TIRANA: WAIT, BUT ECXEPT NOTHING FROM MILOSEVIC

AIM TIRANA, JUNE 8, 1999

The approval by the Serb Parliament of the principles of the G8 for the solution of the Kosova crisis was met with little enthusiasm and much caution in Albania. The Albanians, ranging from simple people to top politicians, are inclined to distrust the promises that come from Belgrade, whereas in the refugees camps and the UCK circles scepticism is even more manifest.

The Kosova refugees interviewed by Tirana TV channels after the conclusion of the Ahtisaari-Cernomyrdin mission were quick to declare that it was hard to believe that peace would be established by shaking hands with Milosevic. The Tirana political class was unanimous in this stand. Both the representatives of the Government and those of the opposition expressed themselves in the same manner about the compromise achieved by the Ahtisaari-Cernomyrdin mission, with the media being even more outspoken in questioning the results of the mission.

However, some nuances and shades of opinion were soon apparent in the stataments of Albanian high officials after the vote taken by the Serb Parliament on the principles of the G8. Whereas President Meidani spoke of a ¾positive step forward¾, Premier Majko was more reserved, considering Milosevic¾s acceptance of the requests of the international community only ¾the beginning of the end of the conflict¾. Foreign Minister Milo was even more sceptical, declaring that one should wait for the materialisation of the Belgrade promises. For its part, the opposition led by former President Berisha spoke of ¾a difficult start on the road to peace¾.

This cool reaction came after two months of armed conflict in Kosova, which for the Albanian North was expressed in real war, in war of nerves and in biblical streams of refugees. Since the start of the NATO bombing of Serbia on March 24 , Albania has received about 500,000 refugees and hundreds of artillery shells from Yugoslavia. This undeclared war between the two countries, which started in the end of April with the break of diplomatic relations, has put the Albanian State in the first ranks of a conflict which affects the major strategic interests of Albania in the region.

Tirana was right from the beginning open to military co- operation with NATO in the war operations against Yugoslavia, nor did it conceal its satisfaction over its rapprochement with the Alliance. This line of unreserved co-operation, which was not affected by the country¾s exposure to armed clashes on its Northern border or by NATO bombs falling by accident on Albanian territory, has placed Albania among those countries which, rather than a negotiated peace, call for the complete capitulation of Yugoslavia and its nationalist leader.

This simple Albanian logic is based on reasons that transcend the rationale of the air strikes on Serbia. The reserved and wary reaction of Albanian diplomacy to the diplomatic success of the international mediators contains a good dose of the traditional distrust that has existed for centuries between Albanians and Serbs and that now, in the conditions of a bloody conflict, is more profound than ever.

The Albanian politicians are well aware that one must negotiate twice with Milosevic: first to achieve an agreement and then to see to its implementation. This sad experience has made that there is more of scepticism than hope in crisis-ridden Albania. On the other hand, considering what has occurred at the decisive moments of their national history, Albanians are deeply suspicious of what the diplomatic circles are up to.

Tirana sees with suspicion some points of the agreement. The Albanian press has pointed out the elusiveness and unclearness of the concept of ¾substantial autonomy¾ included in the document. ¾Substantial for whom?¾ the journal Koha Jone asks. ¾For the Albanians or for the Serbs? What is substantial for Albanians is not substantial for Serbs and vice-versa¾.

Albanians also see with deep suspicion the role and weight of Russia in the future international force that will be deployed in Kosova. They consider the organisation of this force in the way it was done in Bosnia reasonable and realistic. However, if Russian troops are to be deployed in a particular area of Kosova, in its northern part, for example, as is being talked about, then it is highly probable that the refugees will not go back to their homes, just as there exists the fear lest steps be taken toward the partition of Kosova, which is unacceptable to the Albanians.

On the other hand, the disarmament of the UCK, regardless of the few comments made about it, is considered something that is too early to talk about. ¾There is no point in talking about the disarmament of the UCK at this stage, as long as crimes continue to be committed in Kosova and the Serb troops have not yet pulled out¾, the spokesman for the Thaci Government Jakup Krasniqi said.

Actually, the Albanians see this plan rather a way out from the conflict than a triumph of the Alliance or a capitulation of Milosevic. It may be that Albanians¾ misgivings originate also from the fact that they are not part to the Kumanova talks.

However, regardless of the existing doubts, there is the not unimportant fact that the official stand of Albania goes towards the acceptance, not the rejection of a compromise with Milosevic, although people in Tirana know full well that the Belgrade dictator is indicted for crimes against humanity and that it would be immoral to sign a peace agreement with the man.

Nevertheless, for the pragmatically-minded Albanians now all that the Western allies, the Americans in the first place, say and do is moral and reasonable. Although they expressed themselves for the continuation of air strikes until the Serb troops pull out of Kosova, although they were pessimistic about the implementation of all the points of the agreement, the Albanians of all political trends did not come out openly against a compromise with Belgrade. They took great care to do nothing that might be interpreted as opposition to the Western proposals and, this time too, refrained from immoderate reactions which might put in jeopardy Albania¾s position toward this crisis and its eventual developments.

This the more true now that the European Union, the United States and the main financial institutions declare themselves ready to compensate the Balkan countries for the losses incurred in the war and promise to launch what is considered a second Marshall Plan. Agreeing, be it with some hesitation, to the establishment of a peace achieved with the votes of Milosevic¾s deputies, the Albanians hope to obtain something more than the status promised at Rambouillet for Kosova and, in the case the process fails, are ready to accept NATO land troops for the battle that will lead to the unconditional capitulation of Milosevic.

The interruption of the talks between the NATO and Yugoslav representatives at the Kumanova airport, goes more toward the implementation of the latter variant, which Tirana considers more favourable, as it is expected to lead to the complete destruction of Milosevic¾s regime. This negative conclusion of the rapid Russo-Finn peace process would prove true Tirana¾s doubts about an eventual compromise with Milosevic and would definitively make his positions untenable.

Those extreme calculations are characteristic of the Albanian policy, which is fed up and radicalised by two and a half months of a seemingly endless conflict. The Tirana political circles think that, now that Kosova has been empitied of most of its Albanian population, the war should continue to the bitter end. The Albanians think that they have paid what was left for them to pay through the ethnic cleansing of their people. Now it is the turn of those responsible for this tragedy to pay.

¾The interruption of the talks between the representatives of the NATO and the Yugoslav Army has not come to us as a surprise¾, the spokesman of the Albanian Foreign Ministry said after the news of the interruption of the Kumanova talks. ¾A new Nuremberg, not a new Dayton, is what is needed for Milosevic¾, Albanian Premier Majko said. A phrase which does not need much comment.

ARBEN KOLA, AIM