Situation Calls for NATO
Pristina, 30 September, 1998
Since the end of last week, Serbian authorities have been informing about the end of armed operations and withdrawal of the forces into barracks. This was published several times in the past four or five days, but in fact the operations continued. It was first said during the operation in Drenica last week. However, not only had the operation continued, but after two or three days, on 27 September, a new one was initiated in south-western part of Kosovo. On Tuesday, 29 September, on the third day of the operation in that part of Kosovo, the operation in Drenica was resumed and lasted through 30 September.
On Tuesday, 29 September, foreign news agencies carried numerous information on withdrawal of Serbian forces to barracks. Some world media illustrated this by slides showing army tanks which were withdrawing from crisis-stricken regions and moving in a long convoy towards the army baracks in Pristina. That very same day, Albanian sources informed about entrance of a long convoy of between 200 and 250 tanks into Podujevo from Serbia and about its proceeding towards Pristina. Noone from the authorities denied this.
By the latest hubbub about withdrawal of forces to barracks and threats about restoration of armed operations, Belgrade has finally admitted at least two things. First, during the entire course of the latest war, it had persistently and resolutely denied participation of the army in operations in Kosovo. By withdrawing tanks, artillery and other heavy armament onto barracks, it has indirectly confirmed that the army has without any doubt participated in armed operations and not only the so-called security forces as it had been claiming in the entire course of armed conflicts. And second, by the threat that armed operations would be resumed if the forces of the Albanian resistance continued with their activities, the so pomopusly announced Serbian victory and destruction of the so-called terrorist gangs and their strongholds in Kosovo was denied.
However, authenticity of everything that is said can easily be corroborated in the field. An armed conflict is something that can be seen, heard and it causes suffering of many people. Days after the so-called cessation of armed operations, cannon shells of the largest calibre shot in the southern part of western Kosovo echoed at a large distance. It was also possible to see thick clouds of smoke above many Albanian villages which were demolished and set on fire. Local ethnic Albanian sources from the field reported about very heavy shelling of several villages of Stimlje and Suva Reka municipalities and a few villages in Urosevac municipality on the third day of the attack. Systematic burning down of Albanian villages and banishment of ethnic Albanian population were particularly evident in the municipality of Suva Reka.
At the same time, Serb forces continued the operation of dispersing about 15 thousand displaced Albanian civilians concentrated around the village of Vranic near Suva Reka since the first day of the attack against the region of the mentioned municipalities. Dispersing of large groups of displaced persons concentrated in the open has become an integral component of Serbian armed operations in Kosovo. Ethnic Albanian civilians are first forcibly banished, their homes are then robbed and set on fire, and then by brutal armed operations their gathering in large groups is prevented. It is evident that gatherings are highly undesirable. They primarily attract attention of foreign diplomats, and it is easier for humanitarian organizations to offer aid to them. A day after the latest declaration on interruption of military operations, heavy shelling was registered by Albanian sources in Drenica, or more precisely in Srbica and Malesevo municipalities. The village Gornje Obrinje in Glogovac municipality is especially underlined in this context, because it was shelled on 30 September. In the night between 29 and 30 September, a village near Strbac which is close to Urosevac was also shelled.
According to the data from several local Albanian sources, including the Committee of Human Rights in Pristina, in Serbian operations in the course of last and this week, 120 persons, mostly Albanian civilians, were killed. However, these sources warn that new victims killed individually or in groups are revealed in Drenica and surrounding regions, so it is assumed that the number reaches the figure of about 300. The main headquarters of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (OVK) stated that it had lost 11 of its members, but added that this list was not final. Serbian sources stated that fourteen policemen were also killed in Drenica.
There were victims on both sides in current conflicts in the southern part of western Kosovo. Serbian sources published that three policemen were killed. On Wednesday, 30 September, ethnic Albanian sources published that bodies of five massacred or killed Albanians had been found in some villages of Suva Reka. They also stated data about death of a few women and babies due to sickness or lack of food in shelters made outdoors in the region. Pristina Committee of Human Rights declared that between 14 January and 29 September, one thousand and 472 killed ethnic Albanians had been registered. However, it is estimated that the number of persons killed is much bigger because remains of persons who lost their lives in the past months are being discovered all the time. Besides, there are also 1,300 disappeared, kidnapped or persons held as hostages, 45 of whom are of Serb nationality. It is assumed that majority of them are no more among the living.
