Podgorica:Intentions of the Second Army

***Intentions of the Second Army in Montenegro

Nobody is Safe

Why is the Army Supreme Command promising recruits and its high officers that it will send them from one end to the other of the Yugoslav battlefield

AIM Podgorica, 23 April, 1999

Oil has been added to the flames of uncertainty and general insecurity in Montenegro by the recent statement of the Supreme Command of the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) in which it informed that it would "in order to achieve the best results, according to need, transfer units from one end to the other of the Yugoslav battlefield". The purpose of this decision which creates the possibility for the recruits from Montenegro - with or without their consent - to be sent to Kosovo, is not quite clear.

From the military standpoint, movements of military units of the Second Army on the territory of Montenegro is explained as the so-called operational masking, or simply put: hiding from NATO bombers. But, for sending units from Montenegro to Serbia and those from there over here - there is no logic in the military sense. According to what Predrag Bulatovic, federal defence minister, says, there is about 24 thousand soldiers and members of the reserve forces in Montenegro.

Could really a part of these twenty odd thousand Montenegrin troops be decisive for relation of forces in Kosovo? It is assessed that at the moment the Army of Yugoslavia has about 150 thousand soldiers over there and that Serbia could call up at least that many fresh ones. According to statements of official Belgrade, entrance of interventionist troops would be considered as a declaraton of war on FRY. Defence of the country, as often stressed by VJ, is performed on its whole territory, so the question is - who would defend Montenegro?

The support units of VJ from the territory of Montenegro could actually offer to the troops in Kosovo, judging by the available data, casts a shadow on purely military logic of the statement of the Supreme Command. There is no doubt that even army commands are well aware that resources of armament in Montenegro do not satisfy the needs of possible support to the troops in Kosovo. With about 60 tanks and damaged airfields, Montenegro is hardly capable of resisting possible ground invasion on its own territory.

Strategists and military experts deny the possibility of NATO troops trying to disembark in Montenegro, not only because the surrounding states are offering them a more accessible approach to Kosovo, but also because military resources in Montenegro are not provocative for them. This is corroborated by a recent appeal of French president Jacques Chirac to NATO forces - to reduce attacks against VJ in Montenegro to the least possible extent.

Political logic, contrary to the military, offers a more complex explanation. The use of VJ as an instrument for political purposes was prepared during the whole past decade systematically and precisely, always in accordance with the immediate needs of Milosevic's regime. And as the goals changed, one group of commanding officers was replaced by another, and "political acceptability" of individuals was measured by current demands of the regime. This reflected on political stands of a part of the officers, so that under pressure of discontent - because of their poor financial situation, lost social prestige and injustice which such use is accompanied by - the traditional unanimity in VJ started to weaken.

The army, however, did not become "multiparty", but discord spread in it concerning the manner and the goals in the name of which it is used. To what extent this could be unpleasant for Milosevic's regime was illustrated among other by the case of the head of General Staff, general Momcilo Perisic. After him, the head of the counterintelligence service Dimitrijevic was also discharged. And then a series of transfers of high officers of VJ followed.

And as the situation in Kosovo continues to be increasingly strained threatening with spreading of the conflict to neighbouring countries, the uneasiness because of "political unacceptability" is increasing. That is why "sending units from one end to the other" (for example, of undesirable officers to Kosovo) has so far been one of the seemingly legitimate ways for some commands to get rid of political opponents.

Is the statement of the Supreme Command a signal given to the obedient to square accounts with those who might "use their heads" in a critical moment? Political opponents in the ranks of the army makes secrecy of military operations impossible. Therefore, squaring accounts with them within the army would create conditions for a decisive battle until one of the opposed regimes on the territory of FRY wins its final victory.

Possible deployment of whole units of VJ from Montenegro "from one to the other end of the Yugoslav battlefield" in accordance with political affiliation would probably seriously disturb the relation of forces on Montenegrin political scene and the established "balance of fear". This would be an opportunity for more than declarative patriotism - perhaps a "spontaneous conflict", a "minor" collision.

That is why the announcement of the VJ General Staff can be interpreted as a move against civilian authorities in Montenegro, in conformity with the wish and will of Milosevic. The political leadership of Montenegro has officially never given rise to any doubts about its loyalty to Yugoslavia. Not even the known "working obligation", or the assembly resolution on preservation of civil peace are contrary to principles of defence of the country, nor its unity. But why have two thousand members of reserve forces been called up just in Cetinje - as they say - which is probably the highest percentage of all the cities in FRY?

It is difficult to dismiss the thought that the appeal for historical unity - "especially in combat units" - conceals Milosevic's interest. Because while the army appeals for unity, the military prosecutor in Montenegro is persistently demanding the arrest of Novak Kilibarda, deputy prime minister of Montenegrin government. His party colleague Dragan Soc has recently assessed this demand as a political decision aimed against the Montenegrin state.

It seems that the attitude towards the Montenegrin Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) is not at all more constructive. Montenegrin policemen are increasingly hindered or even prevented in conducting investigations, which is unnecessarily creating dangerous tensions and animosities towards them. As a solution, the possibility of putting MUP of Montenegro under the command of VJ is being offered. At a rally of the Socialist National Party in Podgorica held on 22 April, Momir Bulatovic expressed no doubts. "Montenegrin police will be put under the control of the Supreme Command - or it will cease to exist", federal prime minister exclaimed.

Montenegrin prime minister Filip Vujanovic reached the conclusion, however, that Bulatovic's statement was "an open call to civil war" and proof that "it is impossible to waver Bulatovic".

It is obvious, therefrom, that despite NATO strikes, Milosevic is not ready to give up on the attempt to discipline Montenegro. That is why the Supreme Command he controls, under the pretext of united defence, proclaims Montenegro its battlefield and ignores the official stand of Montenegrin authorities and interests of its citizens. According to a military statement, Montenegro is part of a united battlefield, "because an attack on Subotica is at the same time an attack on Ulcinj, Tivat, Budva, an attack on Niksic and Cetinje is an attack on Dimitrovgrad, Pirot, Zajecar and Bor". But it is striking that the campaigning tone of the statement is in perfect harmony with irrational wishes of groups of citizens who are among their neighbours or at rallies lamenting because Montenegro is not bombed with the same intensity as Serbia. "Shoot at us as well", this cheap logic says. And just one step further is "driving the people out of their minds" - the tested tactics applied in Bosnia and Kosovo.

That is how defence of FRY is increasingly acquiring the form of a tragic farce in which Montenegro might easily become another victim. After all, cannons of Montenegrin police at the Debeli brijeg border crossing are turned in the direction of Herceg Novi.

Goran VUJOVIC (AIM)