ALBANIAN DIFFERENCES ON THE EVE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON KOSOVO

Podgorica Feb 3, 1999

AIM Pristina, 30 January, 1999

(For AIM Podgorica by correspondent from Pristina)

Simply and picturesquely put, the current situation in Kosovo is most often described as a situation just before countdown. This is the description given by those who due to fear cannot exactly be called optimists, but nevertheless put their hopes on every sign of a solution for last year's animosities. Their conviction is based solely on the readiness of large powers to interfere militarily in the crisis in Kosovo and impose a solution. The impression is that this conviction expresses wishes of a large number of Kosovo Albanians, maybe even majority of them. Along with it or immediately next to it is the interest for the proposal of large forces for future temporary or lasting status of Kosovo. Much has been said about it, but it all remains in the sphere of guesses. So far nobody has presented a single specific element which would indicate its content, which leads to the conclusion that the proposal and its basic elements have not even been formulated yet. However, Kosovo Albanians who are even slightly better informed than the others are well aware that the whole variety of ideas and proposals eliminates the possibility of independent Kosovo.

Despite all the fears and uncertainties, this description of the climate expresses increased alertness in the views of the current situation and growing belief in the less painful denouement of the crisis. However, under pressure and impression of the developments, there are views in which the denouement is viewed and described in more sombre colours. The deteriorating and more explosive situation in the field is pointed out at. In occasional minor or major armed conflicts the ceasefire is violated or interrupted every day in almost all parts of Kosovo. As the most illustrative indicator of explosivenes of the situation daily losses of human lives mostly on the side of Kosovo Albanians are stressed. Along with the not at all promising situation in the field which includes intensive preparations and taking positions for war operations, doubts are expressed about actual readiness of large powers to interfere militarily and scepticism about the situation which large powers intend to impose as a solution. Numerous examples of disproportion between their "words and deeds" in the recent past are listed, along with contemplation about the complexity of the legal situation from the aspect of international law and very entangled interests and relations among the world powers.

These and probably many other elements form a network of relations from the aspect of which military intervention does not seem simple. The mosaic of relations would be incomplete if it were not said that it still lacks main assumptions: political, psychological and others, in order to reach a compromise between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo which would be acceptable for both parties without an ultimatum. And finally, each of the parties has its arguments and interests. From the current standpoint of the Albanians, any solution for Kosovo under minor or major jurisdiction of Serbia would have no chance to succeed.

In the existing complex situation, differences within the Albanian movement are an additional factor of uncertainty. In the announced diplomatic process, union of the Albanian political forces imposes itself as a significant alleviating condition for successful termination of the current campaign of world powers concerning Kosovo. The Albanian movement is required to adopt a common platform in relation to Belgrade and the world, or as usually said, to speak in unison. On the surface this appears to be a very benevolent attitude towards Kosovo Albanians or as good will to help them not to exhaust themselves in internal quarrels. For a few years already, the Albanian public has demanded exactly the same, as well as leaders from the lowest to the highest, all Albanian political parties and associations. In advocating this idea there has been no exceptions in Kosovo. After the recent political concensus of all relevant political forces, the political protagonists of Albania have also joined in these efforts.

Nevertheless, the current status of relations makes the impression that Albanian political protagonists of Kosovo have never been more divided than now. This is very confusing and probably the first thing that comes to mind in this context is that Albanian protagonists are not sincere, that is, that they do not really mean what they have publicly repeated for years. It seems that political acrobacy to do quite the opposite from public declarations and promises has become the main characteristics of comprehension of politics and practical pursuing of policy. This is the source of confusion caused by the situation inside the Albanian political movement among the broad Albanian public and among foreigners who are trying to understand the everyday developments in Kosovo especially within the Albanian ethnic and political corps.

When political layers of different colours and density are removed, one could conclude that the deep chasm between two Kosovo Albanian political blocks which are, to make things simple, personified by Adem Demaqi and Ibrahim Rugova, is not just the matter of personal whims and animosities between immature political figures in an underdeveloped Balkan environment. Perhaps majority of the Albanians and politicians would not agree with the judgement that one of the basic causes of the internal Albanian split is disagreement concerning readiness to be engaged in fulfilling the ambition of an enormous part of the Albanians that Kosovo become independent. This does not mean that they do not wish independence, but it does mean that some of them would give it up or that they have already given it up faced with the price which needs to be paid for independence of Kosovo. There is chaos in the Albanian public concerning this issue. But, when the haze of illusions is lifted and primitive haggling and rivalry are revealed, along with shrewdness of ruthless politicians, the impression is that this question is main and the major reason of inter-Albanian splits. After the world powers had conditioned paticipation at the future negotiations on Kosovo with giving up the demand for independence of Kosovo, there is a chance that this question will at least parttly be clarified.

