HOW TO KEEP THE POWER

AIM ZAGREB, March 3, 1999

"The party we would hand over the power to would have to be a responsible one" stated recently Ivan Aralica, a writer and member of the highest Croatian state-party leadership, and thus created a veritable storm of reactions among the opposition. It interpreted this statement as the intention of Tudjman and his HDZ to bargain over the results of the pending parliamentary elections when they will decide whether to keep the power only after the results are known.

Probably because of the impression this provocative announcement has created, Aralica's second statement from the same interview went unnoticed. Namely, he said that he was not in the least disturbed by the several-months long boycott of Parliament by the opposition which has paralysed the lower Chamber of Representatives, but spared the upper District Chamber. This statement of Tudjman's favourite author (whom he has, it is believed, ordained into his "personal Krleza") shows that the ruling party is not only seriously considering the possibility of losing the elections for the District Chamber, but is preparing itself to survive that defeat.

Namely, in that case the District Chamber which now has only seeming authority, would most certainly be significantly strengthened and serve as the penultimate line of defence of HDZ power. As until now, the last and the strongest defence would be Tudjman himself who, with his wide authorities, surpasses and overshadows all other political protagonists in the country. These two lines of defence would be operational until the year 2001 when elections for the Chamber of District are scheduled, i.e. 2002 when presidential elections will be held. In other words, it all seems well planned in advance and safe for the ruling party, but, nevertheless, Aralica's statement on the possibility of handing over the power reveals that the ruling party is fearing the outcome of the forthcoming elections more than any previous elections.

There are many reasons for this, first of which is undoubtedly Tudjman's illness. As usual there are no official statements on the state of his health, but on the rare occasion he is seen in public he doesn't look so well, to say the least. In addition, whenever his health deteriorated his temper also changed and he would become grumbling and moody. This happened when Milan Vukovic, who is slavishly loyal to him, was sworn in as a new member of the Constitutional Court. Tudjman could not tolerate the fact that several judges of the Constitutional Court, who are known as his ardent followers, as well as the Justice Minister did not hold their hand at their heart when the national anthem was being played which he openly reproached them for (although this is a party tradition characteristic of HDZ and members of the Constitutional Court cannot belong to any party).

The second reason for the nervousness in the ruling party's ranks is drastic deterioration of the economic situation which, contrary to even the most sceptical forecasts, is accompanied by a decline of industrial production and even more drastic deterioration of social conditions. For the first time since Croatia won its independence workers are spontaneously organizing themselves in defence of "their factories" from greedy new-capitalists who are their nominal owners. The trade unions are also announcing large-scale spring protests while the prohibited opposition parties will join in for the first time.

The third reason is probably a drastic fall in the popularity of HDZ which has been registered in a number of pools, including even those commissioned by HDZ itself. The only difference between the HDZ's and other surveys is that according to the former HDZ still enjoys the support of the majority of the population (some 30 percent), while according to the latter it is close to losing or has already lost that support (below 20 percent). The recent local elections fit into this picture. HDZ was defeated utterly in Dubrovnik where the one of the largest corruption scandals in Croatia happened. It won some 30 percent of votes which was not enough for it to keep the power as the opposition formed a coalition and won much more.

This gives ground for the fourth strategic reason of insecurity which has crept into Tudjman's party. It is obvious that it is no longer able to rule on its own and that it needs coalition partners for the first time not only in order to destabilize the opposition or prove that it is no longer a party-movement, which spreads over the entire parliamentary scene like an umbrella. Now HDZ needs coalition partners because it simply cannot rule any other way. However, all attempts at finding a parliamentary party willing to cooperate have produced nothing more than the Croatian Party of the Right. Except in Parliament, that small radical party has been doing services for the HDZ elsewhere bidding for votes of Croats who are nostalgic for NDH (Independent State of Croatia) and at the same time shielding it whenever it is accused of doing that.

All other parliamentary parties not only refused to cooperate, but have joined forces into a rather loose, but stable group of the "six". What coalitions will these six form for the elections is still unknown, partly because this is a heterogeneous group which finds it hard to agree on anything and partly because it all depends on the kind of electoral law the HDZ will adopt. The ruling party is also in a dilemma what to do because it doesn't know what will be the next move of the competition and because it itself cannot agree what electoral tactics to apply.

This disagreement is not only of technical, but also of political nature as it seems that there is disagreement whether the electoral collision with the opposition should be heightened or perhaps some concessions made in order to win the opposition's favour in case it wins the elections. Obviously, in the background there is also a fight for positions in the party in the post-Tudjman era in which two factions have come to the surface. One whose interests are represented by Vladimir Seks, Vice-President of the HDZ and Parliament who is in favour of proportionate system which now doesn't suit the opposition although it was its ardent supporter. Namely, the proportionate system discourages election coalitions - and it is certain that at least one part of the six will form a coalition - and if it is applied as exclusively proportionate system it will truly overflow the Parliament with parties which according to some politicologists (eg. Mirjana Kasapovic), may be an introduction into a programmed anarchy which would turn into a premeditated coup d'etat.

The second electoral model is advocated by Tudjman's main adviser for legal and constitutional issues, Smiljko Sokol who has the powerful Ivica Pasalic behind him. Pasalic is known as the evil spirit of numerous corruption and intelligence affairs. However, maybe that is precisely why he is ready to accept such electoral solutions which will grant certain concessions to the opposition or, to put it more precisely, make it possible to conclude better deals with the opposition. That is why he is in favour of a combined electoral system. In other words, according to him one part of the elections should be organized according to the proportionate system and the other part, admittedly much smaller, according to majority system (in electoral units in which the opposition beat the HDZ candidates hollow at the last local and regional elections).

Naturally, none of these streams will win the upper hand if Tudjman doesn't decide so. And judging by all appearances he has not yet made up his mind, although at one moment Seks stated that his model had best prospects. Most probably Tudjman has not yet decided on the date of the elections (the last deadline is the end of this and the beginning of the next year, but there are rumours that it might happen even sooner). Moreover, the reshuffling of the Cabinet which he has announced already late last year was recently postponed. The same happened with the scheduled HDZ "small congress" which was postponed for four months. Obviously there are too many unknown elements which Tudjman did not have to reckon with until now, but he is for the first time in a situation when he truly doesn't know what to do next. On the other hand, for months now he has been fortifying certain state, para-statal and non-state institutions (among others including the Constitutional Court) turning them into fortresses which will be at his disposal if the going gets tough.

MARINKO CULIC