THE OFFER THAT CANNOT BE REJECTED

Ultimatum of the Contact Group

The demand of the contact group that the Serb-Albanian agreement on Kosovo be reached within three weeks' time is a move in comparison with which all similar initiatives taken in the course of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia seem trivial. The role of NATO makes this ultimatum an offer that cennot be refused

AIM Podgorica, 1 February, 1999 (By AIM correspondent from Belgrade)

"The international community has sent a clear message to Belgrade: the time for refusals and postponements has passed. NATO is united and ready for action if you are not", declared USA president Bill Clinton after the decision of the Contact Group reached on 29 January. His foreign affairs advisor Samuel Berger gave an additional explanation: "If Milosevic does not wish to face a high-level autonomy of Kosovo, he will have to face military intervention". And in order to show that they really mean what they are saying, on 30 January, the NATO Council authorized its Secretary General Javier Solana to order military action on the territory of FR Yugoslavia- "air strikes on targets on Yugoslav territory" - if he estimated that one of the parties in Kosovo was not meeting demands of the Contact Group.

British foreign minister Robin Cook, delivered an ultimatum to president of FR Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade and leaders of Kosovo Albanians - president of the Democratic League of Kosovo (Alb. LDK) Ibrahim Rugova and political representative of the illegal Liberation Army of Kosovo (Alb. UCK) in Skopje. Briefly, the ultimatum reads that "representatives of FR Yugoslavia and Serbian government, and representatives of Kosovo Albanians" must meet by 6 February at the latest in Rambouillet near Paris; negotiations will be chaired by Robin Cook and his French colleague Hubert Vedrin. The negotiators are expected to reach an agreement within seven days. On the last day of this deadline, they shall report to the ministers of the Contact Group. If the latter estamate that a significant progress has been made, the negotiators will be given another seven days to finalize it. In fact, they are expected to accept and amend "Principles and Basic Elements" the Contact Group has already prepared on the basis of the sixth and the seventh version of the so-called Hill's plan (American mediator in Serb-Albanian negotiations Christopher Hill). On the contrary, what the authorities in Belgrade and leaders of Kosovo Albanians are required to do will be done by NATO.

The essence of this document is that Kosovo remains within FR Yugoslavia, that it will enjoy a high level of autonomy through its own legislative, executive and judicial authorities. After three years, the agreement will be revised but with no possibility of unilateral decisions. In the meantime, until negotiators gather in Rambouillet, all armed operations must be interrupted, detailed investigation must be initiated concerning the event in village Racak with participation of the Hague Tribunal, members of the Army of Yugoslavia and Serbian police who participated in these operations must be identified and suspended from duty, full cooperation with Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) must be established, etc...

Milosevic said to Cook that the document of the Contact Group would be taken into consideration by "the highest authorities of FR Yugoslavia and Serbia" and after that an answer would be given. Rugova has already declared that he would go to negotiations because, he explained, the document included means for achievement of independence of Kosovo: Albanian police and revision of the agreement which according to him incorporated referendum on secession. Demaqi still has not issued a statement - allegedly he is at talks with commanders of the UCK.

The demand of the Contact Group is a move in comparison with which all similar initiatives taken in the course of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia between 1991 and 1995 seem trivial. Regardless of the mysterious silence of the authorities, this is an offer that cannot be refused. Or at least, it should not be attempted: Solana's authorization to estimate the situation and order air strikes is exceptionally broad. It refers both to the sitution in the field and reaching of an agreement within precisely set deadlines. There is no possibility of veto on his decisions, which was probably intended to convince Belgrade that there was no hope of any spectacular diplomatic turns. William Walker, head of KVM, says that Milosevic will in the end accept demands of the Contact Group. Indeed, at this time it is difficult to see a way in which they can be avoided.

What at this moment attracts attention is the mechanism how it will be done, equally in Belgrade and among leaders of Kosovo Albanians, and the consequences of this acceptance. All relevant parliamentary parties in Serbia participate in power: Serb Radical Party (SRS), Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Yugoslav Left (JUL) are in the Republican government; Serb Revival Movement (SPO) along with the latter two (without Radicals) has members in the federal government. It is very difficult to say which one of them is more zealous in appealing on patriotism, vowing on territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia. Besides, Radicals, Socialists and Leftists have especially distinguished themselves in condemnation of NATO, revealing "conspiracies" of CIA, hue and cry on "fifth columnists", rejection of every "foreign interference" in Kosovo, and similar. To put it simply, they will be forced to forget overnight rejection of the mission of Felipe Gonsales at the very beginning of the crisis, the April referendum in which international mediation was rejected, decision on banishment and putting William Walker on ice, refusal to permit investigators of the Hague Tribunal to work in Kosovo, and who knows what not. If collective amnesia is proclaimed via state media, is it possible to preserve at least the minimum illusion of political credibility?

If they agree to what the Contact Group demands, the mentioned parties and groups should politically and morally go bankrupt; if they refuse - there is great probability of a war with the whole world which amounts to the same thing. If profound causes of bloodshed in the province are disregarded, the government of "national unity" has made the sovereignty of the state - which it had talked about and stressed the most - sink lower on the scale than ever in its history. The same can be said of diplomatic support; this country is internationally isolated like no other country in the world and it is one of the world pariahs. The question is whether the "black-and-red" coalition in Serbia can survive negotiations in Rambouillet.

Opinions differ. According to ones, Milosevic will once again turn out to be the savior of Serbia and "guarantor of peace and stability in the region" because there is no alternative; in the meantime, all kinds of belligerent declarations of the Radicals and the Leftists will continue pouring in, but their real sense should be sought in intensified internal repression. Others claim that the current regime in Serbia is in serious crisis and that it will unavoidably split from within, in other words that mutual accusations are inevitable and therefrom there will be all kinds of spokes in others' wheels.

Both possibilities they greatly rely on the leader of SPO and vice prime minister of the federal government in charge of foreign policy, Vuk Draskovic. Since he declares himself in favour of accepting demands of the Contact Group but insists on Kosovo remaining within Serbia, his role is interpreted differently. According to ones the Radicals will not accept the assumed Milosevic turn (that JUL will do anything president of FR Yugoslavia may demand, nobody doubts), so their place will simply be taken by SPO and this will be accompanied by accusations that it was all the fault of the Radicals. Others believe that the connection between coalition partners in the Republican government is much firmer than it seems in public and that when the negotiations are completed, Draskovic will be the "scapegoat" who the "black-and-red" coalition partners will accuse for "sale and surrender of Kosovo".

Since the whole affair will by then be wrapped up, it is assumed that the accusations will be solely of an internal political nature and will not affect implementation of the agreement. The ones and the others seek stronghold for their hypotheses in the severe verbal war between SRS and SPO. Contrary to the Serb party, on the Albanian scene things are much simpler. Whoever appears as the negotiator will acquire legitimacy with the Contact Group. This means that constantly divided Albanians leaders can choose between accepting the agreement and political death. In this context, there should be no doubt that they will be able to reach at least a short-lasting mutual agreement. Then internal Albanian showdown will follow: Rugova's LDK against Demaqi's UCK. All things considered, FR Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo have stepped into a completely uncertain period. If no other thing, the statement of Javier Solana that he believes sending troops to Kosovo is inevitable confirms this stand.

Philip Schwarm

(AIM)