UNCERTAIN RETURN TO RAMBOUILLET

AIM Tirana, 14 May 1999

Finding themselves under the pressure of a manifold crisis and especially of over 400 thousand Kosovar refugees who have come to Albania, the official authorities of Tirana seem to have expected a stronger position from the meeting of G8. The conclusions of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting of G8 about Kosovo were accepted with reserves from the Albanian Government.

But the music was different in Bonn. The game there was to make Russia join the table of Western allies, aiming at the final isolation of Milosevic and at the calming down of the Russian bear.

One cannot say that the politicians and the general opinion in Tirana do not understand the necessity of political and diplomatic efforts, but they have a tendency to doubt about the compromises and maneuvers, at a time when the crisis for the poorest country in Europe becomes more frightening each day.

Only 24 hours before the ministers of G8 reached a compromise about the crisis in Kosovo, a special aircraft with the Kosovar leader, Ibrahim Rugova on landed in Rome. After an intervention of the Italian Government supported by USA and Germany, Rugova managed to leave his prison-like villa in Prishtina to escape from the hell of war. This episode that happened only one day before the Meeting of Bonn took place, left the impression that the time came to replace bombs with the international diplomacy. Such a situation has traditionally been viewed with doubt in Albania, for as long as the Albanian State historically has not been able to influence decisions taken for its own citizens by the powerful diplomacies.

The reaction of Tirana officials did also show some kind of disappointment about this unexpected turn from the tough position they had seen at the end of April in the NATO Summit in Washington. The Albanian Foreign Minister, Milo, who participated in the meeting of foreign ministers of the Council of Europe in Budapest, took advantage of it to remind his colleagues that they should be careful with Milloschevic, because he never kept his promises.

Milo's words in a way expressed an indirect objection to the principles of G8, while the Premier in Tirana approved by protocol the initiative of Bonn. Nevertheless, a few hours later the Albanian authorities made it clear what they did not like in the list of proposals which would become a project-resolution for the UN Council of Security. Disarmament of KLA, unclear definition of Serbian troops' removal, the blurred formulation of the international security force were considered by the Albanian Government like more-than-enough concessions in exchange to Ivanov's participation in the allies' table.

In fact, the declaration of G8 arose other problems for the Tirana officials. Involved in efforts to put the radicals of KLA and the moderate people of Rugova at the same table, the Albanian Government views the request of disarming the Kosovo Liberation Army with skepticism. Never before had an international document, including Rambouillet agreement, asked so openly the Kosovar rebels to lay down arms. Moreover, the exclusive publicity about Rugova's presence in West, as well as his constant objective position towards Tirana officials is dimming Tirana's role among the Kosovar political groups.

Besides pessimism and perhaps nervousness in the official politics, the opposition camp seems to be involved in an open supporting position towards Rugova and Bukoshi, who are seen by the former President Berisha as direct opponents of KLA in Kosovo and of the leftist party in power in Tirana. According to a typical Albanian transforming mechanism, diplomatic movements of the big powers are also reflected in the internal political life of Albania and Kosovo, thus complicating the unification of political factors. Berisha's position towards G8 was more approving than that of the government coalition. Whereas KLA objected the package of G8, especially the part related to its disarmament.

The incident with the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the non-enthusiastic reaction of Milosevic seem to have postponed things. But now it is clear and it cannot be hidden that the official position of Tirana concurs only partly with the position of West. What Tirana has taken over to explain (as much as possible) to Americans, British and Germans is the simple reality that if an international force, with no strong military mandate supported by NATO, is installed in a territory not fully "cleaned" of the Serbian military and police forces, does not offer sufficient guarantee for the deportees to return to their houses. Moreover, instead of providing conditions for stability within Kosovo, it would generate other problems and risks within the countries directly affected by the humanitarian crisis, i.e. Albania and Macedonia.

On the other hand, the official Tirana does not seem ready to actually accept a quick and complete disarmament of KLA. The Kosovar military factor, i.e. KLA, is considered by Tirana as the most important element of the political game among Kosovo Albanians. Besides this, President Mejdani and the Foreign Minister, Milo, who in Washington were asked many questions about KLA and its aims, continue to strongly insist in front of their Western homologues to not let aside or ignore the Kosovar radicals.

The high officials from Tirana, who are nearer to KLA, were not enthusiastic when, by the end of April, they noticed that the NATO allies, especially Italians and French, were insistently trying to neutralize the superiority of KLA over the isolated and doubted Rugova, first by protecting the moderate leader for as long as he was in Kosovo and, later by promoting him, after he passed over the iron curtain of war.

>From this point of view, the declaration of G8 principles sets a new reality different from that of Rambouillet. For this reason, return to Rambouillet, or a little bit further, seems to not satisfy Albanians. In this massive tragedy, they are claiming an extension instead of a limitation of their rights defined by the Paris Agreement.

It is possible that the strategy to be used by the Albanian Government in reacting to the further diplomatic developments, will be attached to the efforts of Western powers up to the moment when their common compromise will not touch the emblem of Rambouillet and the five conditions put to Belgrade by NATO. Beyond this white line, Tirana considers that there is no more space left to tolerate that the future Kosovo will still be ruled, be it also only in writing, by the regime which drove one million people off their houses.

ARBEN KOLA (AIM)