After the latest Serbian operations, the number of mostly ethnic Albanian women, children and helpless persons living outdoors is twice or even three times bigger. Before these operations, foreign sources were mentioning the figure of 50 thousand. Albanian sources, that is, the Pristina Committee of Human Rights, estimate that at least 100 thousand Albanian civilians are living outdoors. The same sources estimate that, when speaking of those who have a roof over their heads, about 150 thousand Albanians are also living in difficult conditions, and that the ones and the others are faced with acute or chronic shortage of food. Pristina Committee presents data that so far 500 thousand Albanians were forced to leave their homes and that over 400 villages were completely destroyed or damaged to such an extent that people cannot return to them. Serbian sources, including the official ones, intensified the propaganda of denying every possibility of existence of displaced Albanians who were living outdoors without shelter. They accuse forces of Albanian resistance for demolished Albanian villages reduced to ashes claiming that they are ready to help the Albanians to reconstruct their homes and provide food.
Serbian allegations about interruption of operations, aid to the Albanians and amnesty of all those who did not commit crimes are interpreted by ethnic Albanians as cynism typical only of Serbian politicians, even as complete absence of reason. This impression was created after the so-called Serbian conclusions about solutions for Kosovo and especially after the debate about them in Serbian assembly. From Pristina it seems that Belgrade is trying to prevent every attempt of "meeting halfway", that is, to exert military, political and diplomatic pressure which will eliminate every other possibility for the Albanians except the one offered by Serbian authorities.
Albanian sources do not give any significance to formation of the Serbian interim executive council for Kosovo. Tasks of this body are assessed, among other, according to the personality of its president, Zoran Andjelkovic. As a promising Serbian communist cadre, in a few years of last decade, Andjelokovic directly stimulated straining of political relations between the Serbs and ethnic Albanians. Coordinator of Albanian negotiating group Fehmi Agani denied every possibility of participation of Albanian representatives in the so-called Executive Council. It is solely a Serb body which confirms Serbian intention to act in Kosovo only from the position of power, or that of victors of the defeated Albanians. Agani estimates that the so-called executive council along with the conclusions on solution for Kosovo are only forms of seeking ways to legalize the political situation which is imposed by the power of weapons.
It is assessed in Pristina that the latest Serbian political actions concerning Kosovo are directed in three directions. The first is winning points among the Serbian public and prevention of any convincing oppositionist activity not only concerning the issue of Kosovo. The second is pressure and intimidation of the ethnic Albanian population. And the third and the most significant direction is acting in relation to the world. Intensified propaganda and Serbian political activities are estimated by Kosovo Albanian sources and politicians primarily as an attempt to neutralise western threats by military intervention. It seems that Belgrade still does not have a precise assessment whether it can actually be exposed to military attacks of the NATO, so it chose manoeuvres which cost practically nothing but enable it to avoid risks and provide it with precious time for continuation of the policy of destruction in Kosovo by less noisy means. Pristina Committee of Human Rights has a list of about 1,700 arrested Albanians against whom charges were raised for the most severe crimes. The same source claims that factory storerooms, mines, schools, have been transformed into prisons where ethnic Albanians are mercilessly maltreated.
There are certain doubts about western military intervention among Kosovo Albanians, too. Majority of the Albanian public considers the intervention as salvation and it is expected as some kind of the sword of God's jutice. However, this is wishful thinking of the helpless faced with brutal force which they cannot defend themselves from. Of course, the westerners have a completely different view. As far as it is possible to see from Pristina, the west is not so united as it might seem from within, not only concerning the possible new legal foundation for the intervention. Along with the general reluctance because of the possible consequences of such an enterprise, a big obstacle is the fact that there is no clear reply to the question: what is the status that will be established by intervention. The American plan probably seems insufficient to them. It is clear that implementation of this document is impossible not only because it is just the adorned Serbian view of the solution for Kosovo, but also because it is exceptionally complicated and impractical. The impression is that, when they visited Pristina on 29 September, ambassadors of the Contact Group did not pressure Ibrahim Rugova to accept this document which in itself speaks of success and failure of American mediation during last summer. In consideration of American engagement, it should not be disregarded that certain Albanian estimates spoke in favour of the thesis that it was in fact just a pretext for avoiding to seriously come to grips with the problem of Kosovo until a new factual situation was created.
Contradictions in Albanian views concerning chances for western military intervention are based on these doubts. The current impression is that those who are very doubtful about it prevail. However, opinions mostly coincide when possibilities of intervention are observed from the humanitarian angle. It is estimated that it might become inevitable in order to prevent death of tens thousand Albanian civilians of hunger and cold.
AIM Pristina
Fehim REXHEPI