Dangerous Balkan Parallels

Podgorica Nov 20, 1998

AIM Tirana, 12 November, 1998

After a comparatively long spell of peace, in the south of Albania, the old thesis of Greek ultranationalism on Vorio Ipiros came back to life in very sharp polemics. Regardless of the fact that a prolonged honeymoon continues between the governments in Tirana and Athens, on the pages of the press of the Greek minority distributed in the regions of Gjirokaster and Sarande, where members of the Greek minority live, old aspirations of extremist circles in Athens which often caused acute problems between the two Balkan countries, unexpectedly came back to life. Journals Ta Nea and Llaiako Vima, both in Greek, raised aggressive tones almost in unison, openly demanding secession of southern Albania considering it to be a part of Greece. However, what immediately strikes one in this new campaign is the parallel drawn between the question of Greek minority in Albania and the tragic drama of Kosovo which attention is focused on and which the international community has been engaged in for quite some time. More or less, the thesis that what ethnic Albanians in Kosovo will demand should also be given to ethnic Greeks in Albania. Nevertheless, in this comparison which reminds of the physical relation between an elephant and a mouse, explanation should be sought for the newly released tide of nationalism in the south of Albania.

Who Moves the Puppets

Renewal of the main theses of Greek nationalism about the so-called Vorio Ipirus can by no means be an accident just as it was no accident in the past seven years. It is a fact that these theses have never come from official Athens; they are always introduced by certain extremist circles which undisturbed carry on their activities in Greece and certain groups of Greek minority in Albania.

Anybody who knows anything about southern Albania knows that by now, in the villages of Djirokaster and Saranda, only the elderly have remained and all the others have gone to Greece a long time ago, where they work almost in the same conditions, it should be said distriminatory, as other Albanian immigrants over there. This means that renewal of the call of Sebastianos, known metropolitan in Konispol who died preaching against the Albanian state, is not meant to awaken scarce Greeks in the south of the country. On the other hand, traditional organization of the Greek minority called Omonia and political representatives of Greek minority in Albania are considered to be puppets whose strings are pulled from Athens. The same is believed for the press in Greek printed in Gjirokaster. The question which arises is for whom the Helenic bells toll in southern Albania?

Athens - Moscow - Belgrade

The conflict and coincidence of political interests of different countries in the Balkans in the crisis in Kosovo seems to be the reason for new stirring up of old speculations in the south of Albania. At the time when monstrous crimes of the Serbs against the Albanian population have shaken the whole world and forced it to deliver an ultimatum to Milosevic, Athens, similarly to Kremlin, declared itself against armed intervention against Serbia. The approach of Eisenhauer aircraft carrier to the coast of Montenegro and raised voices against Milosevic in the rhetoric of leaders of the world powers as a serious threat to military machinery of Belgrade, seem to have caused red alert not only in Belgrade, but also among its traditional allies.

At the time when there is nobody to protect Milosevic because of the fact and undeniable evidence offered by screens of the media around the world, the best help for Belgrade would be to fabricate a new conflict, which, although it might not completely divert attention from the massacre of the Albanians in Prekaze, Drenica and other zones of Kosovo, it might at least face the West with a new and unpredicted challenge among all the challenges abundantly offered by the Balkan at all times. For all those world powers and mighty politicians who were convinced that justice was on the side of the Albanians and that Milosevic understands only the language of force, revival of the old Greek-Albanian conflict would be a big reason for abolition of the decision to use force, if there had ever been any serious will to do it. That is why stirring of the forgotten Greek-Albanian polemics in the south of Albania cannot be assessed as anything bigger than stimulating members of the minorities to fabricate problems between Tirana and Athens at the time when all eyes are fixed on mass graves or coffins of adolescents in Kosovo.

This means that conclusion was reached in Athens that this time the USA and Europe really meant it when they threatened the Serbs and that was the reason why some people thought that wrath of the big ones towards Milosevic could be appeased if they were reminded that the map of the Balkan was very complicated and that Belgrade and the problem of Kosovo were insignificant.

It is impossible to explain in any other way the unexpected and savage ultranationalistic outburst of passions in the press of the Greek minority, especially because in articles published in Greek, a parallel is drawn between southern Albania and Kosovo. However, if coincidence with straining of the situation in Kosovo clearly indicates the operation of the known axis between Moscow, Belgrade and Athens, it is still necessary to clarify their actual effects on significant political protagonists on the new map of the Balkan.

Water in the Fire Lit for Kosovo

It is primarily necessary to clarify which audience this unexpected revival of the theses of Greek nationalistic circles is addressed to. Not only in Athens but also in Gjirokaster, there is no illusion about the possible sharp reaction of the Albanian government from nationalistic positions.

Former prime minister Fatos Nano was in the focus of accusations because of his inconsistent stands concerning Kosovo at a few international meetings, most important of which are the summit in Crete and the one in Lisbon, while he never tried to conceal orientation of his foreign policy towards Athens. Albanian foreign minister Pascal Milo who has remained at the post after the fall pf Nano's government in September, was more careful than his chief in his public appearances.

In fact, as expected, there have been no official reactions to the appeals of the press in Greek published in Albania, because there is not a single formal predisposition of the government to do it, especially since the cabinet has just been changed after riots in Tirana on 14 September. The only public declaration of the government concerning this issue is that of minister Milo who answered to a journalist that if newspaper articles in Greek contained any anti-Constitutional demands, it is the judiciary that should be set in motion, and not the ministry of foreign affairs.

However, a few rightist journals close to Berisha reacted sharply to this issue, marking this as a return of danger coming to this country from the south. Threfore, the press, or more porecisely one of its parts, remained the only ground on which the new battle was fought for ultranationalistic Greek theses which spring up in the south of Albania whenever someone in Athens sees fit. This is sufficient, of course, for creation of the idea that in the Balkan it is not only difficult to establish new determinants, but it is extremely difficult to preserve the old ones because of dangerous winds of primitive Balkan nationalisms. That is why this sudden opening of the Albanian -Greek problem in the south of Albania should be looked upon as a bucket of water that should be thrown on to the fire lit between Belgrade and the West because of the problem of Kosovo.

In the meantime, scratching of the old wound, regardless of the motives, reminds the Albanians that the Greek minority in the south of Albania will be an unexploded shell in relations between Albania and Greece for a long time to come, which will swing from the massacre in Peshkepi, the red hot point of the conflict between the two countries in 1994 and the memorandum on friendship and understanding signed a year later, at the time when Tirana and Athens left their history of conflicts, divisions and borders behind.

AIM Tirana

Astrit PATOZI