UNITING OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATS IN B&H

Sarajevo Jan 20, 1999

LEADERSHIPS OF SDP AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF B&H FINALLY DECIDE TO FORM ONE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

The united Social Democrats have a great, but also probably the last chance to take the destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina in their hands

AIM SARAJEVO, January 11, 1999

Ten years after the fall of communism and disintegration of former Yugoslavia and three years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the end of a tragic war, a new political force is being shaped on the political scene of Bosnia and Herzegovina - the social democrats. Such conclusion reached by many analysts of the political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the past period, results from a fact that at the very end of the past year two until now strongest political parties of Bosnia and Herzegovina of social democratic orientation - the Social Democratic Party of B&H and the Social Democrats of B&H - have reached an agreement to unite into a single Social Democratic Party.

Behind this seemingly simple fact there is a brief, but tumultuous past of social democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina or at least of that implied by that term. New states were created in the space of former Yugoslavia not only through the process of democratization of political and social trends, but at the same time through the process of strong national homogenization and nationalistic euphoria. The Serbian nationalisms in rump Yugoslavia and the Croatian in new Croatia, created rigid totalitarian regimes of Slobodan Milosevic i.e. Franjo Tudjman, direct authors of the Bosnian war cataclysm, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina three nationalisms (Serbian, Croatian and Bosniac) caused inter-ethnic conflicts the tragic consequences of which will prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from becoming a normal state for a long time to come.

The existing Bosnian political paradox is based precisely on the fact that these nationalistic parties have been winning the elections for the last ten years. The policy of national homogenization has practically frustrated any other, especially democratic, option. Unfortunately, the true process of the democratization of the society did not start with the fall of communism. During the war the most rigid nationalistic - religious animosities had culminated even acquiring the proportions of genocide, mass crimes and unfathomable devastation. Only after Dayton, with the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and with comprehensive efforts of the international community did a long and slow, but still unstoppable process of the true political and social transformation of the country begin. In that process of the democratization of the society, social democracy as a political option has an important and, as can be shown, decisive role.

However, during the last ten years social democracy in B&H was only a political option of defeat and hope, just one of many, practically impotent, political ideologies. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia both the reformed communists rallied within the Social Democratic Party of B&H (political successor of the League of Communists), as well as reformed communists rallied in the then Alliance of the Reform Forces of the last Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic, along with many other minor political groups (which in 1990, on the eve of the so called first democratic elections after the fall of communism, sprang up like mushrooms after the rain) failed to put an end to the general nationalistic euphoria in B&H and prevent a major electoral victory (in 1990) of three powerful nationalistic

  • religious parties (the Serbian SDS, the Croatian HDZ and the Bosniac SDA)on the B&H political scene. Each of these three parties rallied and homogenized large parts of "their nations", opposing each other and at the same time forming a powerful anti-democratic political bloc which has successfully thwarted the electoral victory of social democratic forces.

It should be mentioned that social democrats are to blame for this also. Namely, for ten years they failed in all their attempts at getting together and uniting into a strong party or bloc capable of defeating the powerful rule of nationalistic parties. They had the first chance, which they missed, even before the first general parliamentary elections in November 1990 immediately after the formation of nationalistic parties. At that time Ante Markovic did not succeed in rallying around himself several democratic parties and serious defeat which he suffered at these first elections broke apart even those few he had managed to get together. But, at the multiparty elections held after the war the nationalistic parties won again, not only because of their strength, but also because of political disagreement between the remaining disunited and fragmentized democratic opposition and alternative forces.

Despite strong and open encouragement of the international community and persistent demands of certain national forces of democratic and civil orientation (especially the CIRCLE 99, Civil Forum from Tuzla and some non-governmental organizations in B&H Federation and the Republic of Srpska), leaders and leaderships of the two strongest social democratic parties - Social Democratic Party of B&H and the Social Democrats of B&H (reformed parties of the remaining Markovic's reformists - The United Social Democrats of B&H - UBSD) twice failed to unite and attract a significant percentage of undecided electoral abstainers (30 percent) despite the fact that the nationalistic political ideologies were growing weaker in the three years after Dayton and the insurmountable internal crisis among the ruling nationalistic parties.

The first attempt failed with the defeat of the Joint List (SDP, UBSD, MBO, HSS and the Republicans) at 1996 elections and its final disintegration that followed. Neither the attempts and pressures of alternative democratic forces aimed at uniting two strongest social democratic parties (SDP and the reformed UBSD: Social Democrats of B&H) before the 1998 elections nor the strong and open support of international community (Westendorp, the Socialist International, leaders of West European countries with social democratic governments) succeeded - leaderships of the two parties could not find a common language and frustrated the hopes and expectations of all those who wanted that union as the only way out of a continuous political crisis B&H has been going through after Dayton. At the recent elections the nationalistic parties won power, but this time weakened by their own internal crisis and (some) gradual strengthening of the democratic opposition - so that their victory was no longer convincing nor so easy to maintain.

But, although they did not win power at the last elections, the democratic forces gained new experience and knowledge. This primarily relates to the reinforced and encouraged Social Democratic Party of B&H led by a steady hand of Zlatko Lagumdzija, but also to electoral losers - the Social Democrats of B&H of Selim Beslagic whose political and personal charisma was insufficient to save them from electoral defeat, even in the Canton of Tuzla, in which they had the greatest ambitions.

