Whose is the Croatian Army

AIM Zagreb, 7 June, 1999

As parliamentary elections in Croatia are approaching, the question which is increasingly repeated is whether the Croat Democratic Comunity (HDZ) whose defeat is believed to be an accomplished fact, will peacefully give up power and what role will the army and the police play if that happens? It is no secret, as defence minister Pavao Miljavac admitted, that a large number of officers of the Croatian Army are active members of HDZ. Although according to the defence law, "all political activities, foundation of parties, holding political gatherings and manifestations" are forbidden, it is clear to everybody that without the membership in HDZ it is impossible to be promoted or survive in the Croatian Army, and high ranking officers in uniforms were often a decoration at HDZ gatherings, some are even deputies in the Croatian state assembly. The Croatian Army has been systematically cleansed of non-HDZ elements and nowadays it is quite certainly the army of a single party. And the fact that the supreme commander is at the same time president of HDZ makes indoctrination of armed forces by ideology of the ruling party very easy. Of course, similar is the case with the police which was persistently cleansed of "strange elements".

For these reasons, every statement especially when it comes from Franjo Tudjman is carefully analysed, the one given on 28 May, the Day of the Armed Forces, inclusive. This is the date when in 1991, the corps of national guardsmen lined up at the Zagreb football club stadium. Tudjman is however proposing that the Day of the Armed Forces from now on be celebrated on 5 August, in memory of liberation of Knin, and that 28 May be just the day of ground forces. But this proposal did not cause so much attention as some other things he said. For example, Croatian president claimed that the Croatian Army must defend the state from those who wish a different Croatia. "We are", said Tudjman, "a Central European country and we will not allow others to decide about our destiny and that is why we need a powerful armed force and awareness of the Croat pople, because if we preserve social, political and economic stability, nobody can impose their will on us". Tudjman then clearly established who the real enemies were, because according to his judgement there are 10, 15 maybe even 20 per cent of the people who have never accepted the independent democratic state. We are in favour of rationalisation, but it is important that the HV remain the power which the state leadership can rely on.

Such talk, but especially that about protection of the regime and 20 per cent of the enemies rightfully launched the rumour about a military coup or refusal to recognise election results. Such doubts were intensified by numerous interventions of special police against workers on strike or football fans, and Croatia belongs among countries with numerous armed forces. According to the new peacetime organisation, there should be 62,450 members of armed forces, 38,450 of whom would be professional soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers, and 24 thousand soldiers doing regular military service. There should also be 9500 civilian employees who do not make up the figure of the armed forces. What the exact number is of soldiers doing military service in the armed forces is not known, although in the beginning of the year it was stated that there are 66 per cent of the planned number in the army. In December last year ministry of defence gave OSCE the datum of 61,506 men, but in fact it is believed that there are more than 65 thousand of them.

Another 33,916 employees of the ministry of internal affairs should be added to this figure, out of which 10,916 are working on non-police jobs. This brings one to the total of about 90 thousand men. According to the relative force, that is the number of soldiers in relation to the number of inhabitants, the Croatian Army is the second in Europe (Greece has 1.59 and Croatia 1.36 per cent in its armed forces). According to European standards countries which have a "surplus" of soldiers are Bulgaria (1.22), Yugoslavia before the war with NATO (1.08) and Turkey (1.02). Members of NATO and countries in transition invited to become its members have a much smaller number of soldiers in relation to their population. For example, Poland has 0.62, Czech Republic 0,57, Hungary 0.43, Slovenia 0.47... It turns out that Croatia has more policemen (about 0.54 per cent) per cepita than some countries have soldiers.

This year Croatia will spend the total of 12 billion kunas on defence, which is equal to two billion dollars or 10 per cent of the gross state product, that can be measured only with Russia or Israel. From the state budget, the army will get 18.7 per cent, that is, every citizen will allocate 313 dollars for it, which is twice more than the world average. But, although Croatia is distinguished by exceptionally high percentage of money spent on the army the manner in which this money is spent is extremely inadequate: 93.6 per cent of it is spent on maintenance - salaries, food, spare parts, fuel and similar, and just 6 per cent on new equipment.

Minister of defence Miljavac believes that this situation will have to change just as Croatia must reduce the number of professional soldiers from the present five to three guards' brigades. The minister announces that rationalisation will be completed in about three years' time, but he also forecasts a new conception. "Having learnt from the experience of the homeland war and our defence strategy, we have reached the conclusion that for us the best form of organization is military territorial partition". With his statement that Croatia is not a regional power, the minister contradicts his supreme commander and explains this by the fact that "our strategy is defensive and in its main starting points it does not consider anybody an enemy. We rely on the first strategic formation - professional brigades of guardsmen and the second strategic formation - reserve units. Our main task is to defeat the enemy as close to the Croatian border as possible".

Asked about fear of extra-institutional actions of the army, Miljevac answers: "Some rumours are intentionally launched in public which is often used and transferred to the political scene and then it has undesirable consequences. I stress that this armed force formed of the army and the police has created and defended this state, and democratic processes and control of the army are so complex and mechanisms are so safe that such abuse is almost impossible". But the catch lies in that "almost". The truth is just the opposite and shows that there is almost no democratic control over the Croatian army. Who controls it and how and whose favourite toy it is was shown by the war in B&H when nobody had made the decision on waging war on the territory of another state although only the assembly is competent for it. The Croatian Army is a state within the state, and some persons in it have become so arrogant and powerful that they smuggled cars into the neighbouring B&H through the army, which the former head of military police has been taken to court for.

The assembly cannot even get an insight into the data how the military budget is spent and how much of that enormous amount of money flows into the so-called Herceg Bosna and aid to the Croat Defence Council (HVO). And all that is possible because Tudjman's presidential power in the sphere of defence is much broader than in other spheres. Being the supreme commander, he has constitutional and legal authority to command independently the armed forces on all levels, to nominate commanders and officers and promote them. At the same time, Tudjman is not responsible to the government and in fact can do whatever he pleases. And this means that he alone will command the army even in case HDZ loses power.

Only on Tudjman and a few of his powerful cronies will it depend how the army will act in case of change of power, but it is assumed that fear of a military coup is exaggerated. Croatia is too close to "real" Europe for anything like that to be allowed, and consequences for Croatia would be catastrophic. Therefore, regardless of how much he might dislike it, the supreme commander will have to adapt and cooperate with the new government and assembly which is the only one that can limit him in his current unlimited power.

GOJKO MARINKOVIC