Macedonia and the War in Kosovo

Ground Intervention from Macedonian Angle

AIM Skopje, 2 June, 1999

The main topic in Macedonia for almost a month now are speculations whether and when NATO will invade FR Yugoslavia. There is almost no serious military analyst, army officer or journalist who did not tackle the question of the land invasion. Moreover, this topic is the subject of everyday tittle-tattle in cafes. There is plenty of reason for this. Macedonia is the country which is just twenty odd kilometres away from the battlefield, and opening of a ground "front" would mean its involvement in the war.

In the past few days, oil was added on the fire by information that the Alliance was planning to increase the number of soldiers in Macedonia from 16 to 30 thousand, and to bring the total contingent of the troops in the region up to between 45 and 50 thousand. This piece of news was received in Macedoinia as a definite proof that a ground invasion is just a matter of days. Fear perhaps should not be a surprise because the Macedonians have been watching for eight years the war winds approaching their land, from Slovenia, across Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. But, although average citizens watch things from the aspect of fear of the war, majority of generals and war analysts claim that there are no realistic preconditions for ground invasion and that there are more "cons" than "pros". They stress several reasons for this.

The first is that the western public is not ready to face its own victims. Second, that the West is not sure how the Russians will react. Third, that such a denouement would be condemned by the Western public and that this would mark the end of the unity of NATO. And finally, that the ground intervention would mean an introduction into a regional war. Retired general Todor Atanasovski, who is a member of the Security Council of Macedonia, declared that he believed that there would be no ground intervention. But, he also said that from theoretical point of view Macedonia was the only geo-strategic point which could be used for entrance into Kosovo. Retired general Mitre Arsovski shares this opinion; he said for a local television station that an intervention from the ground was not possible. If statements of western politicians are closely analysed, who would not even use the term "ground invasion" but speak only of "peace forces", it seems that the two generals are right. Secretary General of NATO Javier Solana repeated a few times that the new forces were peace forces, but added that "all options were opened". Head of the Foreign Office of Great Britain, country which seems to be in favour of an intervention from the ground had the identical stand, but the main "player" in NATO strikes, president of the USA Bill Clinton appears to be against such a denouement. Other members of NATO, having taken into account the recently published public opinion poll conducted by a Dutch agency, are mostly against a ground invasion.

At this moment, should NATO decide to make this step, different possibilities are interesting. An experienced planner of the former Yugoslav People's Army who wished to remain anonymous says that Macedonia is the most convenient for a possible invasion of Kosovo from land. He rejects Albania as a possibility because of inadequacy of the ground and lack of roads which would enable quick entrance into Kosovo for NATO soldiers. There is another thing that spoils such a plan, and this is that Yugoslav forces are concentrated in that region in order to prevent raids of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Analysts say that there are four passes from Macedonia into Kosovo. The first is Blace near Skopje, the second Jazince near Tetovo, then there is Banjani and finally the broad plain near Kumanovo which leads to Serbia and not directly to Kosovo. The first three passes are very dangerous routes, says the planner of the former JNA. First, because they are narrow canyons, as if meant for traps. Yugoslav army, NATO sources and intelligence circles of the Macedonian Army say, watches these points and the land is mined. This would mean that NATO would suffer great losses. The fourth entrance is convenient - NATO could enter through it in a broad "front" with mechanised infantry and tank units.

All analysts agree that if NATO decides to enter Kosovo it has to do it within a fortnight. Prolongation of the drama would give time for the international public to recover from shock, and for the reserve forces of the Yugoslav Army to be called-up and concentrated. And what is most important it would give time to Russia. It is expected that at first it would react sharply but by politrical means, but in the long run, it is uncertain what it would do. It is known that tank units and motorised infantry can proceed 50 to 100 kilometres a day, depending on the resistance and the ground. When one knows that in Kosovo and in Serbia almost all the roads and bridges have been destroyed, that the resistance would be powerful and that NATO troops would run into mine fields which destroy tanks, only the first possibility can be taken into account, which means that a minimum of five or six days would be needed for taking Pristina. It must be kept in mind that the tank units of the Army of Yugoslavia have the total of two thousand tanks. It is believed that there are 350 tanks in Kosovo. But such an attack means bringing in logistic and supply units which, according to NATO standards, form 30 per cent of a combat group. In the guerilla warfare which would certainly be applied this would bring additional problems to NATO.

If it wanted ground intervention, NATO would have to apply classical tactics seen in Iraq, that is, a combination of air and ground battles. A modified but effective version of such warfare is "parched land". General Todor Atanasovski said that he had already recognised signs of such tactics in Kosovo. It implies an intense air campaign lasting up to ten days which is intended to wipe out everything that moves on the ground. Theoreticians say, in it everything is bombed and by all possible means. First heavy bombers come on the scene which fly high, then fighter planes intended for fighting the air-force, and then low-flying "heavy" and slow planes such as A-10 and Apache helicopters which are supposed to destroy tank units. Only after that in the scenario of "parched land" come the ground troops in a powerful brunt of tank and motorised units which need to penetrate as far as possible and ensure falling apart of defence and capitulation of the enemy.

One significant element is missing here - what would resistance of the Yugoslav Army and police forces be like? Just this week Nebojsa Pavkovic, commander of the third army of Yugoslavia declared that "NATO soldiers will see hell. We know the ground better, and by manoeuvring we avoided destruction of soldiers and equipment. Technical advantage of NATO will melt in just a few days." Such statements, military strategists believe, should not be taken seriously. They have two interpretations. Either the morale of the soldiers is in top form or it is an expression of weakness and a cry for keeping up preparedness. It is a fact that morale is on the side of Yugoslav soldiers, which in a prolonged war leads to defeat of their enemy. Vietnam proved this. In the possibility of a "successful blitz crieg " such as we have seen in Iraq or on Falkland Islands, morale is a completely irrelevant category.

War analysis are, however, just academic and hypothetical. It seems that after the latest diplomatic attempts, a light has appeared at the end of the tunnel of the Kosovo crisis. Macedonia is the country which would suffer the most severe "collateral" damage in case of a ground invasion. Such a denouement may result in a regional conflict with unpredictable consequences. The political scene of Macedonia has so far kept aloof from any such statements or steps which smell of ground invasion. NATO demanded deployment of another 14 thousand soldiers in Macedonia, but as head of Macedonian diplomacy said, conditions have been sent to the Alliance. One of them are guarantees that these troops, like the rest in this country, are not offensive. The answer from Brussels still has not arrived, but Macedonian public is convinced that neither the government, nor the parliament will allow counting on the possibility of a ground invasion. After all, nobody, not even ethnic Albanian government coalition partners, has mentioned ground intervention. The opposition Party of Democratic Prosperity did appeal a month ago on the international community to aid refugees if need be even by ground intervention, but hardly anybody in Macedonia believes that this was a relevant political signal that the door was opened for it.

AIM Skopje

VALENTIN NESOVSKI