A political panorama of Albania

ALBANIA: TRISTESSE POST FESTUM

AIM TIRANA, JULY 29, 1999

The return home of nearly half a million Kosovars sheltered in Albania created a vacuum, not only in the refugees empty camps, but also in country's political scene. After an armistice forced by the crisis in Kosovo, Albanian policy is resuming its normal agenda and its own inner conflicts. Meanwhile in the country¾' streets are returning the scenes of crimes, while newspapers pages are crammed with corruption stories.

The uncertainty is coming back in the country, despite some police forces spectacular actions, that managed to arrest at Rinas airport one of the Sicilian Mafia leaders sheltered in Albania for a long time, or expelling from the country two Islamic extremists, related with Ossama Bin Landem, suspicious of preparing an attack against the US Embassy in Tirana. Albanian citizens, as they feel happy of the news of the detention of international perpetrators, they feel miserable of hearing that their country is converted in criminals sanctuary. And no one knows if they are the last or not.

The temporary political d÷tente due to the crisis in Kosovo has shifted in favor of the conflicts inside the main political forces; country's weird stability, that managed to cope with a flux of refugees equal to 15 percent of its population, is substituted with a new phase of instability; while the optimism climate caused by the deployment of NATO troops in Kosovo is gradually fading away in favour of a new era of pessimism.

The prolonged Albanian crisis remains first of all the crisis of its political class and its political scene. Sons of the Cold War, Albanian politicians continue to remain more linked with the past of the poorest Balkan country, then with its future. The pluralism conceived as a political conflict and not as a political dialogue has made the Albanian transition along and tedious one.

The two big dinosaurs of "placa de torreros" are still the ruling Socialist Party and opposition Democratic Party, which besides the conflicts with one another, are engaged in inner conflicts that can bring about unexpected changes in the political scene.

The ruling Socialists are probably experiencing the gravest crisis since they resurfaced in the political scene eight years ago. The deserved decorations for coping with the refugee crisis seem not to be enough to provide the support of a public, who is manifesting growing signs of dissatisfaction and dessilusion.

The government of the 31-year-old Majko has the merit of easing somehow the relationships with the opposition headed by former President Berisha, but they have neither managed to restore the public order nor curb the galloping corruption.

Majko, who currently is the number one among the Socialists, has to maneuver between Schilla and Caribdes. On one side he finds himself attacked by the opposition, headed by Berisha, while on the other side by former Prime Minister and former party leader, Nano.

Nano, who resigned from the party's leader post, late January, has initiated campaign of rallies aiming at regaining the leadership of the party in the upcoming Congress in October. Nano's campaign and its critics towards the Premier Majko and deputy Prime Minister Meta have greatly aggravated the relations among various groupings within the socialists. The upcoming congress may turn to be the splitting point for socialists, who during the last eight years has managed to avoid the serious rupture and has demonstrated an unusual tolerance for an Albanian party.

Once closed allies, now Nano and Majko are fighting to secure support within the party and also of the massive parliamentarian group, made up of 101 members. Nano is still playing anti-Berisha carte and has accused Majko of flirting with Berisha by meeting him on December last year.

If in the upcoming Congress Nano wins, this can bring about the end of Majko's cabinet. If Majko wins there are chances that Nano can split off and set up a new political force. In both cases the ruling socialists are threatened with the split up, which can pave the way for early elections.

Even if it is difficult to forecast, who has more support among the rank and file members, it is obvious that Majko has two advantages. First he enjoys the undisputed support of the international community and second, he is more accepted by the opposition, a factor which can't be ignored in a country exhausted by political conflicts.

It seems that Nano is based mainly on anti-Berisha electorate, which can't be considered as insignificant. But he is short of support from abroad and especially he is not popular in Kosovo. Nano is considered as responsible for the country's booming corruption, more than the new governing body.

