Differences Prevent Stabilisation of Kosovo

AIM Prishtina, 7 September, 1999

"We work together in order to do a joint good deed". This is approximately the latest slogan of OUN special envoy in Kosovo Bernard Koucher in his approach to resolving the problem of Kosovo. Kouchner seems to have successfully passed the first test of his invitation to general cooperation in the talks with lawyers in Kosovo on new legislature. But expectations are much higher, interests of interested parties quite uncoordinated, and even contradictory, and matters do not depend on Kouchner alone. That is why it is very difficult to forecast possible developments. Nevertheless, in view of the situation which imposes taking certain measures without delay especially in the field of security, perhaps the order of moves that lie ahead and their practical effect might soon be made public.

The first practical need is to solve the problem of protection of minorities, especially of the Serbs and the Romanies as the most threatened ethnic groups. All things considered, urgency of measures means that the idea on cantonisation presented at the latest session of Kouchner's Transitional Council of Kosovo will finally have to be given up. After this session, Kouchner announced introduction of a new system of protection of the Serbs and other non-Albanian population. He did not explain its nature, but the conviction of the declaration in which it was announced leaves the impression that the measures had been prepared and that they were awaiting only the decision on practical implementation. Nothing has leaked into public yet, but based on previous measures it can be assumed that the new system of protection of non-Albanians will consist of intensified, maybe round-the-clock presence of members of KFOR and international police in places where they live at the moment or where threatened ethnic communities should return. This might mean that something that resembles safety zones or regions could be established or even publicly proclaimed. Since due to ethnic composition, that is, due to the fact that the endangered ethnic groups are scattered, these regions could not be big in the sense of territory, indeed it could mean that in villages, parts of towns, even at entrances of apartment buildings and other similar places, a special system of control of movement of people would have to be introduced. A special system of supply and handling of goods would also have to be established. It is not clear yet how the population would be supplied with necessary food and other necessities: as humanitarian aid or by organising, conditionally speaking, convoys accompanied by KFOR for going shopping or anywhere else where people feel a need to go.

The problem of security is obviously a much broader one. Everybody knows and feels that. That is why in consideration of these and all the other measures of protection the question which inevitably arises is the question of the essence of safety of people: do the measures improve the ambience in general so that people would feel safer? After everything that has happened in Kosovo, one should not expect quick results. But, what should be taken into consideration is whether and to what extent they, just as a form of pure physical protection without certain other necessary accompanying measures and activities, contribute to the achievement of assumptions for creation of a desirable ambience for all. One of the most significant assumptions in this sense are coordinated activities of all interested and involved parties in the crisis of Kosovo. The slogan: we work together which is the best way for resolving problems is impracticable without at least a minimum cooperation of several factors in the achievement of joint objectives. For instance, international diplomacy, or rather policies of great powers which have assumed and bare the biggest part of responsibility for the situation in Kosovo would have to be coordinated.

It is primarily necesssary that all the segments of international organisations which are directly involved in the establishment and in the implementation of the system of international rule in Kosovo act in coordination with each other. It is unnecessary to stress how closely interdependent these two levels are, or rather directly mutually conditioned. A careful observer cannot miss that inside the one and the other there are not just differences but even quite the opposite stands about the approach to solving current problems. Not even the question of the final status of Kosovo has been raised yet. It should be noted, though, that differences among international civilian structures are not that prominent. But this is what it looks like on the surface. Beneath it, the differences are probably much bigger and are close to those which are evident in diplomatic and other activities of the great powers.

It is not less significant what the relations among ethnic Albanian political blocks are like at the moment. If there will be no harmony among them, they, first, lose in significance as partners or parties engaged in development and reconstruction, and second, they decrease the efficiency of action of international organisations in Kosovo. If there is no cooperation among Albanian political forces, UNMIK and its structures will be forced to work on their own, or with only one of the Albanian political blocks, which does not contribute to the necessary all-Albanian relaxation which is one of the main preconditions of pacification in general. Blinded by their quarrels and intolerance mixed with primitive struggle for power in the background of which are not only differences concerning the ways to the achievement of the final goal, but also about what the final goal could actually be, the Albanian political forces are not aware of the significance of mutual cooperaton even about the minimum objecives. In the current situation this could be a partnership with UNMIK and the international community for resolving the burning issues of Kosovo.

One gets the impression that UNMIK and the other international organisations present in Kosovo are united in their interest, as publicly said, for a union of all Albanian political forces. If one bears in mind how sensitive ethnic Albanian organisations are to influences coming from abroad, by just slightly increased pressure they would almost certainly agree to cooperation and temporarily give up on calculations with votes, false patriotism, blackmail and demagogical mutual accusations. The international community, that is, its diplomacy is not united in it either. With considerable caution but clearly enough for anybody who is trying to understand politics this was manifested during their recent visit by heads of German and French diplomacy, Joschka Fischer and Hubert Vedrine. They appeared as if they had come to reprimand or criticise Thaci and support Rugova. European support to Rugova that the French blaze the trail in makes the impression that the election campaign in Kosovo is in full swing. However, it is more likely that Europe is preparing the ground for future negotiations on the status of Kosovo, or rather a compromise which it is assumed it would be easier to reach with Rugova than with Thaci. Increasing presentation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in negative light probably partly serves for that purpose, too.

AIM Prishtina

Fehim Rexhepi