STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE BOSNIAN-HERZEGOVINIAN CROATS

A THIRD ENTITY, TUDJMAN'S DREAM OR...

AIM SARAJEVO, October 28, 1999

The political circles in B&H and international community reacted quickly and unfavourably to the recent speech of the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Gracac, Lika and particularly to his statement given some two days later to the local and foreign members of the press that the Dayton Peace Agreement had to be revised and that a third, Croatian entity should be established in B&H. There is a considerable collection of such reactions, but despite all that, as soon as emotions and reactions cool down a perfectly logical question will be raised on the appropriateness and importance of such Tudjman's statements and reactions they provoke.

Namely, according to those familiar with Tudjman's policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as with the basic contents of the majority of comments about these statements, it can be concluded that there was no reason for any, let alone such, surprise at Tudjman's statements since, basically, what he said was nothing new, nothing that he had not already said, but rather something that he constantly wanted and tried to achieve through his political followers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The "strategic importance" of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats for the fate of his global policy vis-a-vis B&H was never a question. Tudjman never tried to either hide or deny it and that always had a decisive influence on the relations between the two states, even after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, especially on the relations between the federal partners - Bosniacs and Croats, i.e. two national parties: the SDA and the HDZ.

Tudjman's dream about a "third entity" was not always just a dream. It is enough to remember not so recent past when the Croatian "Herzeg Bosnia" was still in existence and perfectly functioned with all the elements of a true state order although it was always a typical para-statal formation. However, no matter how legal and legitimate, the non-existent or totally helpless "real" state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was never able to oppose it efficiently until its abolishment in Dayton by the will and order of the international community and with the establishment of the B&H Federation.

And even after Dayton, the B&H Federation had "functioned" for a long time on the basis of the actually existing "entity" aspirations of Bosniacs and Croats. That is why some strong elements of Herzeg-Bosnia as an entity are still alive or have left such deep traces in individual parts that they represent a serious obstacle to the definite establishment of a stable Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, turning a blind eye to the fact that without Tudjman, and even more so with him, the advocates of the "third entity" are still very present and strong in B&H and that Tudjman had said nothing new or surprising would be an act of political blindness and, moreover, totally irresponsible. He only tried once more what he had always wanted and tried even before.

If he is right when he claims that "there can be no Bosnia without Croats", the second part of Tudjman's statement is totally out of any reasonable and acceptable context. He does not recognize the B&H Federation as a framework of equitable life and work of Croats in B&H, but once more advocates territorial division of B&H and ethnic homogenization of the Croatian people within it, with the ultimate aim of annexing it to Croatia. If, according to him, the "survival of Croats in B&H is strategically important for the strategic interests of the Croatian state in view of the form of the Croatian border", on account of which he is advocating the establishment of a third (Croatian) entity in B&H, then it is quite certain that he has overlooked and even denied the "strategic interest" of Croats in B&H and that they should be the ones to say what they really want when their interests and fate are in question.

As I have said, the reactions to this Tudjman's statement were numerous and mostly quite negative. They reveal rather unusual facts - e.g. even Biljana Plavsic said that "such ideas and irresponsible statements can further deteriorate the already precarious situation in B&H, especially regarding the relations between the Bosniac and Croatian side within the B&H Federation". Is she said so, it doesn't have to mean that that was what she had in mind, and especially that her motives for such a reaction were identical to those of the SDA or SDP B&H or some other parties within the B&H Federation and even in the Republic of Srpska. But, observed from that angle, it could be said that Tudjman's statement almost had a mobilizing effect so that even incompatible elements which are, as a rule, mutually irreconcilably opposed, have joined forces against him.

In other words, it is not surprising that Tudjman's statement met with strong opposition of local political factors. Perhaps some were truly disturbed (again) and even irritated by this statement. But, the United States and representatives of the international community soon brought down the political ball and cooled the hotheads with their statement that the revision of Dayton, as well as "third entity" are out of the question. Several days later, Tudjman's "third entity" balloon went down like a lead. Still, the reasons and true consequences of his statement have yet to be analysed soberly.

If we leave aside for a moment the hypocritical character of his aspirations towards territorial division and ethnic homogenization of B&H, which is essentially a drastic denial of and opposition to the Dayton Peace Accords, it can only be concluded that right (were) are those analysts who have interpreted Tudjman's statement just as his pre-electoral propaganda wisecrack actually aimed at homogenizing his electorate, but this time in a situation which, according to all relevant political analysts, is heralding the defeat of Tudjman's politics and his overpowering HDZ at the coming elections in Croatia.

In other words, this time the revival of the Croatian Republic of "Herzeg Bosnia" in a form of a third, Croatian entity in B&H was, most probably, intended more for local Croatian pre-election purposes and less for "strategic interests" of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that sense, one should take seriously the statement of the former longtime US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraight, that "we are living at the times of the downfall of Tudjman's rule". His comment that "Tudjman's politics has brought the greatest harm to the Bosnian Croats. Tudjman's politics is threatening to eradicate the Croats -Catholics from B&H where they have lived for centuries" is worth mentioning.

From this point of view, it is less important what Tudjman and his extremist "Croatian" followers in B&H think and want. Since the fate of B&H and their own within that B&H is truly in question, the most important thing is what the Bosnian Croats want and think. It is clear from the reactions to Tudjman's statement on the "third entity" that it was not received with much enthusiasm even by the HDZ B&H leadership. Its leaders merely pointed out that the "establishment of the third entity is not something that should be proclaimed for a dogma" adding that "the HDZ B&H resolutely rejects any stands that do not allow a democratic discussion and democratic solutions in that context". But, it has been clear for some time that the HDZ B&H is no longer such hard core advocate of Tudjman's policy in B&H, although its extreme wing is still strong. No less important is the fact that HDZ B&H is no longer a sacrosanct "leader" of the Croatian people in B&H.

Apart from its Bosniac Franciscans (the centuries long honourable guardians of Bosnia), the Croatian people in B&H now have more realistic, more tolerant, pro-Bosniac oriented political and national groups and political leaders

• the New Croatian Initiative, the Croatian National Alliance (which consists of the Croatian Peasants' Party and the Croatian National Community) and others. It is crucially important for them to have predominant influence on the Croatian population in B&H so that the life in Bosnia, together with other nations, would definitely become their "strategic interest" and B&H their true and only homeland. There is no doubt that such awareness will develop according to the manner and pace of the disintegration of Tudjman's policy and regime in Croatia. But, the Croats in B&H must be aware that their destiny within B&H does not depend on Tudjman and that they are the masters of their own destiny.

That is why Tudjman's latest statement should not under any circumstances be underestimated, at least as a warning that forces wishing to divide B&H are still strong. But, it should not be overestimated either. Probably right are those who, having in mind Peter Galbraight's claim, think that this was yet another pre-election political "firecracker" intended to homogenize the local (in Croatia) electoral clients, but also an attempt at restoring the lost rating of Tudjman's "Bosnian policy" among the Croats in B&H. However, the Croats in B&H will be the ones to decide what will be their "strategic interest" in Bosnia and Herzegovina in both near and distant future. Depending on its stand vis-a-vis the latest Tudjman's "entity" and other political ideas, HDZ B&H will be put to the hardest trial. Luckily, apart from HDZ B&H, the Croats in B&H already have much wider choice of political orientations so that it would be logical for the HDZ B&H to see its destiny more in B&H than in Croatia.

Slavko SANTIC

(AIM, Sarajevo)