Revival of Political Life in Serbia

Who Will Join Whom

Is the split of the coalition of the Radicals and the Left in sight because the former refused to accept the peace plan? What is the role of SPO in the new political combinations? What are Panic and Djindjic offering? In any case, in the devastated country, exhausted by the war and afraid of the imminent poverty, political strggle in the future will be fought between those who have already started shouting "there is no alternative for peace and sovereignty" and those who claim that after this war we lose what little could have been saved without it.

AIM Podgorica, 5 June, 1999

(By AIM correspondent from Belgrade)

Majority of journalists who followed the special session of the Assembly of Serbia last Thursday when the "document for achievment of peace" was adopted, immediately after the end of this session hurried to Zemun to the seat of the Serb Radical Party (SRS). There, Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Radicals who had just about half an hour prior to that, at the session of the parliament held behind closed doors voted against the peace plan for Kosovo, was having a press conference. Among the journalists who were hurrying to Zemun, it was mentioned that Seselj might state at this press conference that the Radicals, as a sign of discontent because of "the extremely unfavourable agreement with the international community", would be leaving the coalition government in which they sit together with the Socialists (SPS) and the Yugoslav United Leftists (JUL). To the direct question whether the Radicals were leaving the government - to about seventy domestic and foreign journalists Seselj answered: "We certainly will not wait in the gorvernment for the possible entrance into Kosovo and Metohija of troops from the aggressor countries, primarily the American troops".

That same evening, in the central daily news program of state television (RTS) at 19.30 which due to the lack of transmitters is carried by all local television stations, Seselj's press conference where much had been said, was passed over in silence. For example, the broad public simply did not know that the Radicals were against withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo; that they think that no NATO troops should be deployed in the southern Serbian province, especially that "the possibility of NATO commanding the UN forces is completely out of the question"; that temporary administration in Kosmet "must not replace our state authorities", and that is exactly what was accepted by the peace agreement; that it was "unbearable for our army to serve foreign forces in removing mine fields or participate in any similar activities in the service of NATO".

Instead of Seselj, that same evening Vuk Draskovic appeared on the screens of RTS. First there was a picture of him sitting at the session of the Assembly of Serbia in the front row where he had never sat - close to the president of Serbia Milan Milutinovic and between prime minister Mirko Marjanovic and Ljubisa Ristic from JUL. A little later, the report from Draskovic's press conference, exceptionally correctly prepared, was carried in the fifth or sixth minute of TV daily news, which Vuk has almost never managed to accomplish before. Contrary to the Radicals, deputies of Draskovic' Serb Revival Movement (SPO) all voted in favour of the peace plan in the Assembly of Serbia and appealed for reconciliation with the world. But, it was impossible to hear on RTS the part of the conference in which Draskovic answered to the question of a foreign journalist about what the people in Serbia would say when they realized that this peace plan was very similar to the one from Rambouillet, and that because of more or less the same thing they had suffered for more than two months from bombing and had victims. Draskovic aswered: "They must seriously reconsider what has happened in the past, but now it is most important to accomplish peace and I am sure that the Serb people will celebrate the arrival of peace".

To someone uninformed, and there are many of them in Belgrade (especially among foreign journalists), everything that was happening last Thursday in the Serbian parliament could have seemed quite strange and illogical at first sight. The whole opposition supported the peace plan backed by Serbian government. The party (SRS) which is in that government was against. The small (so far mostly) pacifist Coalition for Voivodina of Dragan Veselinov was also against the offered peace solution for Kosovo and demanded that capitulation be declared. Finally, in favour of the peace agreement and arrival of quite robust foreign (primarily NATO) troops, voted first and foremost the party (Socialist Party of Serbia -SPS) which more than a year ago initiated the people's referendum in which it was resolutely said "no" to any form of foreign presence in Kosovo. All this does seem slightly crazy and illogical but only to those who are not from here, but it in fact belongs in the category of "normal abnormalities" seen many times before in Serbian political life.

