Destiny of the Prime Minister

What After Dodik?

Dodik has succeeded to the extent to which the number of candidates for prime minister has increased in comparison with January, and he failed because this post will most probably slip out of his hands

AIM Banja Luka, 7 December, 1998

The latest session of the parliament in Banja Luka has left the cabinet of Milorad Dodik speechless as none before. This is quite understandable: first, under pressure of the opposition and its coalition partners, it was forced to retreat and withdraw the decision on the exchange rate of the convertible mark with that of the Yugoslav dinar, and then, the parliament rejected government recommendation to Dragan Kalinic to return his mandate and not force the deputies to wait for 90 days. If after that session Dodik has really become, as Kalinic predicted, "departing prime minister", this entanglement is the result of three things none of which is destiny.

First, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) has never forgotten the warmth around the heart created by possession of power; second, Serb reformists have forgotten how the SDS does things when it is in power, and third, Dodik had to stumble on every obstacle his political opponents have put in front of him in the course of the past ten months. Finally, the SDS has not improved one little bit its opinion about him since that night in January in Bijeljina when they realized that the sky would not tumble down on them if someone who is not a member of their party became the prime minister of RS; the Radicals claim that every kilogram of Dodik's large figure is treacherous; his coalition partners have their own ambitions and claim that the prime minister has quarrelled them with everybody else (that is, with Belgrade) for the sake of love of the wavering and perfidious international community; the Bosniacs have raised their hands in favour of Dodik in the parliament only because they were told to do so by Westendorp, but they were aware that by doing it they would take more blame for everything that was happening than they would have if Krajisnik or Klickovic had been sitting in Dodik's place; the international community, the last stronghold of the current Serb prime minister, seems to be increasingly convinced that it is more profitable to trade Dodik than to unconditionally support him.

PRICE OF PRIME MINISTER'S HIDE: Therefore, on the political stock exchange, Dodik's stocks fare worse than ever. Is this their real value? No. The calculation is simple: he has succeeded to the extent to which the number of candidates for prime minister has increased in comparison with January, and he has failed because this post could slip away from his hands. When he became prime minister, Dodik took over the post as one of the rare ones who still believe that something could be done. The economy was stifled by the black market; the international community considered RS as an enterprise which would be the most profitable if shut down; getting a lottery prize was more common in RS than receiving a salary; patriotism was somehow becoming impossible to live off; in Sarajevo, the relation between the Federation and RS was most commonly illustrated as the relation between two Koreas... Having realized that in RS power was held by neither those who won it in the elections, nor by those who were given it by Westendorp, but by the one who grabbed it more firmly, Dodik chose a clear division of jobs: the international community would distribute salaries and pensions to the people, and he would walk behind and break all the opponents. That is the reason why Dodik's success cannot be measured by flourishing of democracy in RS, because only someone who realized what power of the SDS was based on and who resembles the SDS at least as much as Dodik does could grapple with it. That is why after his ten months in power, those who wished flourishing of the economy and democratic freedoms were left disappointed; people could eat more regularly, but did not have anything better to eat, the authorities beat less frequently, but more severely. Even more disappointed were those who believed that God had said that RS would be ruled by Krajisnik, even if he were not called that. There was less crime and corruption during Dodik's mandate, but the number of unresolved cases of them increased by the number of those from the new authorities who were not immune to crime and bribery. That is why the question of evaluation of Dodik's government is a question of point of view: whether the glass is half-empty or half-full.

Supporters of the first point of view will say that Dodik mercilessly broke down the power of Pale; they will claim that he sent away directors of government enterprises which are nowadays, instead of working, queueing for international aid; they will say that he tamed Serb Radio-Television which is nowadays broadcasting less program than it did in 1992; they will tell that he shattered SRNA by moving it from Pale... Those who see all that as a half-full glass will have strong counter-arguments without denying any of what has been said; is there anyone who would more willingly rule RS with Pale as powerful as it used to be than as it is now, is there anyone who would more willingly control Serb government enterprises and media after the Pale administration than after this one. There is not, of course.

To cut a long story short, the greatest Dodik's merit is that he rolled up his sleeves and grappled with and broke the rule of Pale. His greatest weakness was that he did not know how to put it all back together. This means that he demonstrated all the virtues and weaknesses of transitional governments: that he compromised democracy because he lacked feeling for it, but perhaps due to that very feature, even among the ranks of the SDS itself, he dismantled the futile epic nationalism which he lacked even more feeling for. That is why Dodik's political career is at this moment faced with the greatest challenge ever: with this government, in these circumstances and with these manners, he hardly has anything to offer. On the other hand, forces which believe that this government should be sacrificed for the sake of reforms are still weak. At the same time, those who intend to proclaim Dodik's ten months a bad period for RS are much stronger, but they should thank him for having freed them of political deadend streets from which they were unable to find a way out.

THREE POSSIBILITIES: The problem is, however, that at this moment what they all have in common is the idea that Dodik must go. They also agree that the prime minister should remain in power only for as long as it is necessary for the Madrid conference to be over, where both RS and the Federation will be proclaimed entities politically and psychologically under age so they will get new guardians and keep the old ones who will get even thicker sticks in the Spanish capital which they will be able to punish them with for every wrong move they make. The other event opponents would not like to spoil for Dodik is arbitration for Brcko which will again, evidently, not become part of RS more than it is of the Federation. These two events, along with the arrest of general Krstic and a few other unpleasant episodes which are about to happen and which Dodik will have to approve (just as everybody else in his place would have to approve), will certainly further weaken him. If he does not manage to preserve power, RS will have one of the three possible governments. The first is the union of enlightened members of the SDS and moderate reformists which is manifested through the offer made by Pale to Mladen Ivanic to accept the mandate. For something like that, Ivanic has a too high opinion of himself. He simply does not think that he has been collecting all his moral and other credits during all these years to squander them in just a few months because without a party to back him he would just be manipulated in the government. In case Kalinic gathers support of parliamentary majority, the second possibility is the government of the SDS and the Radicals. Such an outcome is just as probable as the possibility that Westendorp build a summer cottage for himself in Pale. The third possibility would be an alliance of dubious reformists, members of the SDS and Radicals, which would bring forth a candidate for prime minister from Harmony coalition whose name would not be Milorad Dodik. Relation of forces in such a coalition which would try to create some kind of a government of national unity, would be such that in about six months Slobodan Milosevic would move into RS again in grand style. Briefly, with or without Dodik, RS will choose between two evils. But we are used to doing that.

Zeljko Cvijanovic

(AIM)