Macedonian Media and the Crisis of Kosovo

Skopje Jan 23, 1999

AIM Skopje, 16 January, 1999

The known proverb "far from eye far from heart", in the case of Macedonia and the crisis of Kosovo, at least when the manner in which this crisis is presented by Macedonian media, could be modified to read as follows: "the further from eye (and ear), the better". In any case Kosovo cannot be treated as something "far" away, because it is just "over the hill", but there is a tendency to treat the tragedy of Kosovo as if it were happening "across seven seas". This does not refer equally to all the media (in the sense of their linguistic/ethnic affiliation), but this nevertheless illustrates the general attitude, because the "contribution" of media in Albanian language in creation of the overall picture is almost negligible.

Media in Albanian language treat the crisis of Kosovo as an "internal" problem of FR Yugoslavia, carrying daily information on everything that is going on in the field, while media in Macedonian (and other languages) report about this crisis mostly as about something very distant. Contrary to the Albanian media in Macedonia which mostly rely on Albanian sources in Kosovo, media in Macedonian use foreign sources of information, primarily those coming from major news agencies, but Serbian sources too, which is a rare occasion in media in Albanian. If a foreigner arrived in Skopje and tried to make ot the domestic disposition on the crisis of Kosovo which seriously threatens safety and stability of Macedonia, he would probably be surprised with the lack of stands concerning many questions.

If one was asked to describe the situation in a single sentence, one could say that Macedonian public has an "undefined" stand which has not changed much even after parliamentary elections of the end of last year. In other words, in Macedonia fear prevails that the crisis might spread into Macedonia. This fear is especially present among ethnic Macedonians, and that is the reason why an attempt is made to keep this crisis by all means "as far as possible" in order to decrease the fear. The fear is not founded only on frightful prospects of a possible war, but also on a specific assumption that too detailed treating of the crisis among the domestic public might open the "Pandora's box" in interethic relations and lead to spreading of the situation in Kosovo into Macedonia. Although it is not openly discussed, the Macedonians fear that any destablisation of the country, especially if it were the result of spilling out of the Kosovo crisis, would inevitably lead to a threat to the very existence of the country. Such a pessimistic view is based on the assumption that Macedonia would not be able to cope on its own with an open conflict which would probably move along ethnic lines and which would unavoidably cause foreign reactions which could jeopardise the very foundations of independence of this state, regardless of whether these reactions would be aimed at "rescue" (directed towards Macedonians) or "concern" (directed towards the Albanians).

What they "omit" to write about the crisis of Kosovo, Macedonian media compensate by writing about "protectors" of Macedonia who have recently multiplied. Although with a delay, NATO forces for extraction of possibly threatened OSCE verifiers in Kosovo are "growing" every day. All things considered, the planned number of 1,700 soldiers will in the end be somewhat bigger, but nobody is concerned by that. The only "problem" which accompanies this issue is the presence of UN mission, UNPREDEP. For the first time after more than six years of hospitality, and even persistently claiming that their stay be prolonged, UN "peace-keepers" are faced with the unpleasant feeling that they are undesired by the new government. On the other hand, president Gligorov who is still the most prominent figure of the Social Democratic League of Macedonia (party which was defeated in the last elections), is very persistent in his request that the peace-keeoers stay in the country despite the arrival of NATO soldiers. It seems that UNPREDEP will get one more, according to sources from the Macedonian government, last mandate intended to enable them to get ready for the final departure. Based on the tone with which this problem is discussed by the government and the president, the impression is that UNPREDEP is the favourite of the Social Democrats, and NATO extractors are favourites of the government! The new government does not conceal its inclination towards NATO, but especially its pride for being the one which has brought NATO to Macedonia when the former government failed to "lead" Macedonia to NATO.

It is interesting that media participate in this quibbling, so that certain media speak about the "extractors" who have occupied the country, alluding to the fact that a large number of them are still staying in hotels. For others (prime minister included) this fact is an additional reason for the UN peace-keepers to leave the country and, of course, vacate the military barracks where "extractors" could move in.

However, that the peace-keepers do not intend to "withdraw" so easily is illustrated by the fact that a few days ago, after more than three months without a head of the mission, UNPREDEP got its civilian head who is in the rank of a special envoy of OUN Secretary General. Soon after his arrival in Skopje, the new civilian head of the mission declared that interests of the "two armies" are not conflicting, in other words that NATO extractors have the mandate to protect verifiers in Kosovo, while the mandate of UNPREDEP is to guard the Macedonian state border. Nevertheless, it seems that the new government is resolute to persevere with its stand that presence of NATO forces, even with a mandate outside Macedonian borders and even without US soldiers, is a better solution than UNPREDEP. Of course, this stand is somewhat influenced by the personal relation between the prime minister and the UN mission which in the past six-year period, which coincided with the rule of the Social Democrats, did not have a very friendly attitude to the opposition which is now in power.

It is important to mention that in view of the fact that the present coalition government consists of "extremist" Macedonians (VMRO-DPMNE) and "radical" Albanians (DPA) (along with the civic oriented Democratic Alternative), the manner in which the crisis in Kosovo is observed nowadays is by far more realistic than the one before the present government was formed. The point is that since "radical" Albanians are members of the coalition in power who could "bring" the Kosovo crisis into Macedonia (as it was claimed and believed in the past four-year period), the current government has a much more relaxed position than the previous one. Such atmosphere is reflected on the media. But, whether this will last depends on the outcome of the crisis in Kosovo.

AIM Skopje

IBRAHIM MEHMETI