AFTER SFOR's DECISION TO WARN THE HVO

Sarajevo Jan 22, 1999

JELAVIC "REMINDED" OF DAYTON

AIM Sarajevo, January 15, 1999

That some 30 thousand SFOR members are not on parade in B&H but are on a peace stabilizing mission and charged with issuing warnings to those military components which violate the Dayton Peace Accords, was confirmed by a recent dispute with the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), which is a part of the Army of the B&H Federation (VF). SFOR confiscated armament from the HVO barracks because a certain number of HVO generals were appointed to new posts, promoted without the prior approval of the SFOR commander and another group reassigned to the Croatian Army, i.e. the army of another state. After heightened tensions, the problem was resolved at the negotiating table with the Croatian promise to the VF that something like that would not happen again and that it would not circumvent SFOR in making important personnel changes within HVO.

The misunderstanding arose when Ante Jelavic, member of the B&H Presidency, as a civilian commander of HVO, of his own volition, appointed a certain number of officers. The SFOR Command assessed this to be a violation of the Dayton Peace Accords and notified that "such an act could not be tolerated". Namely, already last October, the SFOR Commander instructed both military and civilian authorities that each promotion or appointment of generals in the military forces of entities had to be approved by him. However, Mr.Jelavic either did not understand the essence of the mentioned demand of the SFOR or refused to understand it because he decided to award some officers with a higher rank. This "ignorance" is surprising, to say the least, when it is known that Jelavic is a retired general and has spent most of his life in uniform. Namely, he has graduated from the Technical Military Academy in the former YPA (Yugoslav People's Army) and until the beginning of the war in Croatia in 1991 was an officer in active military service. During the war in B&H he was one of the HVO's commanding officers.

Whom did Jelavic promote?

Zeljko Siljeg, who until now worked in that same command, but with a lower rank, Jelavic appointed to the vacated post of Deputy Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the VF since general Zivko Budimir was transferred to the Croatian Army (namely, it became common practice for the Croatian officers to work for both the HVO and the Croatian Army). According to unofficial sources, there is nothing general Siljeg should be ashamed of in his war career so that it is quite possible that SFOR could subsequently approve his appointment and thus making him second in command after general Rasim Delic, Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Federation Army.

Jelavic appointed general Zlatan Mija Jelic Commander of the First HVO Guard Corps in the place of general Stanko Sopta Baja who was also transferred to the Croatian Army and is currently attending further education in Zagreb. Namely, for his participation in the so called "deals which were not of military character" Sopta got a dressing down from the SFOR which demanded his withdrawal. The Croatian establishment in the B&H Federation tried to keep Sopta, but when this proved impossible a compromise solution was found - by Jelavic's order Sopta was, without much consequences, transferred to the neighbouring state's army.

SFOR will soon state whether they think Jelic to be a "good solution" for Sopta's vacated place. General Jelic is not much known to the international forces and that is why they probably need time to gather information about him. Only then it will be clear whether Jelic can discharge the duty to which he was appointed without SFOR's approval.

Together with these appointments, Ante Jelavic, the HVO civilian commander, promoted two more brigadiers to the rank of major general: Ilija Nakic and Ilija Rasic. Both commanded a regiment. Nakic, as the former commander of the Third HVO Regiment in Vitez was to be transferred to the VF Joint Chiefs of Staff. It seems that his appointment might "pass" and that the HVO has no problem with the surplus of generals! Namely, according to the Agreement, there can be 30 generals in the Army of the B&H Federation, while until Jelavic made his appointments the Federation Army already had 32 officers of that rank. Fifteen generals are in the B&H Army (Bosniacs) and 17 in the HVO (Croats), while according to the plan there should be 20 Bosniac and 10 Croatian generals. According to the latest data there are currently 14 Bosniac generals (brigadier general Salih Malkic recently left the army service and is currently a minister in the Government of the Tuzla-Podrinje Canton). However, with Nakic's and Rasic's promotion, the number of Croatian generals in VF has reached the figure of 19 which is twice the envisaged number.

Even if there was no surplus of generals among the Bosnian Croats, it is hardly likely that SFOR would approve the promotion of the second brigadier, i.e. commander of the Fourth HVO Regiment in Orasje - Ilija Rasic since it had serious objections to his behaviour during last year's electoral campaign. Namely, as Rasic thinks that an officer can belong to a party - and his political option is solely the HDZ - he brought military police to electoral rallies of the New Croatian Initiative (a party formed by mostly former HDZ members) and violated the freedom of speech and different opinion.

However, the impression is that with this urgent promotion of Rasic into general Jelavic wanted to award him and thus show that HVO generals who publicly support HDZ can advance more quickly in their careers than those who have reconciled with the international suggestions that the army must be depoliticized. It seems that some officers of the B&H Army, i.e. Bosniacs, also disagreed with this as several of them were on the lists of candidates of the ruling SDA at the elections in September 1998 although general Delic (declaratively) told them to choose "either the army or the politics, as one cannot ride two horses at once".

Furthermore, with his order Jelavic has also promoted three colonels to the rank of brigadier: Mario Bradar - commander of the Third Guard Brigade, Ivo Filipovic- commander of the Fourth Guard Brigade and Petar Barisic - commander of the HVO Training Recruit Center in Capljina.

However, HVO has more than planned number of brigadiers although the difference is not as large as with the generals since the B&H Army also has a significant brigadier "corps". According to the Agreement the ratio between Bosniac and Croatian officers and non-commissioned officers should be 2 to 1 because the B&H Army, as part of the VF, has 23 thousand military professionals and HVO 10 thousand. In addition, out of three corps, three are Bosniac and one Croatian.

What did Minister Prce promise?

On the basis of Dayton Peace Accords the SFOR Command in Bosnia and Herzegovina should have all the data on the number of men in the VF units and commands, as well as on the personnel composition of the generals with a view to coordinating the work of the B&H Army and HVO, especially the number of generals. That is why the Federal Minister of Defence, Miroslav Prce, promised the reduction of the number of 19 HVO generals by retiring a number of older generals or freezing of their rank and their deployment to posts in the civilian state authorities, e.g. ministries at different levels of the B&H Federation.

The statement which the Minister Prce and SFOR Commander Montgomery Miegs, recently signed together said that the misunderstanding had been patched up, emphasizing that violations, like the one Jelavic had committed, would not be allowed to happen again. SFOR said that it would return the confiscated arms, but the announcement on "the reconciliation" made no mention of the appointments and promotions. In all likelihood, efforts are exerted at reaching a compromise by subsequently issuing an approval for some promotions and denying the promotion of some other officers, like Rasic.

In any case, the decisive SFOR's action after Jelavic's personal "show" only proves that the international military forces monitor and assess everything done by the military of the two entities with great care, and insist on the application of the same standards for everyone. This can be a lesson to local civilian and military commanders not to test the SFOR's patience with the their anti-Dayton moves, if they are willing to listen to such a lesson.

DJURO KOZAR

(AIM SARAJEVO)