With Massacre Against Dialogue?!

(For AIM Podgorica from correspondent from Pristina)

AIM Podgorica, 17 January, 1999

For those who look upon the crisis of Kosovo as a series of incidents, almost accidental occurrences, the massacre of the Albanians in the village of Racak comes as a surprise and as an event which stands out of the "normal" course. There are certain unclarities in it, but with certain effort they can be eliminated and it can become operational. Approximately this is the view of many especially abroad, who have despite certain differences and nuances concerning its essence, accepted Serbian explanations of the causes and status of the problem of Kosovo. The list of consequences of such a view is long, but the most significant ones probably are the (im)possibility to understand the nature of the problem and advocating of a solution within the existing conditions, which have led to the crisis and to the misfortune which is marked as war.

For Kosovo Albanians and those few in the world who are trying to penetrate to the most profound layers of the problem, the massacre in Racak is just one in a row of similar or identical events which inevitably rwbd to hapen in such a state of Albanian-Serb relations. That is why the insight into the existing situation and solutions within its limits are practically only the continuation of the agony with occasional short or long and more or less catastrophic eruptions of human misfortune and material destruction. Since Kosovo Albanians are not powerful enough to resolve the problem on their own, and as it appears neither are the Serbs, comprehension of the problem by those who are more powerful than the parties concerned and its partial improvement or correction, for the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians is something that could be said to be the inevitable evil destiny.

The problem of Kosovo cannot be understood and least of all resolved by putting out the minor or major fires which occasionally break out. There are numerous smouldering fires in Kosovo. That is why, putting out one or a few of them is not a sufficient condition for serious and promising negotiations. The most convincing confirmation of this are the developments registered in the past 20 odd days. Just after Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in the end of last year managed to establish ceasefire in the region between Podujevo and Kosovska Mitrovica and announced this as a convenient condition for the possible beginning of Albanian-Serbian negotiations, serious tensions arose when Serbian soldiers were taken prisoners by the UCK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës-Liberation Army of Kosovo) in that same region. When the soldiers were set free it was estimated as the most promising event for a good beginning of negotiations. Instead of confidence which was supposed to be reinforced by unformal gesture of reciprocity which Belgrade authorities would make by setting free a certain number of members of the UCK, the massacre of Albanians in Recak followed. It should not be disregarded that in the meantime almost incessantly minor or major conflicts occurred in the southwestern part of Kosovo, more precisely in the region between Stimje and Suva Reka and in the broad region of western Kosovo between Decani and Djakovica. In the context of these events, the massacre in Recak is a confirmation of the illusory approach to the problem, its resolution and negotiations.

The incessant occasional conflicts and the existence of several smouldering fires enable the parties in conflict to aggravate and undermine practical implementation of any probable negotiating initiative by instigating events which the other party cannot disregard. Such events can have multiple objectives. The crime in Racak should also be observed in this context. If the intention was to prevent the beginning of negotiations - it was a complete success. Deeply frustrated by the death of such a large number of innocent civilians more than 20 of whom were beastly mutilated, it is difficult to expect that any of the main Albanian political factions, including the most moderate ones, would agree to serious negotiations with the Serbian party.

By powerful political pressure on the UCK, KVM has so far managed to prevent some of the possible major violations of the ceasefire by the UCK. As the more powerful party which relies on legitimacy which KVM does not deny, Belgrade has interpreted this as the right to strike even several times heavier blows and to violate the agreement or break promises given concerning the number and position of its troops in Kosovo. It proved that in conditions of expressed unequality of the conflicting parties along with denied legality, equidistance in fact means pressure on the weaker party and in warlike conditions of Kosovo, direct favouring the stronger party. After the event in Recak, it is easy to imagine how the Albanian public will interpret declarations of foreign diplomats when Serbian soldiers were set free that a balanced agreement had been reached about it. To Albanian expectations that a certain number of members of the UCK would be released, Belgrade replied with a vindictive bloodshed of a large number of innocent Albanian civilians.

After this event, the question arises whether the ceasefire is still in force, in other words whether it is possible to maintain it. The Albanian party has so far been very critical about the way Serbian authorities and the KVM interpreted and evaluated conditions and the course of the ceasefire. It seems that there are serious doubts about it in the UCK. They became more visible after events in which Albanian civilians suffered. In such instances, some of its stands were sometimes interpreted in the world as rejection of the ceasefire. The UCK is expressing critical stands about the ceasefire after the event in Racak. They say that the UCK has accepted the ceasefire unilaterally and that it is not a signatory of any document about it. They also insist on the stand that the ceasefire enables Serbian forces free movement on the territory controlled by the UCK and therefore it made it easy for them to carry out armed operations in which mostly the Albanian population suffered. They also claim that the ceasefire has brought to the Albanian party great suffering of the people, especially among civilian population. However, despite criticism, it should not be expected that the UCK will formally renounce ceasefire. It is more likely that it will become more active depending on development of the military situation, primarily in order to protect its position, and as far as possible, the civilian populaion. In any case, the event in Racak is a great military and political challenge for the UCK.

Among numerous Serbian objectives of the crime in Racak, the main one had probably been to prevent different Albanian political factions from uniting even around a minimum political platform. The unclarified murder of the head of Kosovo Information Centre, Enver Maloku, the man who was in the narrow circle of Rugova's close associates, should also be considered in this context. Relying on unconditional adherence to negotiations of the moderate Albanian faction, Belgrade estimates that in forthcoming negotiations about uniting of all Albanian political factions on a minimum platform, after the event in Racak, the tense political atmosphere among Kosovo Albanians could become an additional factor in deepening internal divisions.

As known, representatives of Kosovo Albanians should talk about it in the next few days, and a definitive agreement on joint appearance opposite the Serbian party should be reached in Vienna in the end of this month. However, among Albanian observers there are those who believe that there are two ends to this Serbian calculation, in other words that it can cause quite contrary effects. Kosovo Albanian public has for years exerted pressure on its political leaders to formulate an agreement on most vital issues. Of all the attempts made in this sense in the past years, this is the most critical one and it is possible that under pressure of the public and the danger of political marginalisation it just might happen that this time long advocated, obviously just verbally, minimum internal Albanian unity will be achieved.

A large contribution to the efforts invested in this direction in the past weeks was given by the Albanian political forces in Tirana. Although at daggers drawn, causing great surprise of many in Albania and in the world, main political forces there overcame their differences concerning the question of Kosovo. The result of these efforts was the recent almost sensational meeting of the Albanian prime minister Pandeli Majko and Sali Berisha, former head of the state who is the head of the biggest Albanian opposition party. A few days ago, Belgrade has addressed so far the gravest accusations of Tirana concerning Kosovo. Tirana and Pristina, considered these accusations even as a possible intention of Belgrade to intervene militarily on the territory of Albania.

For the time being, the stand which prevails in Tirana is that primarily this is an instrument of pressure and that matters will not go that far. It is interesting that engagement of Tirana on the minimum union of Albanian forces in Kosovo coincides with the latest straining of relations between Tirana and Belgrade. From that angle, accusations of Belgrade primarily seem to be pressure exerted on Tirana to give up on further engagement in uniting the Albanian political factions in Kosovo. Both in Tirana and in Pristina it is concluded that this is a significant indicator of the extent to which Belgrade fears even the minimum unity of Kosovo Albanians and at the same time of the political significance this unity may have for the cause of Kosovo Albanians.

Fehim REXHEPI