Police and Army in Kosovo

AIM Podgorica, 4 March, 1999

(By AIM correspondent from Pristina)

The ticking of the clock in Kosovo is not an ordinary count-down. It is a race between war and peace. A lot is still not clear, because there are strong arguments to be stated in favour of one or the other direction of developments. The possibility of a middleway, of something that would be a mixture of black and white, should not be eliminated, although there are, for the time being, very few of those who believe in such a possiblity. Kosovo experience and previous trends do not offer convincing arguments that a middleway is possible as a means to avoid the worst.

Ever since war broke out a year ago, never have serious preconditions been created for a possible turn. After several months of unsuccessful flying diplomacy, a spark of hope of a turn was aroused by the ceasefire agreed by Milosevic and Holbrooke in the middle of October last year in Belgrade. In relation to the previous situation it brought enormous improvements. First of all, it redced the number of victims and interrupted a quite imminent humanitarian catastrophe. But, from the first day there were indications that it would be short-lived. It was not known then and it is not known still what and whether Milosevic and Holbrooke have signed anything at all and whether they have agreed about any rules for implementation of the ceasefire in the field. Finally, it should be kept in mind that one of the conflicting parties, the armed movement of Kosovo Albanians, was not only left out of the process and was not even informed about it, but this was intentionally done.

The course of developments confirmed the assumptions that the ceasefire was in fact conceived as a temporary forcible freezing of the situation in order to create space for diplomacy. However, despite numerous announcements of quick and efficient action with short and fixed time limits, the situation in the field has remained unchanged. In such a situation it was just a question of time when the ceasefire would prove altogether a failure and when armed hostilities would continue, this time on a much larger scale. After a number of so-called incidents, numerous human victims, unconcealed concentration of forces and preparations of Serb troops for war which the other party was also getting ready for, of course, in the last few days of December, heavy armed conflicts occurred in the region of Podujevo. Under the pretext called "winter military drill", an increasing number of military and police reinforcements were brought and Kosovo was completely covered by a large network of military installations and troops. This time reinforcements were sent to parts of Kosovo which had not been directly affected by the war last year.

That is how the situation was created in which escalation of conflicts was inevitable. After Podujevo, conflicts between Mitrovica and Vucitrn and around the main road connecting Pristina and Prizren between Stimje and Suva Reka became an everyday event. Occasional several-day long or short conflicts occurred in western Kosovo as well, in the region between Decani and Djakovica, and between Djakovica and Prizren. This is the border zone with Albania. In the past few weeks, conflicts or tensions were registered along the border with Macedonia as well. Large-scale conflicts are currently going on in the region of Kacanik, almost by the border, and significant concentration of troops and taking positions are registered also in the region of Gnjilane, where a military drill recently took place and a part of the Serb population was mobilised. Mobilisation of the civilian population was observed by Albanian sources in other parts of Kosovo, as well. A few days ago for the first time the public was informed that UCK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës- Kosovo Liberation Army) has its command of operations near Karadaka whose task is to cover the region of Gnjilane.

It should be noted that concentration of forces, drills, tensions and conflicts along the border with Macedonia coincided with threats of the West and NATO and their efforts to bring new forces to Macedonia and this part of the Balkan. It seemed that concentration of Serbian, or Yugoslav troops and drills were primarily a demonstration of force intended to discourage the West. In this sense, along with the politicians, high Yugoslav army officers became very talkative. From the aspect of Kosovo it seems that relations with the West were skilfully used in order to bring new forces and strengthen the position in Kosovo. Observed in a broader context it can be concluded that new forces were actually brought to the region for both purposes.

After diplomacy had failed to use the relative ceasefire which had lasted for more than two months, the impression was that the ceasefire was in fact agreed just in order to give world powers some breathing space to think about possibilities and modes for resolving the crisis of Kosovo. It was confirmed that if they are not completely united, they are not capable of taking preventive action and that their engagement in crises is something that they were forced to do. In this specific case, we see this in their exaggerated use of heavy accusations with dubious foundation, in helter skelter organising of negotiations, in unrealistic demands and deadlines due to which they gain nothing but forced out promises and signatures on documents which lack the possibility to be implemented. This does not mean that it is not done with only the highest intentions, but there is also the concern that the cure might become worse than the illness. Of course, when these and similar critical remarks are addressed at the world powers or some of them, it should always be kept in mind that they are not directly responsible for the conflicts in which they do not participate and which they do not stimulate in any way. But, due to interwoven interests in the modern world, they cannot renounce responsibility for solving them.

The crisis of Kosovo is very complex and difficult. Historically it reaches a long time back into the past, and current interests and ambitions of the opposed parties completely exclude each other. In such situations, diplomats do not have an easy time. That is why most of them do not like history. However, focusing on the present or as they say on interruption of killing, regardless of how humane that may be, does not reach the roots of the problem which produce disturbances and conflicts again and again. In fact, this causes the greatest fears concerning the latest diplomatic endeavours on Kosovo. By its nature the drafted document from Rambouillet is a compromise, and a compromise can never satisfy both parties. By its public rhetoric which need not realistically reflect whether and to what extent the compromise is well balanced, it seems that the Serb party is less contented than the Albanian. However, readiness of the Albanian party to sign the drafted agreement on 15 March is not the expression of its lesser discontent.

If something unpredictable does not happen, the delegation of Kosovo Albanians will sign the drafted agreement from Rambouillet. This is understandable in view of the suffering they have endured and the impression that majority of the Albanians, despite the prevailing verbal discourse, do not wish to participate in the war or are not ready to invest everything that war requires. A large, maybe decisive role in creation of the atmosphere in contribution to the final acceptance of the agreement on 15 March is played by the Americans. There is persuasion and pressure in their statements, even serious threats. Pressured from all sides, it is almost impossible for the representatives of Kosovo Albanians to find any manoeuvring space except to put their signatures on what has been offered them.

The impression created by majority of Kosovo Albanian media is that of a widespread inclination towards acceptance of the agreement. Under the surface, there are different opinions, of course, but they seem to be carefully selected so as not to reach the public. In most of them, opinions in favour of signing prevail, but there are also numerous dilemmas and difficulties in implementation of the agreement as well as the need to engage everybody in their solution in order to enable Kosovo Albanians avoid having to do everything all over again from the beginning. Of course, there are those who consider the drafted agreement quite insufficient for the achievement of the ultimate Albanian cause and reject it. As far as it is possible to find out, Adem Demaqi is the only prominent figure who is appearing in public with such a stand. With its positive assessment of the developments in Rambouillet, the main staff of UCK is in the past few days expressing willingness to see the continuation of this process. Indirectly this implies readiness to sign the agreement in the name of UCK. However, it is still impossible to say that this stand expresses all existing opinions inside the heterogeneous structure of UCK. In this connection it is very interesting to note that so far the voice or the stand of the commander of UCK, Sylejman Selimi, has not been heard yet.

AIM Pristina

Fehim REXHEPI