Serbia on the Eve of the Conference in Paris

Buying Time

Milosevic is still weighing the pros and cons of the departure to the Rambouillet castle. The time when Serbia could actually gain something has long gone - it is only posible to determine the degree of damage done by years of policy of defying the whole world with no foundation in economic, political or military power of the state.

AIM Podgorica, 3 February, 1999 (By AIM correspondent from Belgrade)

By scheduling the emergency session of the assembly of Serbia for 4 February, that is, just a day before the planned gathering of negotiators in Rambouillet, Milosevic's regime has obviously tried to buy time in order to weigh all the pros and cons of the appearance at the conference; wiser analysts would say that the official Belgrade was in fact estimating whether it would lose more if its delegation appeared or if it did not appear at the French castle: however, the time when Serbia could actually gain something has long gone - it is possible only to determine the degree of damage caused by years of policy of defying the whole world without any foundation in economic, political or military power of the state.

It is imposible to further postpone solving of the essence of the explosive problem of Kosovo, nor is it possible to continue confusing the issue by trite petty politicking because the price is becoming too high. It is true, however, that ten-year long experience with the rule of Slobodan Milosevic confirms that this man and his associates consider no price is too high if it keeps them in power, but also that the people of Serbia have neither the will, knowledge or resoluteness to offer resistance to all the disastrous adventures of the regime; however, the international community has assessed that continuation of the present untenable situation in Kosovo - with radical risky security implications for the whole southern Balkan - would be too expensive and that it was necessary to begin with clearing up the mess there. That is why the question for Belgrade is not whether it will participate in it, but only whether its vote will count, or whether Serbia will be just the "passive object" in resolving the serious problem on its own territory.

Political dogma of the official Belgrade has for years been: "Kosovo is the internal question of Serbia and we will at no price permit internationalization of this problem". Such a resolute stand - about which even a "patriotic referendum" was pompously organised last year - has been considerably moderated in practice a long time ago, and on the eve of this conference it seemed essentially brought into question. Full agreement of the official Moscow with moves of the USA and the European Union destroyed even the last illustion of Dedinje that "salvation from the East" would come to its rescue: Slobodan Milosevic and Mirjana Markovic can, therefore, do nothing else but, like on the caricature by Predrag Koraksic alias Corax, cry on the shoulder of their dearest guest Genady Zyugabov, leader of Russian communists. That is why Milosevic's dilemma before the conference at Rambouillet was so difficult: if he decided to be "cooperative", he would have to agree to an essentially different position of Kosovo in the present state - probably different to such an extent that Kosovo would just formally remain in Serbia; had he refused to negotiate under conditions of the increasingly impatient international community, he would have faced the most realistic threat of massive military strikes.

The regime also has a sizable heap of problems at home; having got involved in the bizzare double political marriage - with the Radicals on the Republican and with the Serb Revival Movement (SPO) on the federal level - the ruling party has to face double pressure. SPO of Vuk Draskovic insisted on departure to the negotiations, claiming that everything else would be an adventurer's folly; Seselj's Radicals, however, very resolutely refused to participate and called their coalition partners to remain at home, at any cost. They believe that further internationalization of the problem of Kosovo would work in favour of ethnic Albanians, and that Serbia had to oppose all forms of pressure. It remained in the dark who would have to pay the (undoubtedly high) price for this epic gesture of the Radical "patriots". In view of the relation of forces, the Radicals are nowadays a much more important coalition partner of Milosevic's "leftists": with a big number of ministers and vice prime ministers they participate in the Republican cabinet of Mirko Marjanovic and they have very significantly and dangerously affected many aspects of internal politics in Serbia in the past year, prooving to be a very reliable ally in every adventure of the regime.

SPO, on the contrary, holds only three departments of minor significance in the weak and illegitimate federal government of Momir Bulatovic, Montenegrin puppet Slobodan Milosevic had appointed to the post contrary to the will of legal authorities of Montenegro.

Independent Belgrade daily Blic wrote (of 3 February, 1999), referring to sources close to the Radicals in the federal authorities, that the Serb Radical Party would leave the government of Serbia if Milosevic decided to send a delegation to the castle near Paris; asked to comment this, Republican minister of information and important member of Seselj's team, Aleksandar Vucic, flatly answered with: no comment. Obviously, an intensive "battle in the trenches" was fought in the past few days in Belgrade political lobbies, or rather bargaining for high stakes. One should remember that in the beginning of the nineties - at the time of "liberation and unification" wars in Croatia and Bosnia - the Radicals were also on very good political terms with the Socialists, but that they split due to refusal of the Radicals to agree to the key role of the foreigners (Vance-Owen, blockade of the Drina, Dayton...), so that it is not impossible that history may be repeat.

On the other hand, the Left and the Radicals are having a very good time together, and it is certain that Socialist Party of Serbia and Yugoslav United Left could never find such a reliable partner for their style of rule: SPO one day advocates this and the next something quite different (depending on momentary mood and interest of the Draskovic couple) and the opposition neither has the power nor the wish to participate in the authorities which will bear the responsibility for spectacular long regression of Serbia.

Serb non-parliamentary opposition (becasue it boycotted the last elections), mostly gathered around the ambitious League for Changes, is trying to balance between the understanding concern for territorial integrity of the country and the need to cooperate with the international community; that is the reason why its leaders, just as the Church and many prominent scientists and intellectuals, point out that significant concessions have been made concering the "issue of Kosovo", but also that the rigid policy of the regime had brought it about since it had ignored the existence of the problem for a long time believing that it could pacify almost 90 per cent of the population of Kosovo and then rule for centuries sitting on bayonets and then in a helter-skelter manner started "solving" it by enormous military and police force. And all that in the midst of the region where sometimes a single well aimed shot from a pistol could cause a new "thirty-year war".

It will in a way be convenient for the League for Changes and other opposition groups if the Left, the Radicals and SPO discredit themselves and remain fully responsible for consequences of the long-lasting monstrous policy. There are no representatives of the League in Rambouillet, because the Serb negotiating team consists only of loyal and selected members of the establishment, while Kosovo Albanians are represented by all significant political forces and representatives of Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK). This speaks for itself of the nature of the regime which claims to have a monopoly both on willful creating and forcible resolution of problems in this part of the world.

One thing is for sure: Slobodan Milosevic will find a sufficient number of allies and enthusiastic supporters for any of his decisions. Having for years dilligently improved his system of rule, he is nowadays ensured from all sides, so that he can present his every decision as a "nation-wide choice". The only thing that is true, however, is that consequences of his policy will continue to be "nation-wide". But, it is not worth crying over it: if in a country the regime is unbearably powerful, the opposition unbearably weak, and the people unbearably apathetic, one can hardly expect that at least bearable ideas and projects for its own future would arise and be conceived. That is why for such countries a team of "physicians" is usually appointed from abroad to treat them. In case they continuously oppose it, forcible medical treatment is also possible, with a jacket buttoned at the back.

Teofil Pancic

(AIM)