Military Annex - Critical Point

AIM Podgorica, 23 February, 1999 (By correspondent from Pristina)

Even before departure to Rambouillet, it was clear for the Kosovo Albanian party that the most heated discussions will be about three or four key issues. The first is the question of the manner in which the temporary three-year situation would be ended. As far as it it was possible to find out, the latest (Sunday night) formulation of this stand in the drafted document avoided the word "referendum" which Kosovo Albanians had insisted on. An international conference on Kosovo and an (un)imperative consultation of the will of the population of Kosovo were proposed as a compromising solution. The second issue referred to the position and destiny of UCK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës - Kosovo Liberation Army) in the course of the three-year period and after that. This problem was included in the part of the drafted agreement dealing with military and security issues. As far as it is known, these issues were not even formally discussed in Rambouillet, probably because the stands of the Contact Group concerning them are fixed, that is, they are not liable to change.

Treåe pitanje su meðunarodne garancije, odnosno NATO trupe koje bi obezbeðivale sprovoðenje eventualnog dogovora. Po proceduri pregovora u Rambujeu moºe se zaključiti da granacije treba da se odrede posebnim sporazumom i na drugom mestu. Meðutim, faktički taj sporazum trebalo bi da bude deo i osnova dogovora u Rambujeu. Imajuåi u vidu iskustva u odnosima sa Beogradom, neke velike sile smatraju da bi dogovor u Rambujeu bio bezvredan papir bez uverljive vojne podrþke. Na tome insistiraju Amerikanci, a predstavnici Albanaca ne bi niþta potpisali bez takvih garancija. Za njih takva granacija mogu da budu samo NATO -ve snage u kojima åe biti prisutni i Amerikanci. ¼etvrto pitanje je status Kosova tokom privremenog stanja. Mada od velikog značaja, obzirom na privremenost, kod ovog pitanja predstavnici Albanaca mogli su da stvore sebi malo prostora za manevrisanje i kompromise. Nema informacija koliki je bio obim diplomatskog pogaðanja u ovoj oblasti.

The third issue refers to international guarantees - NATO troops which would ensure implementation of a possible agreement. According to the procedure of the negotiations in Rambouillet it can be concluded that guarantees should be determined by a special agreement and somewhere else. However, that agreement should be part and the foundation of the agreement in Rambouillet. Having in mind the experience in relations with Belgrade, some world powers believe that the agreement in Rambouillet would be a useless piece of paper without a convincing military support. The Americans insist on it, and representatives of Kosovo Albanians would not sign anything without such guarantees. Only NATO forces in which there would be American soldiers could be such such a guarantee for them. The fourth issue is the status of Kosovo during the transitional period. Although very significant, with this issue, in view of its impermanence, representatives of Kosovo Albanians could create some space for maneouvres and a compromise for themselves. There is no information to what extent this sphere is subject to diplomatic bargaining.

If, as it is claimed, the military and security issues are fixed and not liable to bargaining of the negotiators, after a possible agreement comes into force, a large number of Serb-Yugoslav forces should be withdrawn, and UCK should cease to exist in the course of three months. It is proposed that within the shortest possible period of time Serb police forces should be reduced to 2,500 policemen, and forces of the Yugoslav army to 1,506 soldiers. Besides, Belgrade would retain 75 members of Republican border police and 50 officials of the federal customs administration. Every one over this number should immediately leave Kosovo.

Except for the number of members of the forces, when the police and the army are concerned, limitations are also planned for their equipment and activities. When speaking of the number and composition of the police, it is explicitly said that all antiterrorist and special forces must be withdrawn, including special police forces. When speaking of the eqipment, all armoured vehicles weighing more than 6 tons and all arms of 12.7 mm calibre and over must immediately be withdrawn. Serb police forces in Kosovo would perform only normal police duties under command of the head of KVM (Kosovo Verification Mission). Gradually, however, they too should withdraw from Kosovo, it is assumed within 12 months, in accordance with the rate of training and qualification of local Kosovo police which is expected to take over their police responsibilities. During gradual withdrawal, the head of KVM can determine special regions or places from which all Serb police forces would withdraw first. However, the head of KVM would have the right to demand withdrawal of individuals or certain police units even before the deadline, just as he might demand continuation of their activities after these 12 months expire.

