Awaiting Denouement in Kosovo

Between Global Developments and Local Wishes

AIM Sarajevo, 15 April, 1999

Bosnia & Herzegovina still does not have an official stand on developments in Kosovo, and in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The reason for this is very simple - joint institutions do not operate and even when they do, they are not capable of reaching any joint decision. Especially not a political decision, since attitudes of the three B&H oligarchies to all the developments in the region in the past ten years have been absolutely different - from that to the causes and the nature of the war in B&H, participation of Yugoslavia in Balkan developments, and therefrom to what is happening there now. Of course, the official answer to the question why there is still no official stand is that "representatives of Republika Srpska are not coming to work since they froze their mandates after publication of the arbitration decision on Brcko". Therefore, everything remains "along the lines of statements of individual officials" says spokesman of the foreign ministry Hajrudin Somun and adds that only the attitude towards refugees can be considered to be the joint stand of B&H - to receive them and try to ensure the most comfortable possible accommodation conditions. B&H is a signatory of the international convention on refugees, and in the end of last year, the Council of Ministers of B&H issued instructions for temporary reception and accommodation of refugees from the territory of FR Yugoslavia.

What are the statements of individual B&H authorities like? Representatives of Republika Srpska in central institutions are holding their posts on ice, but from positions ensured by these posts they are addressing letters to institutions of the international community openly demanding that bombing of FR Yugoslavia be discontinued. Such a stand in Republika Srpska is quite expected and almost understandable. But this is the state of affairs in B&H Federation: at a meeting of the council of the European Union, state foreign minister Jadranko Prlic, very surprisingly for official Sarajevo, presented the stand that "B&H has always advocated and still does the stand that Kosovo crisis could be solved only by negotiations with active participation of the international community", and added that "it would be exceptionally dangerous for peace and stability not only in this part of Europe, but also for the whole continent if Kosovo crisis should spread further in its military aspect". In view of Prlic's post this stand could be considered as the official stand, but almost simultaneously Bosniac member of B&H Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, in his interview for CNN, whole-heartedly supported NATO air-strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by saying that "NATO operations should continue in any case. Everything but victory would be very dangerous not only for Kosovo and the refugees, but also for B&H, the Balkan and even more broadly", he said and added that giving up on the operation before the final victory by NATO would "raise the question of credibility of NATO, and even raison-d-etre of NATO". For the same media, CNN, co-chairman of B&H Council of Ministers, Haris Silajdzic, who last year offered the territory of B&H as the base for strikes against FRY, expressed pleasure by saying: "Milosevic's regime killed 100 thousand people in the Republic of Croatia, in B&H 200 thousand and who knows how many in Kosovo". Whether because of ignorance, lack of information or "wishful thinking", Silajdzic distorted facts according to which, for example, the official authorities of the Republic of Croatia in counting victims in their showdown with Milosevic stopped at the figure of 16,000 victims! This fact did not prevent Silajdzic from claiming in local media that CNN "spoke nothing but the truth".

Where is the connection between FR Yugoslavia and B&H? The answer to this question is clearly given in the International Crises Group (ICG). Analyst James Lyon says that in case of a possible failure of NATO in FR Yugoslavia, "the influence of the international community in B&H would greatly weaken, the Office of the High Representative would lose its competence, nobody would have any respect for this institutions. RS would completely secede from B&H, and the same would be the case with the Croats - they would seek secession of "Herzeg Bosnia" and its annexation to Croatia. In this case, the Bosniacs would certaily demand that parts of territory which used to be populated by majority Bosniac population be returned to them". He also assessed: "The minimum NATO must do is resolve the crisis of Kosovo - ensure autonomy or independence for Kosovo under conditions from Rambouillet agreement or full independence. But if NATO fails to do it, NATO will be ruined as well as all the attemts for Kosovo. And NATO's success there would lead to additional stabilisation of the peace in B&H - certain retrograde forces in various ethnic and political groups would become aware and realise that NATO is powerful, resolute and serious when the Balkan is concerned".

This short analysis may be the key to the question of the absence of a united state stand of B&H concerning developments in the neighbourhood. The objective of the authorities of Republika Srpska from the beginning of the conflict in B&H is secession from B&H and annexation by FR Yugoslavia, and at this moment, assistance to "brethren across the Drina". Therefore, they are awaiting the denouement of the situation in Kosovo - if Kosovo gains independence, it will offer the authorities in RS an excuse to ask the same for themselves with the explanation that in the new organization and arrangements concerning borders in Europe, they too are entitled to their own borders.

Croats in B&H personified by the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) are silently waiting for their chance: if everything goes "well" and Kosovo is given independence, it will be an opportunity for annexation of Herzeg-Bosnia by Croatia, which they have never given up on. At the same time, in the Republic of Croatia, the official stand of which is the foundation for that of Bosnian HDZ, the attitude to developments in FR Yugoslavia is twofold - slight fear of the possibility of their own becoming a target because they too are guilty of the lack of cooperativeness in certain areas (the election law, attitude to media, relation to B&H itself) on the one hand, and slight hope that by being cooperative it is possible to come closer to the international community, and European and world associations. That is the reason why Prlic's statement in Luxembough was such as it was - "lukewarm", as a high Bosniac official said explaining that Argentina or Korea could have such an official stand on developments in FR Yugoslavia, but not B&H.

On the other hand, Izetbegovic's militarism in statements for CNN should not surprise anybody. He has never hidden his wish to have B&H surrounded by "democratic Croatia and weak Yugoslavia", and NATO strikes are the best possible opportunity for Yugoslavia to become as weak as it can possible be.

Therefore, twenty days since the beginning of NATO operation above the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, B&H still does not know what its interest or stand in this situation is. The only thing observers or analysts in B&H agree about at this moment is that B&H has never been further away from the Dayton peace accords than it is now - everybody is pulling and tugging in opposite directions trying to satisfy their individual interests and waiting for the most convenient moment to grab as much possible.

Along with fear for B&H and its future which might be changed by a solution for Kosovo, there is another fear - if Slobodan Milosevic should finally and officially be proclaimed a war criminal, is his signature on the Dayton peace agreement going to become invalid, automatically nullifying this document which is keeping B&H together? According to certain legal experts that is exactly the danger threatenng B&H, but as the president of one of B&H courts recently said: "The law is like an open book which anyone can interpret as one sees it and as it suits one". Knowing the situation in the past ten years, it is clear that the international community has invested too much in the Balkan or B&H or even the Dayton agreement to have it nullified just like that. Therefore, if a radical change of authorities does not occur in FR Yugoslavia, the most probable of all sounds the statement of the already quoted analysts who believes that the whole Balkan will be "arranged" by a great peace conference, like the 1878 Berlin conference.

Rubina CENGIC

AIM Sarajevo