Greece's Albanian Nightmares

AIM Athens, 29 September, 1998

"Beware of Greeks baring gifts!" Could that be a legitimate comment of an observer, especially an Albanian or a Kosovar one, towards recent Greek policy on the Kosovo issue? Such conclusion may have tentatively been drawn when one listened to Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos calling in early September Milosevic a moderate and the Kosovo Albanian side radicals, on the basis of their respective stands on the conflict.

Why an allusion to deceit? Because (see our "Efforts to Rationalize Greece's Balkan Policy: the Kosovo Case" AIM July 1998) Greek foreign policy in the first half of 1998 had impressed many an observer with what had appeared as a pragmatic turn, symbolically characterized by strong criticism of Milosevic's handling of that very crisis. Why then Pangalos, a few months later, made statements that gave the impression that there was a new Greek tilt away from newly found realism? Enter Greece's traditional "Albanian nightmares," fears of recurring manifestations of Albanian nationalism that are received as direct threats to Greece's "national interests."

It was explained in Athens that Pangalos' surprising statement was a direct consequence of a first hand experience he had with supposed or actual KLA sympathizers if not leaders in Tirana, just before going to Belgrade. These Kosovars were reported to have told the Greek foreign minister that KLA's future aspirations, once their current struggle is vindicated in Kosovo, will include the rights of Albanians in Macedonia and Greece, with the ultimate aim to assemble all Albanians in one state.

That was considered as a completely unacceptable position, which turned the KLA into a potential enemy of Greece and certainly a current adversary. So any actions of Milosevic aimed at frustrating this ambitious rebel organization were naturally welcome in Athens. After all, Greece does not recognize any ethnonational minority on its territory: not even the Turks or the Macedonians who do exist and actively seek their right to self-determination in ways that have deservedly been embarrassing the country's diplomatic services. So, introducing an argument in favor of a completely non-existent ethnonational group will not win the favors of anyone, even in the small human rights and/or anti-nationalist community that has consistently denounced Serbian atrocities in the 1990s and backed the Kosovars' legitimate demands. Theodore Pangalos does certainly not belong to the latter group, so the outrageous KLA claims made him lose patience with that group.

It need be mentioned here that almost a quarter of a million Greeks belong to families whose traditional mother tongue, called by them Arberichte -in their language- or Arvanitika -in Greek-, linguistically belongs to the Albanian language group and, more specifically, the Tosk (Southern Albanian) sub-group. However, most of these people had developed a Greek national consciousness in the first half of the last century, well before the "Albanian Renaissance." They had fought in, if not led, the Greek struggles for independence in the nineteenth century; and had clearly opted not to be amalgamated with the emerging Albanian nationalism and the later ensuing Albanian nation around the turn of the century. Regrettably, the Greek state undeservingly questioning their allegiance forced an assimilation upon them which has led to a dramatic decline of the use of the language and has in reaction to that led most of them to become staunch nationalists, just as in the case of most Vlachs: most human and minority rights activists are in fact the target of Arvanites and Vlachs when they merely refer to them as linguistic minorities. So, the worst way to prevent their cultural specificities from becoming extinct is to make them part of the Albanian irridenta.

The latter is one of the reasons why Greeks from all walks of life despise today Sali Berisha, who had, in a few occasions, alluded to the existence of an Albanian minority in Greece. Moreover, and more importantly, the unfortunate policy choices of his government towards the Greek minority in Albania, culminating in the disgraceful trial of four leaders of the Greek minority organization "Omonoia" in 1994, have decisively alienated most Greeks.

Therefore, when the crisis following the assassination of one of Berisha's main associates Hajdari erupted in Albania, hardly anyone sympathized with his party=92s all out startegy to unseat the Nano government, even among the theoretically and ideologically closer to him Greek conservatives, who had in fact actively helped him come to power in 1992. So, for example, almost all Greek media adopted uncritically the "coup d=92etat" description of Berisha's actions by the Nano government, which hardly any other Western media did. While Minister of Defense Akis Tsohatzopoulos "explained" the unrest in Tirana as another manifestation of Albanian extremism like the preceding one in Kosovo. He had simply expressed the -widespread in Athens- belief that KLA was directly linked to Berisha and only to him.

So, the fear of Berisha was the driving force behind Greek reactions to the September 1998 crisis in Albania. His own explicit attacks against Greece, during the crisis, when he alleged that Greek policemen played a direct role in arresting his supporters in Northern Albania, were the climax of an attitude that helped revive among Greeks their "Albanian nightmares." This is why when Nano resigned and it was announced that he would be replaced by a socialist colleague of his, no one in Athens even bothered to worry or say that he would be missed. Nano's support in Athens was never solid: he was simply considered as the most convenient way to keep Berisha far away from power. If Albanians could find an alternative, which in fact may be more efficient in discrediting Berisha's antics, he would immediately be welcomed in Athens, where the continuation of the "honeymoon" in the bilateral relations is all that matters.

Panayote Elias Dimitras