Montenegro and the Army of Yugoslavia(VJ)

SOLO SINGING UNDER THE ORCHESTRA'S WATCHFUL EYE

AIM, PODGORICA, February 26, 1999

Since the possibility of armed conflict between the Yugoslav Army and NATO troops has been avoided, at least for the time being, it will remain a secret how had the Government of Montenegro really meant to prevent the use of Montenegrin territory in a possible clash with the forces of the international community.

The quoted formulation was used in a statement issued after the extraordinary session of the Montenegrin Government held a day before the expiry of the first deadline for the conclusion of the Serbian-Albanian negotiations in Rambouillet also pointing to the danger of a possible clash between the Yugoslav armed forces and the Montenegrin police. If such a danger was realistic, it was forestalled by the present outcome of the negotiations in a castle near Paris. However, the very possibility of confrontation between the federal army and the Montenegrin police deepened the distrust between the authorities in Podgorica and the Army of Yugoslavia.

Unable to influence decisions of the federal and Serbian authorities and aware of the danger of possible war conflict with the armed forces of the Western military alliance, already in mid last year the official Podgorica made it known that it would do everything that was in its power in order to protect Montenegro from devastation and death. In mid June 1998, against the will of Momir Bulatovic's Socialist National Party, the Montenegrin Parliament had adopted a Resolution which, among other things, put the Montenegrin state authorities under obligation to advocate a policy which would prevent a conflict with military forces of the international community and ensure the protection of the Montenegrin territory from possible conflict with the international military forces. It was this political enactment that the Montenegrin government invoked when such a conflict seemed more certain than ever. In addition, it invoked its "constitutional authority" to pursue both internal and foreign policy, as well as to preserve peace and security of its citizens.

Either at the time of the adoption of the Resolution or now, it was not an easy task to discern what were Montenegrin authorities capable of doing in keeping their promise. Since it was unrealistic to expect from the Command of the Yugoslav armed forces to carry out orders of the republican civilian authorities, it turned out that the promises of the Montenegrin Assembly and Government could be fulfilled only if the Army was somehow (by Montenegrin police action) prevented to act.

Consequently, if decisions of the Montenegrin authorities on the protection of the territory of the Republic from possible conflict with the armed forces of the international community were earnest, then any serious analysis should envisage a conflict between the police and the Army. However, none of the Montenegrin officials mentioned this possibility openly. The only exception was Dr.Novak Kilibarda, Montenegrin Deputy Prime Minister and President of the National Party. His statements made after the extraordinary session of the Government indicated that a possibility of police trying to physically prevent the VJ from using the Montenegrin territory in conflict with NATO, should not be ruled out.

That intentions of the Montenegrin authorities have been taken more seriously than ever before was evident not only from the reactions of the Montenegrin political parties close to Slobodan Milosevic's regime, but also from the reactions of the HQs of the Second Army of the VJ and the Navy. Creating a precedent, these two commands have publicly accused the Government of Montenegro of unconstitutional conduct and undermining of the defence capabilities of FR Yugoslavia. In their statement, the officers recalled the provisions of the Defence Law which explicitly deny the right of anyone "to sign capitulation of the country or any part thereof" or "to prevent citizens from fighting the enemy who has attacked the country" and stated their belief that the Army would enjoy the unreserved support of the citizens of Montenegro in executing its patriotic duty of defending the country.

Statements of military commands in Montenegro did not mention what would happen with those who would oppose the defence of the country, but that was easy to conclude; especially after the announcement made by the SNP Main Board, whose President is Momir Bulatovic, Federal Prime Minister and Pavle Bulatovic, Defence Minister, one of its leading figures. "Anyone who would try to prevent us from exercising our legitimate right to defend ourselves from foreign aggression would thereby side with the aggressor and would be treated accordingly", read the message from the session of the SNP Main Board after which two mentioned Bulatovics visited the HQ of the Second Army of the VJ, stationed in Podgorica.

