Unsigned Ceasefire?

What Happens After Withdrawal of Army and Police Forces

(From AIM Podgorica Correspondent from Pristina)

AIM Podgorica, 28 October, 1998

Whether 26 and 27 October 1998 - the day when several thousand army and police troops withdrew from the territory of Kosovo or into their local bases, including all kinds of machinery equipment, tanks, heavy artillery, transporters and other combat and ordinary vehicles - will be important dates in the history of Serb and Albanian party will be known in a very short time. Until that time comes, it is quite certain that danger has been eliminated again of great powers becoming really angry and exerting more pressure on Slobodan Milosevic again, pushing him into an even deeper chasm. For the beginning he was praised that he had begun seriously to implement demands of the Resolution of UN Security Council. Some of the deadlines for meeting obligations have already passed, and some still lay ahead of Milosevic...

In the past week, members of antiterrorist units have withdrawn, along with police reinforcements which since March (the beginning of the open Serb-Albanian conflict) had been arriving in Kosovo every day. However, they withdrew in a symbolic numbers. It was especially hard to conceal their repositioning inside Kosovo, against which NATO observers were warning, who were following the movements from great heights. The analysts were estimating, however, that withdrawal into garrisons, police stations or departure from Kosovo would be transparent and that it would take place at a minute to twelve, which proved to be correct. High NATO officials were also pointing that out while visiting Belgrade and departing with promises of Slobodan Milosevic and the army and police leadership that the obligations from Security Council Resolution 1199 would be fully implemented. Nevertheless, the nine-year long situation in Kosovo contrubuted to deeply rooted suspicion among Kosovo Albanians that this massive withdrawal was not real. Moderate Albanian circles also registered the withdrawal, but they also quoted statements of the inhabitants of some villages that they were told not to touch the abandoned points, because allegedly the police would return. Others openly declare that this is just a performance for the international community, but the number of those who believe that the majority of troops have remained in Kosovo and that with the weapons they have at their disposal it is possible to hit targets from great distance, "as they have done so far". Whether they are radical or cautious, it is difficult to estimate in the circumstances of strained ceasefire, but it is certain that it could not have been expected that in just a week, the destroyed Serb-Albanian mutual trust could have been re-established, especially because the stand is spreading among Kosovo Albanians that the international community has just given Milosevic another chance and that he has remained unpunished.

Nevertheless, international diplomatic observing missions are confirming withdrawal both of the army and the police. In a meeting with the journalists, just a few hours after the expiry of the ultimatum given to Belgrade, head of American diplomatic mission, Sean Burns, declared in Pristina that the observers had noted significant withdrawal of army and police forces from Kosovo, that is, that in the past 24 hours there had been no violations of ceasefire. He also confirmed that, according to information he had, only three units the size of companies were still outside military barracks - one near Dulj, between Stimlje and Suva Seka, the second - seven kilometres west of Pristina, and the third to the southwest of Klina on the road to Pec, stating the estimate that in the past two days 4,100 policemen had left Kosovo and that all police control points had been removed.

According to other available information, at the Pristina railway station, eight police transporters and combat vehicles, a military trailer truck and two police cars were loaded on a train, and another police convoy was withdrawn from near the village of Malisevo on the road between Pristina and Kosovoska Mitrovica and left to Serbia via Podujevo. And while the official Serbian and military sources have not issued a single statement on the number of withdrawn machinery and troops, Albanian sources were reporting on mass withdrawals from almost all municipalities in Kosovo, especially referring to the best known points at the entrance to the town of Podujevo and Komoran in municipality of Glogovac, where armed incidents had been very frequent, mentioning in their information the departure from Feronikl factory in the Glogovac municipality and some village school buildings. It was stated, among other, that only from Podujevo, more than 100 bus-loads of policemen had left and gone in the direction of Serbia.

