposition is mostly of the opinion that "executors" were wiped out and not the main obstruction-policy makers. It could be said that lizards' tails had been cut off, but that they will soon grow again. Nikola Grabovac from the Alternative Council of Ministers was of the opinion that the snake should be hit in the head. It is naive to believe that the main brakemen were local housing clerks on both banks of Mostar. It is clear that they took part in preventing the return, but it is also common knowledge that they did it under the instructions of their political bosses.
On the basis of the fact that mostly low-ranking officers paid the price, a question arises: can this measure influence the change of policy and open the doors to return? The psychological and political effects of Petritsch-Berry measure will start a process in that direction. The Bosnian experience shows that the power always implied certain privileges. In a surrounding where you need to be well connected to even get a simple certificate from the communal administration, let alone when seeking employment, looking for a flat, business premises or have discretionary powers to use budget funds, people in power became more important than their function implied in any regulated state. The destiny of thousands of ordinary citizens was in the hands of such people. The power is the greatest passion as lulled politicians start believing the daily toadying.
By Petritsch's decree, the local lords have lost their jobs overnight, confused and surprised as shipwreck victims who do not understand what has happened to them. For those dismissed the abandonment of their positions and politics for many years to come (they cannot take part in the elections or hold any public offices) was equal to early retirement. Imagine a demoted governor of Bihac, Mirsad Veladzic, who until this decision, lived surrounded by his four bodyguards and disposed of enormous cash funds as he pleased both in war and peace time. Even a director's position of his own choice could never be adequate compensation for what he once had. Perhaps his party leadership will offer him a position in Sarajevo, but there he will be lost in anonymity. The alternatives left to Serbian officials are even fewer. There is no single firm in the poor eastern communes of the Republic of Srpska that can boast of decent wages, the SDS has no money left, and they cannot count on Dodik's help - he does not need such men in Banja Luka. The Croatian officials are in a somewhat better position. But, long gone are the days when Croatia could find position for its dismissed cadre (Boban, Kordic, Blaskic...). Now the dismissed officials have a material alternative, but nothing can make up for their political retirement.
After rigorous measures of the international community, the present officials and successors of those replaced have become aware that the High Representative's broom could easily wipe them off the face of the earth overnight. Since personal interests have become more pronounced than those "patriotic" and national, the officials will try to be more cooperative with representatives of the international community than before. On that same day, office of Safet Orucevic from Mostar thawed its frozen relations with the regional OHR Bureau (Orucevic and Prskalo were only reprimanded). After such an experience it is probable that the local officials will start abiding by the law instead of party guidelines. It turned out that only those carrying out the party policy in practice got whipped, while the bosses remain unharmed.
The second effect is the mopping-up operation. It is well-known that the ruling parties have their own casting: the leaders are verbally for Dayton, while on the ground there are "party soldiers", who are against it, and are divided into democrats and hard-core nationalists. These "party soldiers" are the principal support of their leaders on the ground. Actually, they are not acting but are faithfully carrying out the true guidelines of party oligarchies. Without Stipe Maric in Mostar - on the South-West, Pazin in Stolac or Kordic in Capljina, the HDZ hard-liners are left without their most loyal supporters. With their departure, those issuing orders become weaker as they are left without those who would carry them out. This is also true of the SDS party structure whose membership has been falling ever since it lost power, and the process is continuing on the local level.
It is believed that Izetbegovic was most hurt by the removal of governor Veladzic in the Bihac region. Veladzic is considered to be a person without political charisma and unpopular even in his native Buzim. But, his rule and authority result from the fact that he is a man of great Izetbegovic's trust, and even related to him. At the same time, his removal means the dethroning of the Cengic clan (Veladzic is married to Hasan Cengic's sister). The demoting of Gorazde prefect, Elvedin Hrelja, is also a message of warning to the much more influential governor Rijad Rascic (again Cengic's cousin).
There are speculations that the list is not final and that a similar elimination could ensue on a much higher level and include some ministers, the Army and the police. In accordance with Petritsch's policy regarding responsibility and the general policy of international community (the implementation of commitments undertaken in Dayton), selective higher level removals and twisting of arms can be expected. The first stage of this policy will probably last until the elections and could be conditionally called "personnel trimming". It is true that a lizard can grow a new tail, but one thing is certain - it will never be strong as the old one.
A more radical cut could follow after the local elections which are scheduled for next April. Further strategy of the international community, whose clear aim is to weaken the national parties and remove war lords, will depend on the election results. The Stability Pact requires new leaders.
Emir HABUL
(AIM Sarajevo)
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