However, even the latest victory of nationalistic forces and the most recent defeat of the social democratic bloc are actually illusory indicators of the current balance of powers. The deep crisis has caught the most radical political party in the Republic of Srpska - the Serbian Democratic Party. It lost its leading position there and is presently drawing its strength from its coalition with Nikola Poplasen's Radicals. But, the new political situation in this part of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the last elections, clearly shows that the political crisis is continuing and growing deeper. In the B&H Federation, on the other hand, the most powerful political party - Alija Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action - is not so superior as it used to be. The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) of B&H is being rapidly and definitely undermined by internal party crisis. Numerous small political parties have not only fragmented flabby electorate, but have scored negligible results. Bosniacs are still superior but only because of the existing Coalition for Integral and Democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Individually, apart from Izetbegovic's SDA, none of its members (Party for B&H, the Civil Democratic Party, the Liberal Party) would have any political weight irrespective of their leaders (H.Silajdzic, I.Spahic, R.Kadic). The HDZ dissidents and their new party NHI also had no luck at the elections nor could it have, realistically speaking, expected it. Apart from the fact that Selim Beslagic's Social Democrats of B&H did not score the expected electoral results, it is still true that Zlatko Lagumdzija's Social Democratic Party of B&H was the only one which made a marked progress and turned out to be the indisputable leader of all opposition social democratic forces.

It is precisely this fact that brought into being, unexpected for many, but logical initiative of the two social democratic parties to find a mode and definitely agree on their uniting, but this time without any external influence and pressures. Public speculations regarding this option started shortly after the elections, but the leaders of two parties kept their talks secret until they managed to reach an agreement. At the end of the last year, on December 27, 1998 political leaders Zlatko Lagumdzija and Selim Beslagic signed a protocol on the uniting of their parties in Tuzla. There are many reasons why this act can be considered a historic event not only in the brief biography of the social democratic movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in the more recent history of the state of B&H. The decision on the uniting was welcomed by all those forces which claimed from the very start that nationalistic movements were the greatest danger for the future of democracy and civil society in B&H.

The uniting of the two social democratic parties reaffirmed their position even more and raised their hopes that a change in the political atmosphere in the country can be expected soon. Particularly encouraged in their hopes were those numerous uncommitted voters, abstainers at the elections held so far, who were deeply and sincerely against nationalistic parties, but who were also frustrated by the hitherto discord and political short-sightedness of social democratic leaders and leaderships. Undoubtedly, their participation in the political electoral procedure will now rapidly increase and can be decisive for the future electoral outcome, already as of the next fall when elections for local authorities are planned.

There is no doubt that the new party will attract many new followers and that fact threw the until now sacrosanct nationalistic parties and leaders into panic. After the signing of the Protocol on the Uniting of the two Social Democratic Parties, even the charismatic Bosniac leader Alija Izetbegovic found it necessary to say that he himself felt as a social democrat, but of "European kind". There was much cynicism in his statement addressed to Social Democrats (links with the communist regime), but also unmasked awareness of the new political reality in which there is no bright future for his political movement, and ideology even less. True, Izetbegovic had a panic attack already in last July after leaders of the Bosnian&Herzegovinian Social Democrats had a "close encounter" with mighty leaders of the international community in Brussels.

His tactless statements at that time indicated that he had fully estimated the danger facing him. Despite theatrical announcements about his withdrawal from the electoral race, he was aware that that would mean a total political defeat of both his ideology and his party. He was left politically isolated in his charisma, under a terrible burden of uncertain destiny of his political heritage. He experienced the present act of the uniting of his most serious political opponents as a realization of his nightmare.

However, now Izetbegovic and the destiny of all current nationalistic options in B&H, at least concerning that which lies ahead, are less important for the social democrats and the entire political alternative of Bosnia and Herzegovina than that which the social democrats themselves should do at their first Congress of the new joint party scheduled for February 27, 1999 in Sarajevo and all that remains to be done after that. A decisive role could be played not only by the fact that the social democratic leaders have brought their stands close and reached almost an idyllic political agreement, but also by the unanimous support of their respective party memberships, broad democratic public in B&H and the entire international community, which is the one actually pulling all the important strings in this country.

The political strategy and tactics to be adopted at the forthcoming Congress will decide whether, at the next local elections, they will succeed, at least in major towns of Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e. in both entities) to defeat the current nationalistic power holders. If the decision on uniting and creating a new integral Social Democratic Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina is justifiably considered to be an expression of great political wisdom and courage of the social democratic leaders, then their pending political struggle for the victory of the democratic and civil option in B&H can rightly be considered a major political challenge in the face of which the united social democrats must demonstrate both their political maturity and responsibility.

The scare of social democracy is going around Bosnia and Herzegovina taking over the political space and relying on the time which is on its side. What will really happen in the forthcoming period mostly depends on whether the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, learning from bitter experience of the past tragedies and daily proof of the rigidity of current nationalistic authorities, will finally decide to place their trust in democratic ideas and goals of the social democratic bloc. In other words, whether they will render the necessary support to the new political party which would thus get a historic opportunity to turn the destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its citizens towards better future.

Slavko SANTIC (AIM, SARAJEVO)