However, hardly 24 hours have passed since Serbian police and army abandoned their posts, when new uncertainty came in sight - unconcealed return of members of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (OVK) to the territories previously controlled by Serbian armed forces, who were observed even on the roads. This was confirmed by representatives of diplomatic missions. Sean Burns stressed, however, that there had been no information that they had put up their control points anywhere, expressing hope that armed Kosovo Albanians would also meet the demands of the international community. At first sight this answer could be classified as a "relaxed" one, especially when one has in mind the evident disturbance among the Serb population. In his latest appearance in front of the journalists, political representative of the OVK Adem Demaqi answered to the same question as follows: "The OVK is on its land, in its villages and homes, where the whole people is, so it is wrongly believed that return of people to their homes allegedly is using the opportunity, that is, the circumstances for regaining earlier positions". He also guaranteed to all the Serbs in Kosovo that nothing would happen to them after withdrawal of Serbian forces if they had not participated in armed operations. But, certain facts speak more than could be assumed. The political representative of the OVK in several answers to numerous questions put to him by the journalists said a few sentences which, when put together, form an interesting message. Demaqi first declared that an agreement was reached by the international monitoring mission and the OVK concerning their deployment and, as he put it, stands, hoping that unilateral self-restraint of the OVK would some day turn into an agreement on ceasefire which would be more productive and more stable. Then he stressed that the OVK would remain in places inhabited by the Albanian population and that it would not enter places with mixed population, because there are plenty of problems there, said Demaqi, as it is. He also explained that this was no ceasefire, but self-restraint, admitting that in international circles the OVK was not recognised as one of the parties, and that signing of a ceasefire requires two parties.

Rumours spread around political lobbies that American diplomatic observers in separate contacts a few days ago reached allegedly a kind of a verbal agreement with the police and members of the armed Kosovo Albanians concerning control of certain parts of Kosovo. One could even hear that territores had been determined which would be controlled by each of the parties. Just a few hours after these Demaqi'e statements, some foreign media informed, referring to American diplomats who wished to remain anonymous, that the American diplomatic mission had for some time been the contact between members of the OVK and Serbian forces in the attempt to reach some kind of an agreement on the conduct of the OVK after withdrawal of police from Kosovo.

Should this prove to be true, the question which arises is whether the international community has actually made a compromise with the OVK in this way, in order to ensure success of the whole mission in Kosovo. For some time Demaqi has been sending messages to NATO and the OSCE that they should also sign some document with armed Kosovo Albanians, explaining that they were an actual force in Kosovo. However, in view of the fact that the international community is at this moment turned towards the moderate Rugova and his option of political solving of the problem, not wishing to antagonise official Belgrade which considers members of the OVK terrorists, agreeing to become involved with the OVK would just further complicate the relations with Serbian authorities, and maybe even with Russia itself, since its minister of defence has called members of the OVK bandits. The only thing that is evident on all international levels - both political and military - is that for the time being hope is expressed that armed Albanians will cooperate with the international community, and implement the Security Council resolution, and that they are mildly warned not to try to jeopardise the "ceasefire" in the field. It could not be heard what sanctions would be applied on the contrary. But perhaps the contact of the international community with the OVK is much closer than visible on the surface.

Nevertheless, the activity of American diplomats is increasingly intense. Like for who knows how many times before, American mediator for Kosovo, Christipher Hill is announcing his visit to Pristina where he has left lawyers of the State Department to re-examine with Kosovo negotiators their complaints on the offered project on resolving the transitional status of Kosovo. The only thing that is known is that one of them is in charge of providing conditions for deployment of Serbian and Albanian policemen on the territory of Kosovo according to the Annex on police which is not exactly acceptable for either of the conflicting parties. Of course, if new and more acceptable ideas do not arise behind the scene. Obviously with the intention to reach an agreement, Demaqi, one of supporters of an influential international mediator between Pristina and Belgrade, declared yesterday that establishment of the governemnt of Kosovo with representatives from a broad spectre of political parties and groups might also broaden the negotiating team of Kosovo Albanians which would directly negotiate with Serbian authorities without Richard Holbrooke and Christopher Hill "in order to reach an optimum and quick solution which is in the interest of both parties". Referring to data from an article in The New York Times that the Miloasevic-Holbrooke agreement envisaged that Serbia keep in Kosovo 12,500 soldiers and 6,000 policemen in the course of next three years, he calculated that until 1989 there had been 3,500 policemen and 6,000 soldiers there. According to him, "international standards for the ratio between the police and army and the total number of population are as follows: one policemen per 3,000 inhabitants, and one soldier per 50,000 inhabitants. This would mean that according to the alleged agreement between Milosevic and Holbrooke, there would be one policeman and one soldier per 200 inhabitants of Kosovo."

Analysts of Kosovo developments believe that American and European mediators will be engaged in realization of a few key points: formation of the police, deployment of international observers, that is, the OSCE verification mission, and reaching of the agreement on transitional status of Kosovo, while, according to them, details of the agreement will be resolved by the conflicting parties. According to this, and conclusions of the Government of Serbia which was supported by the federal, 2 November will be one of the key dates set by Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement.

Anton BUSHATI

(AIM)