Plan for Kosovo

Beograd Oct 2, 1998

Slightly Less than Republic, Slightly More than Autonomy?

AIM Belgrade, 27 September, 1998

At the height of the offensive of Serbian security forces against the OVK in Kosovo in the end of summer 1998, the Contact Group offered some of the models which could be useful in consideration of an acceptable solution for Kosovo. As inspiring models, Southern Tyrol was mentioned along with Aland Islands, Tatarstan, "Silent Protectorate" by the model of Mostar, and the model called "Slightly Less than a Republic and Slightly More than an Autonomy". The latter, it leaked in mid September, proved to be the American draft interim agreement on Kosovo which was recently published first in media in Albanian, and then in some Belgrade media, too.

The draft was conceived with an obvious intention to be the foundation for normalization of life in Kosovo, while the question of the status remains open. In this way, a possibility is created for interruption of armed conflicts and normalization of relations in the field in order to prevent broadening of the gap between ethnic communities. Resolution of the key problem is left for the time when political passions will die down. This approach simultaneously made it easier primarily for the Kosovo Albanian leaders to sign the agreement, because in this way they would "only" enter the negotiating process without having to give up the proclaimed political goals.

Significant general characteristics of the agreement are that it is "general and transitional", in other words that it is neither comprehensive nor lasting. The "territory" as Kosovo is called in the draft agreement, would have its own assembly and executive authorities, judiciary and local police responsible for keeping public order and peace, that is, approximately everything prescribed by Lord Carrington's document on "Special Status" dating back from November 1991. The novelties in the American Draft Agreement in reference to this document are the Representative (in fact the president who is elected directly and who would represent and sign agreements in the name of Kosovo), Ombudsman (person who would supervise implementation of the agreement especially concerning rights of ethnic communities), administration departments responsible for implementation of decisions of Kosovo and federal and republican agencies when need arises...

The provision which is especially significant is the one which offers the possibility to municipalities, which are defined as basic administration units, to establish self-administrative regions which would consist of several municipalities, which implies creation of ethnic regions, which would then, in case of asplit, join "their own". Implications in this direction are indicated by a provision which prescribes that a part of the assembly of Kosovo would consist of a certain number of delegates who would be elected under direct international supervision, and a certain number who would be elected by ethnic communities pursuant relevant procedures.

The parts of the draft which refer to additional rights of ethnic communities are in fact an attempt to meet the demands primarily of the Serb, but also of other ethnic communities, which are concerned for their destiny in case the status of Kosovo and Metohija changes. However, the ethnic principle which is domineering in the draft also points out in the direction of a less painful division in case the project of joint life fails. Members of ethnic communities will enjoy additional rights. Each ethnic community will, according to the agreement, nominate its national council which will administer affairs of the community on the territory. Each council would also establish its executive agencies.

In fact, they would be agencies founded on ethnic principles which would take into account additional rights of ethnic communities. The draft agreement prescribes that the federal and the republican administrations would not be able to affect or interfere with the work of the administration in Kosovo, which would operate in accordance to its duties and responsibilities. The struggle for duties and responsibilities will be the key issue, according to the draft, after three years when the agreement will "essentially be reconsidered". This seems to be the formula for further preservation of power for the Serb signatories and for further support of the USA and the EU to Albanian signatories, because for as long as the agreement is not essentially reconsidered, its guarantors will be those who sign it: Milosevic and Rugova.

The Albanian party has very promptly come up with its remarks which are more extensive than the text of the American draft agreement itself, and then came up with its own proposal: Kosovo - the third federal unit. Considering the situation in the field, the situation in Albania and the region in general, and the stands of the "international community" that unilateral change of borders is unacceptable - this proposal of Kosovo Albanians can be considered to be maximalistic at the moment. It is indeed a proposal for creation of a state whose independence is being postponed for some time. The proposal of Kosovo Albanians is based on two wrong interpretations: legal status of Kosovo in SFRY and the significance of the 1991 referendum on independence. According to the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo indeed was an element of the federation, but not a federal unit as the authors of the proposal interpret it.

As concerning the referendum, it is nothing else but a pretext for unilateral secession, which is not tolerated by the international community and, moreover, will expressed in a referendum cannot be superimposed to the interest of the international community: peace and security of the region. And the assessment of the international community is that higher interests would be threatened by unilateral implementation of the will of Kosovo Albanians expressed in the referendum. The example which shows subordination of the referendum will to higher interests of the international community are the Aland Islands which have remained part of Finland despite the almost unanimously expressed will of more than 95 % of the population of this archipelago to be annexed to Sweden. Besides, the Kosovo Serbs are being offered by the new status what Kosovo Albanians are offered by Serbia, which they consider insufficient.

The ruling coalition in Belgrade is still publicising neither its platform nor the draft agreement with Kosovo Albanians, nor comments on the American proposal, so based on their previous stands, it is possible only to guess that the basis of it will be the Constitution of Serbia with certain possible amendments. Like in the case of Kosovo Albanians and their proposal, that would be the initial option for negotiations which will follow, or an annex to signing of the American proposal. That which will precede signing of the agreement or which will have to be done immediately after it is signed is normalization of the situaton in the field: curbing the Liberation Army of Kosovo and checking of the offensive of Serb forces, and return of displaced persons to their homes.

The international community is nowadays demanding more resolutely than before withdrawal of special units and the army from the Serbian regime, while the OVK, with its actions and political proclamations, is giving rise and excuse to Serb forces not only not to withdraw but to go on with the offensive. One of the fiercest ones is taking place in the region od Suva Reka and it is estimated that there are about a hundred victims on both sides. Relation of forces (the OVK and state army and police) could be changed only by NATO attacks which are supported by both the Albanian parties and the OVK, so that certain analysts interpret verbal and armed provocations of the Serbian forces by the OVK as giving additional arguments in favour of international military intervention in Kosovo.

It is true that the international community condemns the Albanian party and insists in the Security Council Resolution on Kosovo that "leaders of Kosovo Albanians condemn all terrorist actions" and reject violence. The unsuccessful attempt of the USA to pacify or at least to politically control the OVK, however, greatly complicates the situation in Kosovo. It seemed that Adem Demaqi's taking over the political leadership of the OVK can change something, but it turned out that he was the one who has changed and not the OVK - his statements have become mnore radical and directed towards continuation of the armed struggle. Besides, it is questionable whether he really controls the entire OVK or just one of its parts? This question arises especially after his withdrawal from public and political life due to "reasons of health". Some link this to American pressure and some to disobedience of the OVK which continues to kidnap, this time even representatives of the Albanian parties in Kosovo. In any case, the war in Kosovo goes on - there are more and more refugees and villages burnt to the ground.

Zoran Lutovac

(AIM)