Besides the problems within the party and the constant offensive of the opposition, Majko should take into account the serious ruptures within the governmental coalition. The Democratic Alliance, which rallies the liberals disengaged by the Democratic Party, has demanded the reshuffling of the cabinet. The same appeals come from the Human Rights Union, a party of Greek minority. Social Democrats seem to be more closely with the socialists, but their relations with other small "brothers" as liberals and minoritars are heated up.

In fact the breaking up of the governmental coalition wouldn't cause parliamentarian crisis, because the socialists has a clear majority, but this would also be another element of tension in the country's uncertain political climate. It seems that the rebels within the coalition more than the current governance have started to think for the forthcoming elections, hoping to win more votes being outside than inside the governmental cabinet.

In the opposition camp, Berisha has given up the prolonged parliamentarian boycott by returning to the Parliament after a year of absence. The US interim ambassador in Tirana Frowick has managed to alter the stubborn mind of the opposition leader, in exchange that the US government should sent experts to investigate the assassination of the popular opposition former leader, Azem Hajdari, last September, an assassination which is still under the shadow. Berisha himself doesn't have the Parliamentarian immunity after the decision of parliament to investigate his role, in what the government considered as "coup d'eta on September 14, 1998", but he has refused to answer the questions put forth by the prosecutors.

While Berisha remains a bitter enemy of ex-Premier Nano, he makes use of a moderated vocabulary for his predecessor, Majko. Berisha and Majko meet for the first time in December, in a move, which had an impact in the de-tension of country's political situation. Berisha has supported Government's policy towards Kosovo, especially on the refugee issue. But he distances from Majko regarding his stand towards Kosovar political factors. Berisha for a long time sustained Rugova and Bukoshi's government in exile, while Majko fostered close ties with KLA and Thaci's government.

Berisha and Rugova meet in Krans Montana. Later on, the delay of Rugova's visit to Kosova, made Berisha to withdraw from the energetic support, he had given the Kosovar leader. Some days ago in two-hour speech in the National Council of his party, focused on Kosovo's issues, Berisha never mentioned Rugova's name, while he never was short on praising KLA.

At the beginning of autumn the democrats also will hold their usual Congress. A group within the leadership of the party, headed by its former chairman Tritan Shehu, since a long time has strongly criticized Berisha on the Parliamentarian boycott and on the suffocating of democratic norms within the party ranks. Former Premier Alkesander Meksi has joined these critics whom is now set aside and engaged in his private business activities.

Different from before, when any critic towards the tough leader was accompanied with the removal from the party ranks, Berisha this time has tolerated critics towards him, at least up to the Congress. He rules the party with an iron fist and there are little chances for the moderated fraction headed by Shehu to come out victorious.

In the recent speeches the political vocabulary of Berisha is moderated. While in July 1998 he appealed on the citizen "for civil disobedience towards the state", in July 1999 he called on the citizens "to respect their state".

Albanian press has augmented the speculations of what is considered as the recycling of Berisha, or on its possibility to grab the power again. It is obvious that the ex-President has a personal constant support of about 20-25 percent, but it is also clear that may be the same or more people object him personally. It is know that in certain foreign political circles, Berisha is considered as a strong man that can reestablished law and order, but it also known that in some western chancelleries he is regarded as the main culprit for country's plunging into anarchy after the collapse of bogus investment schemes. Meantime his democratic credentials are still considered suspicious.

Probably the most critical point of Albanian fragile democracy for the moment is that no one knows "who is next". In a country where public opinion polls are missing, this becomes more difficult. Public's dissatisfaction against the two major political forces is known, but a third force is lacking. So Albanians will continue to chose the less bad thing, between the two bad things.

In some diplomatic circles in Tirana it is always being talked about the necessity of a "Great Coalition"of Socialist and Democratic Parties to stabilize the country and set up circumstances for its integration in regional projects of the Stability Pact. It seems that under the international pressure and not due to their free will the socialists and democrats should say "yes".

REMZI LANI