Whether because it realized what was it getting itself into or that it was really a long shot, the Montenegrin Government withdrew after the statements of military commands were issued, explaining that it had only expressed its "political stand" on questions regarding the Kosovo negotiations. Finally, the Prime Minister Filip Vujanovic labelled these stories an "unnecessary misunderstanding", while Vukasin Maras, Minister of the Interior, rejected with indignation all speculations about a planned confrontation between the police and the Army by calling them "irresponsible statements" and "bestial stories". In his statement for TV Montenegro, the first policeman of the Republic reassured the citizens that "the relations between the VJ and the Montenegrin Ministry of the Interior guarantee the security and stability of Montenegro and also contribute to the security of FRY".

Consequently, it turned out that much dust was raised for nothing and there were no misunderstandings nor animosity. Naturally, this was just the usual attempt at improving the political situation and clouding the issue upon which the recent events have thrown additional light. And the issue is that Montenegro, i.e. its current pro-reform authorities, have neither formal nor actual powers to oppose the Belgrade regime all the way. Official Podgorica can refuse to recognize the current Federal Government and ignore its decisions, same as it can fume about the anti-constitutional behaviour of the Yugoslav President Milosevic, but the Belgrade regime is the one controlling the federal Army.

The importance of this became obvious recently. Metaphorically speaking, the Montenegrin political solo act is under the constant scrutiny of military buglers. The Podgorica authorities have no constitutional or legal authority over the Army, nor can they decide on war and peace on the territory of Montenegro. That falls within the competences of the federal authorities. It is entirely another matter that FRY is in a constitutional-legal chaos and that Montenegro, as one of the two members of the federation, is constantly being forced to accept the role of an obedient member instead of equitably participating in decision-making. The Army of Yugoslavia neither has the authority nor the right to rectify these things, but it is precisely this chaotic situation that puts it into a position of being not only the guardian of sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY, but also the protector of the usurper of power in a joint state. That is why the current Montenegrin authorities fear the Army, i.e. those commanding it.

The Montenegrin authorities have indirectly admitted that they fear the possible abuse of the Federal Army for political purposes when President Milosevic suddenly relieved General Momcilo Perisic from his duty of Chief of General-Staff. Allegedly, Perisic was the one who reassured the official Podgorica that VJ would not interfere in internal political showdown within Montenegro and the federal state. This high officer did not win this trust just by timely congratulations he had extended to Milo Djukanovic on his election for President of Montenegro, but according to rumours, by preventing the use of Army in toppling the legal Montenegrin authorities last January. Namely, both then and later, there were speculations about a plan for the distribution of arms from military warehouses in Podgorica to Momir Bulatovic's followers and on bringing tanks out into the streets. According to stories which were never officially either confirmed or denied, this scenario was obstructed by Chief of General-Staff, General Perisic, personally. Allegedly, he called the then Commander of the 2nd Army, Bozidar Babic, and ordered the closing of all barracks in Podgorica and thus prevented any interference of the Army in the resolution of the political crisis in Montenegro.

The mentioned version of events doesn't have to be completely true, but something else was quite obvious when it came to the relation of the federal Army towards the political crisis in Montenegro which developed after the Democratic Party of Socialists split into factions. This was particularly true on the eve of presidential elections in autumn 1997. At that time the Army conspicuously drew attention to its presence in Montenegro, which resulted in comments and accusations about its political involvement. The Montenegrin Helsinki Committee for Human Rights even accused VJ of exerting open pressure on the citizens of Montenegro.

The most recent reactions of the HQ of the Second Army and the Navy to the stands of the Montenegrin Government could be interpreted as a continuation of the political pressure of the Army on the authorities and citizens, in which emphasis was laid on the fact that under the Constitution the Army was authorized to do that. This, naturally, cannot be taken as a sure sign that the Army could be used against the Montenegrin authorities in the next dramatic stage of conflicts between Podgorica and Belgrade. However, it is a serious warning that, nevertheless, there is a limit to which the Army will tolerate the Montenegrin political solo. In other words, if the Montenegrin authorities showed serious intention of refusing to join Milosevic's patriotic choir even in case of armed conflict with NATO, they would face the fact that they would thereby draw Montenegro into a conflict with the federal Army and, consequently, into a civil war.

Dragoljub Vukovic (AIM)