Serbia and the Foreign Troops

In Expectation of NATO

The stakes of both sides - those of the official Belgrade and those of NATO - have gone sky high. When the cards are laid on the table and when it becomes clear who was bluffing and who really meant it, foreign troops will probably be already deployed in Kosovo, and Milosevic will be a factor of peace and stability all over again

AIM Podgorica, 18 February, 1999 (By AIM correspondent from Belgrade)

President of FR Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic has a "negative attitude" to deployment of foreign troops in Kosovo, it is said in the statement from the White Court (official residence) issued after his meeting on 16 February with American envoy Chrostopher Hill. In the official information for the public it is stressed that this is not just "the stand of the leadership, but also of citizens of our country, as well as the unanimous stand of national deputies in the national assembly regardless of their party affiliation". A day later, Council of NATO adopted a plan of operations titled: "Joint Guards" - about 6,000 American and British soldiers will be deployed in the province just a few hours after possible signing of an agreement which will as "preparatory forces" ensure reception of the main force which would have between 25 and 30 thousand men. A part of the troops has already been deployed in Macedonia, and a part is disembarking at Thessalonike.

However, neither the authorities in Belgrade nor the people they refer to, judging by the polls of state TV daily news program, are particularly impressed. They all repeat in unison - everything is acceptable, except NATO in Kosovo. In this context, things cannot be moved from the standstill even by information about additional increase of the number of American airplanes which will take part in air strikes aimed at imposing the agreement and threats from Washington that they really mean it. It should not be expected that the appeal to the "people of FR Yugoslavia" addressed by the co-chairmen of the peace conference in Rambouillet and foreign ministers of France and Great Britain, Hubert Vedrine and Robin Cook, that the agreement and deployment of troops in Kosovo must be accepted, will cause dramatic and immediate turn. At first sight, it seems that the Titanic has taken the course towards the iceberg.

The momentary interruption of hostilities, limitation for the ministry of internal affairs to 2500 policemen in Kosovo, and for the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) to 1,500 border guards at the bordering five-kilometre-wide region and total disarmament of the illegal Kosovo Liberation Army (Alb. UCK) is the essence of the draft "military annex" prepared for the Serb-Yugoslav and Albanian negotiating delegations in Rambouillet the unauthorised version of which was published by Beta agency. It is also stated that the "parties agree" to invite NATO which will be the guarantor of implementation of the provisions of this annex; that from the moment of implementation of the agreement all combats shall be interrupted, control points removed and drills abolished; that the excess of members of the police and all units of VJ except the ones at the border, first, within 180 days shall be positioned at locations agreed in advance, and then withdrawn outside the Province; that in the meantime, arma of VJ shall be reduced to those below 82 mm calibre, and that within ten days the system of air-force and antiaircraft defence shall fully be withdrawn from Kosovo; that UCK shall put away its arms in storerooms, in other words it shall stop carrying arms and wearing uniforms; that within thirty days all persons engaged in UCK who are not from Kosovo shall leave... This draft also confirms "sovereignty and territorial integrity of FR Yugoslavia".

If main provisions from the "military draft" are accepted, for the Army of Yugoslavia which emerged from the former Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), this would be the fifth withdrawal from a part of the territory it had been "in charge" of in the past decade. It has plenty of experience in this, but a lot of frustration, too. The additional complication is the devastating financial position of the Army which is deteriorating every year and this witdrawal would mean not only abandoning of military bases but, indeed, of housing units of active military officers, too. The border units are in a specially difficult position. Their movement would be limited to five kilometres of the bordering region without any customary support to back them. Although VJ does not have the political significance of former JNA, political life is inconceivable in which the question of responsibility for this fifth withdrawal would not be raised: not so much because soldiers have actively participated in hostilities in Kosovo and because quite a number of them have been killed there, but much more because of state and legal principles. But, not even from the aspect of the illegal UCK is the "military annex" especially attractive. This organization has the power only as long as it can shoot. Should it be disarmed, its power will disappear and it will have to get involved in regular political life. It seems, though, that it can hardly expect much in that sphere: a considerable part of Kosovo Albanians accepted UCK as a necessary evil. That is why it is believed that it will mostly try to join the future local police in Kosovo and thanks to that keep a considerable part of its armament.

The police of Serbia is in a much better position: the comparative number of policemen which must withdraw is much smaller than the number of soldiers, the police remains on the whole territory of the Province, and there are no indications that regular shifts of contingents sent from Serbia would be limited. The police would also cease participating in military combats and it will do what its primary task is - struggle against crime and public order and peace.

Forty eight hours before the end of the negotiations in Rambouillet, neither the Serb-Yugoslav nor the delegation of Kosovo Albanians have officially received the "military annex". If judged by the statements of Serb and Yugoslav officials, such as that of president of Serbia Milan Milutinovic or the Republican vice prime minister and leader of the Radicals, Vojislav Seselj, they will refuse to accept it. This should neither cause surprise nor be taken for granted: just to be reminded, that is what happened with rejection of Felipe Gonzales's mission, "No" at the referendum on foreign interference, decision on banishment of the head of Kosovo Verification Mision (KVM) William Walker, refusing to attend negotiations which would take place abroad, refusal to accept negotiators from the illegal UCK. They agreed to everything after all.

Therefore, optimists believe that Milosevic's, Seselj's and Milutinovic's declarations are in fact playing hard to get in the negotiations and an attempt to hush up the arrival of foreign troops. It is a futile business to try to guess in what form it will be done. There are assessments that arrival of NATO troops is in fact convenient for the regime: combats in the Province will end, these troops will take care of peace and order, every possible pressure will be exerted on Albania so that the situation at the border will be normalised, and Kosovo will - at least formally - be part of Serbia.

Both pessimists and optimists indicate that possible air strikes would be the end of FR Yugoslavia: while NATO bombed, UCK would launch an offensive on the ground which would be almost impossible to stop in the situation thus created; it is believed by Vesna Pesic, president of the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS) for example, that Montenegro would proclaim independence; and Kosovo itself, where there would probably be no Serbs, could hardly ever be brought back within the framework of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia.

According to the optimists, Milosevic will not risk dissolution of the state under bombs and in the end, at a minute to twelve, he will accept foreign troops. As several times already stated by western mediators, the agreement and soldiers for its implementation are part of the same package - one cannot go without the other. Pessimists, on the other hand, claim that for the Yugoslav regime, it is much worse to accept NATO peacefully and all the limitations accompanying it than having to explain to its public after bombing that it was necessary to yield to a bigger force.

Air strikes are, surely, anything but a solution and after them, the region could hardly be pacified in a foreseeable future. However, this is something one should not gamble with when there is real danger of their implementation. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright phoned Milosevic on 18 February. Then she stated that she had told him that if he did not accept the troops in Kosovo and thus brought about the intervention, he would be left "without things which are the most important for him".

In any case the stakes of both sides - those of official Belgrade and those of NATO - have gone up sky high. Soon cards will have to be revealed. Then it will become clear who has been bluffing. Nothing except verbal blustering of the regime in Serbia and TV spot "We love you, fatherland" indicates that something is cooking over here. Judging by similar situations in recent history NATO will be deployed in Kosovo, and Milosevic will become the "factor of peace and stability" again.

Philip Schwarm (AIM)