The troops of the Yugoslav army would be reduced to the level of before February last year, that is to the level of the border units located in Djakovica, Prizren and Urosevac. According to the proposed agreement, in Kosovo there should not be more that 1,506 members of the Yugoslav army at any time. These units will be able to patrol only in the border 5-kilometre wide region along the border with Albania and Macedonia only in order to protect the border against attacks from without and maintain territorial integrity. Military units will be allowed to move inside Kosovo to their official posts or garrisons only along intineraries agreed in advance with representatives of local police. While in transit, they would have the right to act only if their lives and their equipment were directly threatened. Members of the army will not be entitled to have armoured vehicle that weigh more than 6 tons nor antiaircraft defence artillery. Yugoslav units in Kosovo would use only up to 82 mm calibre arms.

UCK is not explicitly mentioned in the draft document, but it is clear that the following formulation refers primarily to it: "... all existing semi-military and irregular forces in Kosovo". It is planned that according to the schedule and rules set by the head of KVM, "these forces" will be dismissed within three months after Albanian-Serb agreement comes into force. During negotiations in Rambouillet, a deadline of one month was mentioned as the time when "these forces" should report arms, but there was also talk about silent political transformation and integration of UCK into Albanian and Kosovo political and legal institutions which will be established during the transitional period. However, "these forces" are expected to hand in all arms of over 7.62 mm calibre which will be destroyed. There is no answer to the question in what capacity "these forces" or their members would keep arms of 7.62 mm and below that.

The proposed agreement prescribes a model of police organization unknown in this country. Its main characteristics are extreme decentralization, absence of specialized units for fighting against modern crime and significant limitations in possession of arms. It is not by pure chance that the future Kosovo police is called "municipal police". Almost all or all regular police work is planned to be done by municipal police consisting mostly of local inhabitants and under command of a local commander nominated by local municipal authorities. Police composition should reflect ethnic composition of local population. Besides uniforms and certain evident signs of identification, policemen will carry short arms, handcuffs, rubber batons and radio stations. Each municipal police unit may have 20 pieces of long firearms, but they can be carried only with the permit of the police commander and only in cases of serious difficulties in enforcing the law. The total of 2,700 policemen are planned for Kosovo.

Such organization of the police may be imagined as a part of the general organization which will enforce peace and normalization, especially because the police will be directly controlled by KVM and its head. Despite the fact that this is just a transitional solution, inevitably the question arises how police cases will be solved which cannot be followed, observed or resolved on the level of a municipality, such as modern organized crime, certain possible forms of disturbing order, natural and other disasters... These questions are not topical at the moment, but they can cause great political suspicion concerning the future status of Kosovo. Some police units will have to carry out such police work. Will they be Kosovo or Serb-Yugoslav forces? Obviously Kosovo police units proposed by this document will not be able to do it (CJA-Criminal Justice Administration which will be the administrative agency on the level of the Province, and KSC-Kosovo Security Commission).

Negotiations in Rambouillet have confirmed the complexity of all aspects of the Kosovo tangle. Among them the most difficult are certainly the questions of security. It is not by pure chance that these issues were fixed and that from the beginning they are the main obstacle for reaching an agreement. Inconsistency, vagueness and ambiguity present in all of them, and in this part of the document should be observed in this context. Obviously a lot will be resolved in the process and in accordance with the circumstances imposed by life itself. Nobody should expect that the document will resolve the problems, but it may mark a big turning point, perhaps even the final end of the present situation.

Fehim REXHEPI