Kosovo Seized by Lawlessness and Crime

AIM Pristina, 19 October, 1999

Developments in Kosovo are characterised by contradictory trends. Search for normalisation which is so badly desired is still in its initial phase. A large number of problems still need to be solved or more precisely put on the tracks which lead to normalisation. There are so many of them which are mutually interconnected that only a parallel solution is possible. It is confirmed every day that certain partial approaches are doomed to fail. This does not mean that it is easy to find good solutions. On the contrary. The search for them is difficult, especially because of contradictions in the approach and opposed objectives of the internal and the external parties which are directly involved in the solution of the issue of Kosovo. It is self-understood that the most significant ones are of political nature.

Disposition of various parties concerning the status of Kosovo is well known. A part of ethnic Albanian political forces inspired by the idea of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is still ready to take risks in order to achieve independence of Kosovo. This is practically the aspiration of the entire ethnic Albanian population. The Serb party is resolutely opposed to Kosovar independence. It desires the return to the previous legal status which is generally formulated as "Kosovo within the framework of Serbia and Yugoslavia". However, it is aware that return to the previous situation is not possible, so it is ready to make a significant compromise within the Serbian and Yugoslav framework. The stand of the international community is defined by the UN Security Council Resolution according to which Kosovo remains under sovereignty of Yugoslavia, but with its own democratic institutions. Under certain conditions, negotiations will be held which will define the final status. The daily rhetoric of foreign diplomats speaks of Kosovo inside Serbia or Yugoslavia. This is not the same thing, but it is difficult to assess whether such terminology is intended to convey certain political messages or whether it is the result of inertia which identifies Serbia with Yugoslavia.

Many things are paralysed due to these cincumstances. There is a lack of laws and therefore UNMIK courts cannot operate, and it is impossible to pass them because there is no institution which would legally and politically competently do it. The legal vacuum is not profound, though, because UNMIK is legally entrusted to execute temporarily full power. However, the ground is not so clear in political respect. The Serbs accept only Serbian laws, and the Albanians are demanding a completely new legal system. One solution is the previous status, the other creation of an utterly different status. The international community is not inclined to either one or the other, and it would prefer to do something in between. Essential issues are at stake, and partial solutions just petrify the situation which in the conditions of Kosovo does not mean simple stagnation but are a regression with extremely dangerous consequences. Without resolving the question of ownership, preserved parts of Kosovar economy cannot be set in motion. Furthermore, without establishing its real possibilities, it is difficult to determine whether plans for reconstruction are founded.

Existential problems have not been outlined and defined yet. These problems are still treated within limits of humanitarian aid due to which most of discontent caused by them is unjustifiably directed towards humanitarian organisations. However, it will not be possible to keep discontent in that direction for long. People are fighting for jobs, agreeing even to work for some time without pay. It is easy to imagine that this cannot last long. UNMIK is pursuing a very awkward economic policy which can have very negative reflections on its authority. UNMIK has established firm control of big systems and facilities, and it has let previous management boards and workers banished ten years ago by Serbian authorities control the minor ones. It offers support to the former just to the extent which enables them to survive, and the latter are left to shift around for themselves.

From the economic standpoint, Kosovo is almost in a complete blockade. There is no money for investments, there is no free and normal circulation of money, there are no stimulative measures. All connections with previous partners were interrupted, some of the routes for transportation of goods were closed. In similar conditions not even a more powerful economy would be able to make a major breakthrough without support of state agencies. Difficulties that will be brought by the forthcoming winter will be included among direct results of the war. However, it should be expected that in spring understanding for such pretexts will melt along with the snow. Existential issues will impose a more resolute search of explanation for numerous failures in the control of Kosovo or for unfulfilled financial promises.

Individual and collective behavior of people will depend on the development in this sector, as well as the political angle of vision. One should not doubt that it will all be based on the past and the experience in relations between the Serbs and ethnic Albanians. There will also be the pre-election atmosphere that should be taken into consideration. The elections disturb the customary rhythm of ordinary life even in democratic countries. In the Balkans, elections are connected with numerous, even dangerous risks. According to the initial monstrous accusations in the press, it can already be concluded that the struggle for power between two main ethnic Albanian political groups will be merciless.

Other questions which burden the existing situation do not promise progress either, some of them even threaten with further complications. There is no improvement in relations between the Serbs and the Albanians. If the region of Mitrovica is taken as an indicator, serious challenges should be expected. Politicians re trying to create the impression that the security situation is improving. They claim that there is less violence, murders, incidents and crime in general. This can be considered to be true to a certain extent. But this is just a superficial view of things. Reduction of these forms of crime is not the result of activities of the agencies in charge of order as much as it is the result of narrowing of the space for some forms of crime. There are no more apartments, houses, shops and other property to be usurped. Everything has already been seized or legal owners have returned. Massive stealing of cars, especially in Pristina has remained.

In view of the war and its consequences, all the possible motives and the level of development of the administration, one can hardly speak with certainty of tendencies and results of the struggle against crime in Kosovo. It is difficult to speak with certainty of the possibility of disappearance of politically motivated individual and collective ethnically determined crime. It is equally hard to forecast the possible development of individual and collective classic crime which is thanks to the situation skilfully veiled by the difficult political situation. Although everything here is put in the political context of ethnic relations among the Serbs and the Albanians, the other forms of crime which are the result of ordinary human stupidity, weaknesses, imprudence ... and similar, should not be disregarded either.

Foreign and local politicians in Kosovo, as well as significant segments of the economy and connoisseurs of the circumstances express great fear because of less obvious forms of crime. This is the organised crime, a mafia-type symbiosis of classical and economic crime and political sloppiness and irresponsibility. It is assessed that apart from Albania, this form of crime is acquiring the possibility of establishing contact with foreign centres of crime among other thanks to the foreign presence in Kosovo. There is no evidence of it because everything is happening here according to the rules of chaotic order. Apart from the laws, there are no authorities in charge of keeping order and prevention of crime, nor the judiciary.

AIM Pristina

Fehim Rexhepi