UCK FROM FOUNDATION TO THIS DAY

AIM Podgorica, 5 January, 1999

(For AIM Podgorica by correspondent from Pristina)

Among Albanian analysts, and in public in general, conviction that the conflict in Kosovo could have been prevented has not been eliminated. Although it is assessed that the conflict observed solely in the context of relations between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians was inevitable, there are opinions that world powers could have prevented the conflict had they remained resolute and consistent in the stands they had taken when the first conflicts had broken out. It is assessed that this could have succeeded if threats had remained convincing, perhaps even only of sharp economic and political isolation of Serbia, and it would have certainly succeeded if military threats issued in the beginning of October had been made at least ten months earlier. The basis of this opinion is that the conflict in Kosovo could have been predicted at least since autumn 1997.

No matter how predictable the conflict had been, in prewar months this evaluation had not been broadly accepted. It was accepted in Kosovo mostly by a narrow political segment of the Albanian movement and a small part of public workers, including few journalists who did not have special influence on the people and on creation of the public opinion. Parts of the Albanian movement which had until recently directed the Kosovo Albanian political and public life, even after the initial serious announcements of the tragic course of events, spoke of the fear of the people to even demonstrate, least of all to take up arms, radical rhetoric of a small number of people, agents of Serbian secret services, frustrated individuals... The rhetoric did not change even during major military operations last summer. Representatives of this part of the Kosovo Albanian movement headed by Ibrahim Rugova still spoke about few radical Albanian groups which had taken up arms in despair because they had lost their dear ones and their property.

Rugova still speaks about groups of Albanians and ignores the existence of UCK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës - Liberation Army of Kosovo); he does not mention war but speaks of a difficult or serious situation, and in his New Year's address as the president, he appealed on the citizens to join efforts "...in order to attain more freedom and independence of Kosovo". The quoted words are the end of a linguistically very correct compound sentence which eliminates the possibility of a slip of the tongue. This means that Rugova really believes that even in the current circumstances Kosovo Albanians enjoy a certain level of freedom and independence. On the same day as Rugova's address, an interview was published in the press of the head of the political board of UCK Hashim Thaci who says about it: "Political subjects in Pristina should reject fear and become aware that Kosovo is occupied, that a war is waged here and that Kosovo must be liberated of Serb occupation".

Sudden evolvement of Serb repression into sporadic armed conflicts and then into war might not have been expected even by Belgrade. Until November 1997, repression was (or at least that is how Belgrade assessed it) within the limits of policy of intimidation aimed at breaking the political will of Kosovo Albanians for secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia. It was also believed in Belgrade that Albanian armed groups which call themselves the UCK were not a serious armed threat and least of all risk that leads to war. Because of that, the emphasis of the struggle against the UCK was put on propaganda, on presenting the whole Kosovo Albanian movement as a terrorist one in order to compromise it in the eyes of the great powers and the world public. By intensive propaganda against UCK at the time when Albanian media were mostly silent about it, Serbian media gave a significant contribution to recognition of UCK.

Belgrade became aware that these assessments were wrong only in the end of 1997. As it is known, on 26 November 1997, a direct armed clash occurred in Drenica between a convoy of about ten armoured and other police vehicles which had logistic support of the army, and a group of between 20 and 40 members of UCK. After 1981, that was the first time that Serbian forces encountered direct armed resistance of the Albanians and for the first time were forced to withdraw.

The conflict in Drenica showed that massive Serbian repression against Kosovo Albanians had quite contrary political and psychological effects and that the force of secret Albanian armed groups was by far greater than expected. That is the reason why in December that year and in January 1998, Belgrade significantly increased its armed forces in Kosovo and more or less directly the Army was involved in police operations. Along with the usual repression, Serbian authorities enormously increased the presence of armed forces in Kosovo. They put Drenica and the neighbouring regions in military and police quarantine and in this way practically abolished freedom of movement of people and goods, established a rigorous system of control on roads, greatly increased presence of different sorts of armoured vehicles, installed a large number of the so-called control points all over Kosovo, many of which were in fact field strongholds for supplies and for limited military and police operations, but also for shelling surrounding Albanian settlements... January and February were months of great police and army movements and every day people were wounded or killed, mostly Albanians.

However, it seems that Belgrade still had not counted on the possibility of an Albanian uprising and war such as the one fought in spring and summer last year. It estimated that enormous increase of army and police presence with increased repression were sufficient to prevent major conflicts. The regime did count on limited local rebellions, but it believed that the existing forces would be sufficient to put them down. With certain doubts and vacillation, Belgrade stuck to these essentially unrealistic assessments of development of the situation in Kosovo until the beginning of June last year. Only after failure of the first great Serbian army and police offensive in the end of May and the beginning of June, Belgrade finally became aware that proportions of Albanian armed resistance were much greater and more serious. In accordance with the new awareness and estimates, after a month and a half of preparations, in mid July, the second great offensive of the police and the army began. Conflicts in which Belgrade used powerful armoured forces and artillery and a part of its elite units including special police and army detachments lasted for almost three months, until mid October, when ceasefire was proclaimed.

