Croatia as the Bulwark of NATO

AIM Zagreb, 16 May, 1999

Will Croatia become a heavily armed border guard of the West against the East, or some kind of a new NATO military bulwark? As known, there was a time when Franjo Tudjman ardently advocated this, believing that this was the most convenient, in fact the only way for Croatia to join the international community. But, after his Bosnian policy had finally failed in Dayton, he gave it up, but it seems that this idea has started to attract those who had so far been the most resolute in condemning it.

This can be concluded on the basis of diplomatic indicretion simultaneously published by New York Times and Corriere dela Sera that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was considering the possibility of deployment of tactical missiles "to the south of Dubrovnik". It is true that this was immediately denied by two Croatian ministries (of foreign affairs and defence), and not long after that by NATO commander for Europe, Wesley Clark (who chose the mentioned Italian newspaper for his denial). But, in the meantime, NATO spokesman Jamie Shea confirmed that actual initiatives in this direction actually existed, so that some of Croatian journalistic speculations have gained credibility, which say that it was a testing probe either for deployment of missiles or for a similar drawing Croatia into the offensive guard of NATO against Yugoslavia.

Indirectly this was also confirmed during the recent visit of Croatian defence minister Pavle Miljavec to Washington where he met his American colleague William Cohen. After the meeting neither of them mentioned any missiles, and judging by their statements, the meeting was limited solely to the question of American sale of arms to Croatia pursuant the recently lifted embargo, to cooperation of Zagreb with the Hague tribunal, etc. But, according to anonymous American military sources quoted by Zagreb Vecernji list, the new role of Croatia was also discussed "within the framework of preparations of forces for NATO ground operation, or for additional forces in connection with the current air campaign or aid to refugees".

This sounds quite convincing in the context of the increasingly evident American effort to draw Croatia into the entrance hall of this military association despite strong opposition of European members of NATO. In this context, some kind of a debut visit of Pavle Miljavec to the headquarters of NATO for Europe was especially significant, where he was brought personally by American ambassador in Zagreb William Montgomery. This was the award for the support Croatia had offered to NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, but it has become clear now, probably also an advance payment for new services Zagreb will be asked to render.

Therefore it is interesting to go back to the mentioned anonymous American military source, because according to him, types of services are very diversified, and some of them even very imaginative. Zagreb is expected, according to this source, to pass its experience "how to treat the Serbs" to the Americans (just as the Serbs were once expected to show how the Turks should be treated), because, just imagine, "Croatia knows Milosevic better than anybody else". With a little bit of imagination one could predict that Tudjman would be asked to give away the technique of negotiation by means of which he had persuaded Milosevic, although the latter was militarily more powerful, to sit down with him in Karadjordjevo in order to make an agreement about the proportions of the war which was approachiing.

In any case, Croatia is considered to be some kind of a regional re-seller of know-how about close neighbours, which, regardless of how ridiculous it may seem, raises the credibility of this story because it presents the Americans as businesslike people even in a matter such as this one. However, there are quite a few indications that Tudjman does not look upon arrangements such as this one with enthusiasm, partly as part of his old aversion to big states - which is the backbone of his political "philosophy", and partly because of regional agreements which have resolved all the issues Croatian head of the state is interested in (Kosovo Albanians do not belong among them, which explains the fact that so far he has not uttered a single syllable about their suffering, having expressed quite unwillingly support to NATO actions).

In the past few days, this suppressed discontent has erupted with all its might on the pages of the regime controlled Vjesnik which openly criticised the "initiative" for installing missiles around Dubrovnik, quite rightfully concluding that this was a sure way to have Russian or Chinese missiles installed on the Yugoslav side of the border. And this would lead Croatia into a position of a permanent state of war with Serbia, and probably with the whole East, and that is the reason why Vjesnik dramatically appeals on NATO not to do a disservice to pro-western policy of Zagreb. But there was no sign of any intention from the American party to respect caution coming from the Croatian side.

On the contrary, steps are taken to raise the morale of the small and indecisive ally, among other, in extremely bizzare ways, like in the case of ambassador Montgomery. Recently, he jumped with a parachute from a plane of Croatian air-force, properly dressed in a uniform, as if drilling for a rerun of the Vietnam war in which he had participated. This undertaking caused admiration with no doubt only of the Americans, while among other it could provoke only a mixture of mockery and bitter feeling that American policy in this space has entered its militant phase and that wisdom has withdrawn.

It is interesting that American manifestation of force has impressed only the Croatian opposition. It reproaches Tudjman for excessively passive support to NATO, obviously with the intention to re-direct sudden expressions of tenderness of Washington to Zagreb towards itself. As there have been speculations that the greatest opposition parties intend to run in the elections in the end of the year in an unformal coalition with the moderate faction of the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) which Pavao Miljavac belongs to, his visit to the United States can be interpreted as the first big foreign political project of the leaders of post-Tudjman's Croatia.

But, it should be said that Croatian opposition in its attitude to NATO has fallen below the level of Tudjman, and strategically it has become his equal. Either to him or to the opposition NATO is not important as an institution which is joined only after democratic institutions of control of the army are developed, but they need it only for collecting shortterm political points which are easily made because of the new geopolitical situation in the region. The worst thing is that NATO is acting the same way, although it has always bragged that it welcomes in its ranks only fine, democratic, and cultivated new members, but now it turned out that it will gladly welcome even the coarse belligerent brutes as long as that satisfies one of its momentary political, but especially its military interest.

MARINKO CULIC