Podujevo, And What Will be Next...?

(For AIM Podgorica by correspondent from Pristina)

AIM Podgorica, 25 December, 1998

Yesterday's heavy Serbian-Albanian clash near Podujevo is just the continuation of the conflicts registered during the ceasefire in other parts of Kosovo. As known, the ceasefire was proclaimed in mid October after the agreement reached in Belgrade by American envoy Richard Holbrooke and president of FR Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic. According to the number of engaged forces, the quantity of used firearms and the vastness of territory, the operation in Podujevo is the largest launched by Serbian forces in the conditions of ceasefire. Before this, the biggest operation was the one in a few villages of the Decani-Djakovica region. This operation was explained as the operation aimed at arresting the perpetrators of the murder of six Serbian young men in a cafe in Pec, and the latest as pursuit of the assassins who had killed a Serbian police inspector.

The region where the Podujevo operation took place spreads in the direction North-South for about 17 kilometres. The whole region with its ten odd, mostly lowland villages has been controlled by the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK). It lies to the west of a strategically significant road which connects Belgrade and a part of Serbia via Podujevo with Pristina and which leads further on to Skopje and Macedonia. Further on to the west this region leans on to the mountaneous region Sala e Bajgores, also controlled by the UCK, which leads to the road Kosovska Mitrovica - Vucitrn which connects this whole space to Drenica.

The fact that the zone where armed operations took place is between the main road Podujevo-Pristina, and Shala e Najgores is of essential significance in comprehending the frametwork, the motives and the objectives of the operation. Primarily one should have in mind that during the operations last summer Serbian forces did not succeed in penetrating into this territory and that the whole organization network in this space has remained intact. It is assumed that on this territory, the UCK has exceeded the other regions concerning military organization, professionalization and readiness.

Probably that is the reason why in that narrow space Serbian authorities engaged about one hundred military and police vehicles, about 50 of which according to Albanian sources, and about 40 of which according to foreign ones were armoured vehicles, mostly transporters and tanks. The region was shelled mostly by mortars and cannons. At least one killed Albanian is mentioned, but there are still no reliable information about victims. Albanian sources inform that in some places severe conflicts took place and local forces of the UCK destroyed several Serbian military and police vehicles. Inhabitants of a few Albanian villages were evacuated to more peaceful neighbouring regions.

Serbian explanations, official and unofficial, were somewhat contradictory or vague. The police stated that members of the police had withdrawn and that the whole operation was ended in the course of the afternoon. However, referring to Serbian government sources, it was stated in OSCE last night that military units had not withdrawn. From government and police sources it could be heard that this local police operation had been launched with the aim to arrest the attacker who had killed a police inspector. Official military sources stated that the army had its usual drill in this region. In the course of the drill, an attack was performed in which two of its members were wounded.

These are the customary explanations of Serbian authorities for all armed operations they are performming in Kosovo for more than a year now. All repressive and forcible operations against Kosovo Albanians in the past 18 years were explained in the same manner. The latest two armed operations, the one in the region of Decani and Djakovica that took place in mid December and the current one in Podujevo are typical examples of lack of conviction of this custom. The operation with armoured and other vehicles in the Decani-Djakovica region was allegedly performed in order to arrest the perpetrator of the crime in the cafe in Pec. At least two fact show that it was probably the immediate cause to take a reprisal, that is, an operation with purely military and political objectives. The first is that this region is at least about 30 kilometres from Pec. And second, from the beginning of the Kosovo conflict, it was known as a significant stronghold of the UCK in the western part of Kosovo, and it is mostly still under its control. Two Kosovo Albanians were killed in this operation. There were arrests, many inhabitants have left their villages, but there has been no official statement in which it could be claimed with certainty that real perpetrators of the murder in Pec cafe had been arrested, except for the accompanying regular propaganda of the government media which usually a priori proclaim the arrested persons guilty of crime. Concentration of Serbian forces had been obvious from before, the attack had been expected at least for the past week, and the police inspector had been killed three days before the beginning of the operation.

Explanations linked to unfavourable trends in the field and in the sphere of diplomacy should be more convincing. In Kosovo, a ceasefire is expected to be in force which has not been signed by the conflicting parties, and about which neither rules of behavior have been prescribed nor where responsibility for its implementation lies. All things considered, expectations that it would be established and that it would hold solely on threats and pressure from abroad were evidently unfounded. It is also evident that nobody predicted that the confusion would be used by the conflicting parties to achieve their political goals in the conditions of ceasefire.

The attempts of foreign observers, and verifiers to fill in these significant gaps in the agreement, mostly by verbal and other agreements with local commanders of the UCK and Serbian police units, due to essential incompleteness of the ceasefire, have not had chances for success from the very beginning. The first and it was assumed the firmest local agreement on the ceasefire was reached for the very region where the latest operation took place. It is not at all insignificant that the local agreement on ceasefire which had seemed to be the most stable one, was violated by breaking out of the biggest conflict registered in Kosovo since ceasefire was proclaimed in mid October.

After several announced time limits for reaching of the Albanian-Serbian agreement and their postponements, it turned out also during the ceasefire that the mediating diplomatic mission of American ambassador Chrisopher Hill had not succeeded. Indeed, more precisely, this form of mediation in resolving the crisis of Kosovo had not succeeded. It seems that now attempts are made to find a new form of mediation, but stands about it have not been clarified or coordinated.

Such course of affairs directly affects the role of the verification mission. The impression is that even they do not see things quite clearly either. Their reports which reach the public indicate that they consider themselves to be field workers for the needs of international diplomacy. However, reducing their role solely to this function conceals the danger of pragmatic instrumentalization. This will not be avoided if efforts are not made to overcome the already existing tendency to adjust facts in the field to daily needs and priorities of international diplomacy. Such adjustment of facts will not help diplomacy much, indeed it may compromise the whole verification mission.

However, one should not disregard the fact that the profile of the mission still has not been clearly defined. The situation itself dictates the vagueness and developments will probably directly bring about clear defining of its role. It seems that the verification mission is heading towards transformation into a mission for establishment, maintenance and imposing ceasefire. This role has become most transparent during the operation in Podujevo. The verifiers directly followed the situation and with their concealed advices and demands probably assisted in creation of the need of one or both parties to withdraw to starting positions. These are in fact the concealed good offices given in the most discreet way.

The operation in Podujevo should be registered as the biggest breach of the ceasefire in Kosovo, but also as an event which can be a lesson for everyone. In western capitals, especially in NATO it was condemned as an incident which should not be repeated. Secretary general of NATO Javier Solana reminded that the threat with bombing was still effective. From these reactions Belgrade could reach the conclusion that the latest criticism addressed by the west to the UCK should not be interpreted as approval of any sort of military or other action, especially not against the ethnic Albanian population. A significant lesson for Belgrade should also be the fact confirmed in the Podujevo operation that UCK is becoming a factor which should not be underestimated.

December developments warn UCK that it should avoid acting in the manner which causes criticism of the west and which could be used by Serbian authorities as a pretext for minor or major military and police operations. Despite sharp rhetoric and threats, leadership of UCK is aware that the ceasefire, even unstable as it is, is in the best interest of UCK and Kosovo Albanians. That is why the formulation in the yesterday's statement of the UCK main staff that the ceasefire was losing its sense after the Podujevo operation should not be interpreted as countermanding readiness to respect the ceasefire. At worst it may mean that members of UCK, as one of its representatives said, would reply to Serbian attacks.

Fehim REXHEPI