The night before the session according to some testimonies was quite tumultous. President of FRY Slobodan Milosevic summoned all the leaders of parliamentary parties, informed them about the plan brought to Belgrade an hour before by EU envoy Marti Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Victor Chernomyrdin, and asked them to accept it. The following morning Seselj claimed that he had talked with Milosevic for 2.5 hours during the night between Wednesday and Thursday and that in the end he had said to the president of FRY that "the plan should not be accepted". On the other hand, Draskovic claims that during that same night he had agreed with Milosevic on almost all points. The well-informed say that both declarations are quite correct. They say that Milosevic allegedly tried to persuade the leader of the Radicals to show somewhat more understanding for the severity of the moment the state was in and not to vote against the peace proposal at the assembly session. The Radicals were asked, if they would not vote in favour, at least to abstain, but not to vote against the proposal. In this way it would be possible to make the impression on the public that political unity expressed during the war was not significantly jeopardised at the moment when peace was approaching. Persuasion of Seselj turned out to have been unsuccessful, so the next day it was impossible to hide the crack that appeared in the government of national unity.

If he should remain consistent to what he said just half an hour after the Assembly of Serbia had approved the peace plan for Kosovo, Seselj could very soon leave the government of national unity. When he was entering this government, the leader of the Radicals forecast that this government could last: "This government", said Seselj at the time, "has primarily been formed to defend Kosovo. There are certain ideological differences among us, but we agree fully when Kosovo is concerned. Milosevic cannot sign anything that the Radicals themselves would not be able to accept".

Some analysts claimed that this government would last and Milosevic and Seselj would cling to each other until the Kosovo ulcer perforated. It seems that that moment is near and that this time the Socialists have crossed the threshold of the Radicals' tolerance and chose to make concessions to the international community which are contrary to the logic of the Radicals' nationalism. Should this coalition break up, new political shuffling of cards in Serbia will be inevitable. At first sight, the closest to the possibility to replace Seselj and prolong the life of the government is Vuk Draskovic who for quite some time has had the status of a "stable reserve player". SPO and Draskovic himself who have invested the most into the end of the war, might decide to use the old Radicals' tactics applied in 1992 in the Serbian parliament. At the time, the Radicals kept the feeble government of the Socialists alive by voting for their proposals and stands without having formally entered into a coalition. Something similar might happen now, if the existing red-and-black coalition should split up. Negotiations and haggling still lie ahead, and it is not quite certain that Milosevic will let Seselj go just like that. Although many believe that the Radicals have "done their bit", a number of Socialists consider Draskovic a "straw man" and fear that at the next curve he might fail them. At the same time, just a day after they had voted against the offered peace plan in the Assembly, the Radicals indirectly hinted that they would not be in too much of a hurry to leave the government. One of the Radicals' leaders claimed at a gathering inside Serbia on that same day that SRS would do nothing that could increase tensions in Serbia.

Tensions will, however, increase now that Serbia has started towards peace. From the seat of the Democratic Party it was hinted that their president Zoran Djindjic would not return to Belgrade from Montenegro soon. Djindjic was suumoned to court due to failure to respond to call-up, which may bring him the sentence of up to a few years in prison. In the past few days, his political opponents say with a pinch of malice that when Belgrade is concerned, Djindjic's political career is over anyway and the only thing he might be able to do is to make room for himself in the government of Milo Djukanovic. Former prime minister Milan Panic issued a statement in Budapest that he was "willing to head a transitional government of Yugoslavia if Milosevic resigns". Majority of other oppositionist politicians demand that new elections on all levels should be considered soon.

Judging by the first reactions, political life in Serbia is gradually coming back to life. In the devastated country exhaused by the war and in fear of imminent poverty, political struggle will in the future be fought between those who have already started to shout that "there is no alternative to peace and sovereignty" and those who claim that after this war we are losing what may have been saved without it; between those who claim that Serbia has won and those who speak of capitulation.

Spomenka Lazic