ELECTION RULES DEFINED

AIM, ZAGREB, 6.11.1999.

Croatia has managed to define new election rules before the polling day. The package of electoral laws was passed in the Parliament literally a minute before noon by the ruling party HDZ and its satellites - the opposition was not in favor. According to the new regulation, Croatia will be divided into 10 constituencies, with 14 parliamentary seats each. The 11th constituency will elect representatives of the so called diaspora, i.e. the Croats who do not live in Croatia, while the 12th will choose parliamen t members among ethnic minorities.

The six-month negotiations between the ruling HDZ and the opposition have practically brought nothing new. The only novelty of 1999 national elections is that local election committees will be able to see the voting records after the voting is over in their local units. Additionally, the ballots will be delivered to home addresses eight days before the election day. These are the only things the opposition has succeeded to achieve from its long, but over time ever shorter, list of demands. The most controv ersial issue in the negotiations - a separate list for the Croat diaspora - has remained intact, not without the consent of the opposition. In addition, the ethnic minorities quota has been reduced: instead of former three, there will be only one representative of the Serbs in the new Parliament. The total number of MP's is increased for almost 20%, enabling a larger number of diaspora representatives as well. The election campaign financing is not regulated in the way usual for Western democracies. The pub lic has no access to voters' registration lists. The controlling process is somewhat improved, but its functioning in practice remains yet to be seen, especially in regard to the fact that the end of the official votes counting will take place during the Christmas holidays.

Election constituencies are tailored in such a way that Zagreb residents will cast their ballots together with voters living close to borders with Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia, as well as those along the coast. The capital is divided into four constituencies in an attempt to neutralize its dominant pro-opposition orientation. The government is afraid of urban population. What is most important, there are no guarantees for the impartiality of the most influential media - state television, in particular. Moreover, the opposition claims that the HDZ campaign headquarters has moved to the Croatian Television. There are a lot of controversies concerning the announced voting day - December 22, Wednesday, a working day in the middle of the week, three days before the Christmas Day. Croatian Catholic bishops have demanded that the elections would not be organized during Christmas holidays, claiming it has never been the case in a country of Christian tradition. Allegedly, there are only four African c ountries with a similar experience. Entrepreneurs have calculated that the electoral Wednesday, turned out into a non-working day, would cost the Croatian economy 110 million of German marks.

It is generally believed that in the long, complicated and difficult for the public to understand political negotiations the HDZ has tactically outwit the opposition. The election regulation has been tailored to the government needs; over a half a year the opposition has not practically achieved nothing - except for discrediting itself by often changes of attitudes, divergence from its own principles, acceptance of rotten compromises.

The international community has not achieved nothing either. Long ago, when Croatia was accepted to the Council of Europe, it took the obligation to adjust its electoral laws to Western standards, first of all to omit the so called diaspora list. In this course, Croatia has been constantly reminded of its obligations. The international community demanded from the government to achieve an agreement with the opposition on the election regulation. For six months the HDZ was performing its negotiating role to m ake the final decision according to its own interests in the last minute.

The day before the electoral package was passed on, the official Zagreb received a demarche from the European Union. The document stated that the "Croatian government decided to ignore most of the EU attitudes concerning the new electoral law", thus "bringing under question its readiness to organize free and fair elections". The EU demands that Serbian refugees from Croatia be allowed to vote, warns that the prescribed way of voting of diaspora violates the Dayton Peace Accords, expresses its worry in regar d to the presence of minorities in the parliament, requires that voting out of Croatia be done only in embassies and consulates, stresses that the day chosen for casting the votes considers "unusual for European circumstances". It expects an "independent and balanced election coverage" from the national television. The demarche also states that "hopes and strives of the Croatian population could be blocked for many years if the election process were estimated as obstructed in any way or if the elec tion resu lts were not put into practice". In a concluding remark, the EU warns: if its comments do not get "appropriate attention", Croatia "risks to have elections which will not be free and fair, with all due consequences". Some analysts think that the international community is ready even to introduce sanction against Croatia, particularly if President Tudjman does not recognize the election results.

Instead with "appropriate attention", the EU demrache was officially met with a snake's hiss. Croatian ministers exposed the democratic international demands to a firework of a Seselj-like rhetoric. The demarche was defined as an "unserious leaflet", a "bureaucratic pamphlet", a result of "door-keepers of doubtful origin", "imposition of a limited sovereignty", an "insolence under the mask of democracy", an "offense to the Croatian people which should be rejected with repulsion"... The official response by the Croatian Cabinet was only a bit more mildly intoned. Zagreb sent a message to Brussels that the debate about the electoral laws was concluded, that there was no need for further discussion on the topic and suggested that it should not interfere in the Croatian election campaign. It seems that Tudjman's regime is more ready to accept the sanctions than democratic election conditions. The rationale here is a simple one: under sanctions, it will not lose anything, as the bill will be p aid by the people; un der democratic rules - it will lose the elections and everything resulting from this.

Despite all government devices of election engineering, independent experts hold that the HDZ cannot win the forthcoming elections. A philosophy professor Zarko Puhovski thinks that the election results are practically already known: HDZ loses, the opposition celebrates, regardless of what both of them will do. The only question is how severe the government defeat will be. Many analysts reckon that a heavy failure of the HDZ is not to be expected, as - among other things - the opposition has adjusted its ta ctics to a limited and relative, and not to an absolute victory (two thirds of votes), the later being necessary for changing the Constitution and putting limitations to Tudjman's presidential power. It has been often stressed that electoral defeat does not necessarily mean losing power. The mandate of one parliament chambre and of the Republic president will last for next two years. The Constitutional Court will be under the HDZ control for another eight years. Tudjman's ambiguous statement that in the cas e of the opposition victory he would "behave as a responsible president in the interests of the Croatian people and the state" was interpreted by some media analysts as an announcement of a coup d'Útat. However, there are opinions that the government could achieve its aims with more subtle means. A Law Faculty professor Josip Kregar warns: "Whoever wins the next elections, will not get the power yet. I think that some institutional measure have been taken (by the government) and assumptions secured that the coup d'etat will not be needed. Why would it need a coup d'etat - it only hinders and looks bad".

The potential scenario for the future situation has already been tested in the case of Zagreb. In the last local elections, the opposition won in the capital, but for two years Tudjman has managed to keep the city under his control denying all mayors from the opposition. In spite of clear election results, the opposition never managed to consume its victory. There are speculations that the same model could be applied now at the level of the whole republic. The Croatian president has very wide competencies a nd he could, following his already established practice of arbitrary interpretations of democratic and legal norms, opt for practical ignoring of the election results. His dangerous illness, whose outcome is difficult to predict, however, brings the element of great uncertainty into this option.

JELENA LOVRIÅ