The mentioned majority would prefer to present these differences as differences not concerning the ultimate goal but concerning the ways for its achievement. Although significant and conspicuous, the differences concerning the ways do not seem to be essential. There is a big gap between the means used by the UCK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës - the Liberation Army of Kosovo) which advocates and applies force and Rugova who advocates politics of passive waiting. But, both parties accept solution through negotiations (Rugova only through negotiations, and UCK if possible and among other through negotiations), they express readiness to support a temporary solution and to make significant concessions if the possibility of the temporary solution to become permanent is eliminated. Although concerning the manner of achievement unity on the minimum platform, there is a certain level of flexibility in Demaqi's stand, basically both parties consider unity as subordinating the other party and putting it under their command.

In their contemplations about unity they usually have in mind a partnership which necessarily implies coordination, compromise and concessions. Demaqi and the main staff of the UCK insist on gathering of everybody around UCK, and Rugova with his Democratic League and a group of related parties which participated in last year's presidential and parliamentary elections demand subordination to all institutions under his absolute control. In time these institutions have acquired a significant role in concealing or blurring internal splits both if the source of differences is in the views of the situation or just meer struggle for power, personal ambition or that of the group, and intolerance. It is believed that the latter plays a signicant part in provoking inter-Albanian conflicts. But, it is difficult to accept the prevailing, mostly simplified belief among the Albanian public that personal and group interests are the decisive factor of inter-Albanian splits.

Disagreements and differences between the two political blocks on the Albanian political scene of Kosovo for a few years already have been presented as a struggle between irreconcilable class enemies within the Albanian ethnic group. This may seem ridiculous to many, but anybody who carefully observes the Albanian political life from within may easily notice that the former so-called Marxists are quarrelling with former so-called reformed communists. This is something they used to be and they would not like to be reminded of it. Of course, everybody has a right to change and probably many did change. But, in the political battle which is aimed at unscrupulous political discreditation, the right to change and the change itself in the positive, democratic direction is recognised only to one's own. According to that logic, the others are the same, which implies that they are not capable of solving the puzzle of modern times. That is why so many labels are exchanged by political opponents: Marxists, communists, democrats, true patriots, war adventurers, authentic nationalists, false patriots, traitors, new rightists, Titoists, national democrats...

Political parties gathered around United Democratic Movement of Rexhep Qosja and UCK question patriotism of the other party, and it replies that they were and still are leftist Marxists and extremists. Each party accuses the other that the main goal of its every political move is struggle to seize power and political monopoly and not freedom of Kosovo Albanians and independence of Kosovo. Demaqi's block does not recognise state institutions believing them to be a screen for concealing defeat of the political program and promises Rugova has been making for the past ten odd years, and Rugova does not recognise UCK which his followers consider just an instrument for winning power.

In the end, something should be said about foreign influence on internal Albanian divisions. There is no doubt that world powers will play a significant role in pacification and then disentanglement of the crisis in Kosovo. Nobody could say that they have generated the quarrel and splits, but their influence was definitely present. Since the year before last when students' demonstrations started, this influence, especially the American, has constantly been increasing. Ever since the beginning foreign influence was directed towards mitigating or threatening radical trends, in other words towards preventing evolution of developments in the direction of a war conflict. That is how it was until it broke out, until the crisis in Kosovo became the acute regional and European problem the solution of which cannot wait. Events have made former political preoccupations untopical, such as political passive waiting, active non-violent resistance, peaceful demonstrations, the right to education, maltreatment of the arrested... After the conflict had broken out, other things have become topical - soldiers, armament, ceasefire, territories, borders...

The few monopolistic Albanian media had for years claimed or in some way hinted to their readers and listeners that the whole world, but especially the western countries were supporting aspirations of Kosovo Albanians for independent Kosovo. Only since two or three years ago, they started informing the public that this aspiration was not supported by the West. However, there was no room for such unfavourable news in the heads of the Albanians. Since last spring when the need of union of the Albanians has increasingly been stressed, it was evident that foreign diplomats did not mean union around a platform established by the Albanians themselves, but around a moderate platform of a solution proposed by the great powers. The result of that is conditioning of participation in future negotiations by giving up independence of Kosovo.

Alkthough such demands are addressed to the Albanians in general, it is quite striking that they are aimed especially at UCK. It is explicitly stated that if UCK fails to give up on independence only Rugova with his allies will be accepted as the negotiator. Apart from exclusion from the negotiations, UCK is threatened with military, political and other measures, among others supply of arms and financial aid are mentioned. It is also said that UCK will militarily be neutralised if it attempts to aggravate or obstruct negotiations. The main staff of UCK reacted in a very conciliatory manner to these demands, but with the conclusion that UCK could not give up on independence of Kosovo.

Fehim REXHEPI