Demilitarisation and Transformation of KLA

AIM Pristin, 20 September, 1999

The three-month period given to the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimatare e Kosoves - KLA) to demilitarise and transform has expired. The deadline was 19 September, but chief of KLA Main Staff, general Agim Ceku, declared a few days ago that KLA would meet the requirements from the agreement three days before this time limit. After the talks of Bernard Kouchner in New York, the visit of NATO commander- in-chief general Clark to Kosovo and numeorus contacts of KLA commander Hashim Thaci, an agreement was reached about completion of the process of demilitarisation.

From the very beginning the process was more complicated than presented to the public. Apart from the so-called technical aspect which could be brought down to surrendering arms and the transition from the phase of demilitarisation to the phase of transformation, its implementation was under almost daily political and diplomatic pressure. This pressure was mostly motivated by far-reaching objectives such as the future status of Kosovo and interests of the world powers concerning the ultimate configuration of this part of the Balkan. In this context KLA was constantly used and abused for corroborating or promoting certain assessments of the developments inside Kosovo, although it is only one of its elements.

The agreement reached in June is known as the document on demilitarisation and transformation of KLA. However, according to the course of its implementation so far and after collecting of about 10 thousand pieces of various arms and gathering of all KLA units in 49 places in Kosovo selected for that purpose, it is evident that the three-month period of demilitarisation has been completed and that the uncertain process of transformation of units which belonged to KLA has just begun. Pessimists might say that KLA and its political supporters have taken the bait. They believe that in the legal and the political sense conditions are created for those abroad and a part of the Albanian politicians in Kosovo who have always been opposed to KLA to take decisive steps for final elimination of everything that could remind of its heritage. At the same time, a final blow would be stricken against its political leadership which was sometimes presented in negative colours as a threat to future democracy and almost the only cause of straining of the situation in Kosovo.

Despite possible attempts and pressure to end the history of KLA in this way, it is not probable that the world would persist in it at all costs. Risks are high and, all things considered, for the time being, the process will not be directed towards complete elimination, but not as men from KLA wish for either - it will not become a regular army in near future which they link for the temporary international rule in Kosovo. The units which will be successors of KLA will, it seems, consist of selected men according to the system of individual applications. The procedure and the criteria for selection are not known yet. The job will be done by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). A day after submission of arms, it will begin receiving applications from those who are already registered by its relevant service. It is estimated that so far about 10,700 candidates have been registered. It was made public that the process of establishment and further constitution of these units was a joint venture of KFOR, UNIMK and KLA, and that IOM would put suitable candidates on the list according to criteria prescribed by KFOR and UNIMK. Selection will be made by seven field officers of IOM.

Everybody says that the successor of KLA will be called the Kosovo Corps. The possibility for KLA to become an army is eliminated in the ideas and proposals of transformation, but it is accepted that its successor be organised and operate according to the rules which are very close to those which refer to military structures. The Corps would have its uniforms and insignia and precisely determined tasks and framework of operation. Its task which is mentioned in all combinations is urgent interventions in cases of natural and social catastrophes. It is also underlined that the Corps would operate solely in accordance with operational rules of KFOR, that is, by orders of commander of KFOR and head of international civilian authorities (UNIMK). The Corps will also have direct connections with KFOR, among other, because KFOR will train its members in specially constructed training grounds. It is claimed that through its liaison officers the Corps will be constantly in contact with NATO and the mission of the United Nations.

The Kosovo Corps will have its commanding staff with a chief and his deputy, and heads of special services. In different ideas and proposals, special units are mentioned for urgent interventions, construction, transportation, health, communications, environment protection, removal of mines... However, in all the ideas and statements of foreigners it is explicitly stated that the Corps will be a civilian non-military organisation. It is underlined that Kosovo does not need an army and that KFOR is in charge of protection of Kosovo from danger both from within and from without. It is also explicitly stated that Kosovo Corps will not be permitted to act in protection and implementation of law nor will it control traffic.

Its troops will not be armed except in cases of physical protection, in other words, in cases when they will act as guards. In statements of top NATO officers and certain diplomats it was mentioned several times that units of Kosovo Corps would not be able to carry out urgent interventions without helicopters. It is said that only about 200 members of the corps who will guard facilities of the Corps deployed in six zones of Kosovo will be permitted to carry small arms. Probably in accordance with certain previous agreements about it, temporary governemnt of Kosovo determined the size and centres of future zones by a special decree.

According to the estimates of Albanian military experts, a compound of about 10 thousand active members of the guards and five thousand reservists would be sufficient for the needs of defence of Kosovo. However, it seems that the Albanian party which negotiated about these issues, demanded that the Corps have another five thousand active members and the same number of reservists. Foreign sources say that the Kosovo Corps could have eight thousand active members and two thousand reservists. It is estimated that in this way one third of the members of KLA would be included and all its commanding officers. It is estimated that a significant part will be integrated into police forces of Kosovo, and several hundred will join programs of non-governmental international organisations as experts for removing mines. For about 300 members of KLA scholarships have been provided for continuation of school, a large number of them have been demobilised, and some of them will try their luck in politics.

AIM Pristina

Fehim Rexhepi