When the conflict broke out in the end of February and the beginning of March last year, the main staff of the UCK had about 1,500 combatants under its command. However, despite maximum motivation to fight, the impression is that it was aware of limited possibilities concerning the number, training, armament and organization for combat against the powerful, well armed and professional Yugoslav army and police. According to what some of its founders say, although much remains in the dark, for the form of struggle it chose for itself at that time and in the given circumstances, UCK was more or less well organised. The only form of struggle for them was classical guerrilla resistance of quick attacks and equally quick departure from the place of the attack. In order to understand the later course of the war, one should have in mind that majority of the combatants of UCK were concentrated in Drenica. The main staff has probably also been there and commanded the operations in the field. But, many questions, especially the relations between the political and the military faction in the country and abroad, their roles and roles of certain personages still cannot be explained. There are a lot of obscurities and understatements in declarations of some of the protagonists. In any case there is no doubt that ever since it had begun issuing statements in public and taking responsibility for certain armed operations in Kosovo in the beginning of 1996, UCK had its centre of command, or its main staff. In the already mentioned interview Hashim Thachi said that UCK had its commander in chief who is respected by Kosovo Albanians.

That was the UCK in the prewar period. Atrocities committed by Serbian forces on Albanian civilians in the end of February and the beginning of March 1998 in some villages of Drenica and then the intervention in Decani-Djakovica region have profoundly changed the situation in Kosovo. The mentioned events have been drops in the cup which was already running over. The Albanian population moved and this movement soon developed into a mass uprising. The proportions it took and the speed with which it spread, although in just one, the western half of Kosovo, show that the uprising was not spontaneous after all, especially not in Dukaxhin plain which includes the broad territory in the triangle between Pec, Djakovica and Decani. The impression one gets is that in this region, UCK was less present than in other parts. Despite this, in the first few months of the conflict, especially in April and May, the uprising in this region was the mast massive. Such beginning was later the cause of a great fall of the uprising and armed resistance in general in the Dukaxhin plain. Besides, Serbian forces used the serious internal Albanian political and military splits, and in this very sensitive bordering region where the division was most prominent, struck the Albanian uprising the severest, not only military, but also psychological and political blows.

All things considered, UCK had not expected development of armed resistance would acquire proportions of a massive uprising. But, when the uprising broke out, it did its best to put itself in command and to direct it and command the resistance. UCK has mostly succeeded in this in the region of Drenica where it had taken root, and in the Shalja e Bajgores region which is between Podujevo and Kosovska Mitrovica and where it had organized the armed movement. It was quite successful in central and south-western parts of Kosovo which border Drenica, too, and it achieved very little in organizing resistance in Dukaxhin plain. They said that there was neither enough time nor cadre, and in some places, not even arms.

In the first five or six months of the conflict, one could say that UCK relied on people's enthusiasm. It was aware of the danger of such a situation and such disposition of the people. That is why it tried, but did not succeed in it, to resist it and direct it in the desirable direction. Carried by the tide of enthusiasm broad regions inhabited mainly or almost exclusivery by Kosovo Albanians were overnight proclaimed free territories. In mid July last year, on the eve of the second Serbian offensive, it was assessed that UCK controlled one third and even up to half of the total territory of Kosovo and that it had between 40 and 50 thousand combatants in its ranks. But this impressive growth still had to be proved.

At the time of the second, summer military offensive of Serbian forces, UCK lost control of most of the free territories. A part of its troops which had joined it on the tide of the uprising, left its ranks. Outside Kosovo it was estimated that UCK had suffered blows which it would not be able to recover from. These were mostly Serbian estimates based on the number of civilian victims and demolitions. In fact, UCK itself had not suffered significant losses of men. It is estimated that in the course of the whole last year, UCK lost 300 members at the most. Except for the Dukaxhin plain where the uprising developed in very complex conditions, in all the other parts UCK preserved its commanding cadre, its organization network, its main force, and even its logistics.

Analysts believe that during he second offensive, UCK reinforced its hierarchy and for the first time started to apply elastic forms of battle both in attacks and in defence. Novelties were introduced in organization and military command from the main staff to the smallest units in the field. The most significant novelties are entrusting professional soldiers with military operations, defining of different military specializations and creation of mobile units which live pure soldires' lives and fight wherever need may arise. It is estimated that at the moment UCK has about 30 thousand men, and that between six and ten thousand of them are in the so-called mobile units.

Fehim REXHEPI