NEGOTIATIONS, DESPITE EVERYTHING!?

AIM Pristina, 21 September, 1998

While on the one hand, conflicts of varying intensity and varying proportions continue, with tragic consequences for the entire civilian population, on the other hand, in Kosovo and around it, political and diplomatic activities are taking place, aimed at creating preconditions for the beginning of long desired and demanded negotiations. That is the context in which efforts should be understood of the Contact Group and special envoy of the international community, American ambassador in Skopje, Chrisopher Hill and his intensive, so-called shuttle diplomacy, or indirect negotiations between the conflicting parties.

After numerous attempts and meetings, some time ago, Mr. Hill made his first partial success public - general consent of both parties to consider elaboration of an agreement on temporary solution of the problem of Kosovo which would be reconsidered and possibly revised after a period of three to five years, with the agreement of both parties, of course. This initial success is considered in political circles and in public to be the first small, but significant step forward in overcoming the war conflict and seeking a solution of the highly complex problem of Kosovo.

Publication of the draft version of the document of mediator Hill on the future status of Kosovo in Albanian press in Kosovo, caused commotion among the political and public in general, provoking different comments and mostly negative reactions. Publication of this document has also met with disapproval of Chrisopher Hill himself, who stressed that it had not been intended for the public, because it was just a draft which was expected to be amended by both the parties and that its publication could only cause damage to the negotiating process causing unnecessary nervousness in the media. Let us, nevertheless, look into the main propositions presented in this "list of ideas".

According to the published document which includes main outlines of a possible agreement on the temporary solution presented in ten chapters, Kosovo is defined as a territory with a certain level of self-administration and agencies and institutions which would enable its realization. Main rights and responsibilities of the citizens on the territory are listed in the document, including among other, the right to "pass initial (organic) documents of Kosovo", "adoption of rules of procedure and organization of the administration of Kosovo", "adoption of the budget and annual balance sheet", "organization - in compliance with the agreement - and participation in just and free elections", as well as "cooperation with the federal and republican institutions", etc. Further in the text, additional "rights of ethnic communities" are listed, where it is stated that they would elect and nominate their "ethnic councils". Additional rights of ethnic communities would mostly refer to promotion of cultural, educational, religious and other properties. In the chapter which gives the list of agencies in Kosovo and their duties and obligations, it is stated that the assembly of Kosovo would consist of a certain number of delegates who would be elected in direct elections, while the other part would consist of delegates elected by ethnic communities which would be enabled to be represented in the assembly in proportion with their participation in the population. Decision in the assembly would be reached by majority of votes, except in cases when majority of delegates of a certain ethnic community believed that a proposed decision concerned vital interests of this community, which would require special forms of decision-making, with the consent of majority of delegates of the ethnic community concerned. Except for the assembly, Kosovo would have a representative (who would be elected in direct elections), an administering body, administrative departments and an ombudsman ("who would be nominated by the federal government from the list of Yugoslav citizens submitted by the president of the European Court for Human Rights"), whose mandate would last four years (with an additional mandate of another two years) and who would supervise implementation of the agreement.

The document also contains main forms of representation of Kosovo in federal and republican state agencies. It is stated that "it would be guaranteed at least ten deputies in the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly and the Government of the Republic of Serbia", as well as that it would be represented in the Federal Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Serbia.

The assembly of Kosovo would also be entitled to establish courts of law and appelate courts, and every ethnic community would be entitled to "establish its own system of solving disputes in the sphere of inheritance, family and civil law". Each municipality would form its local police in proportion with the ethnic composition of the population, and it would be responsible for public order and peace, while "federal agencies would be responsible for external safety, border police and investigation of international crime..."

The Albanian negotiating team expressed its discontent and disagreement with these proposals, although its representatives were very cautious in their comments and evaluations, saying that it was after all just the draft version and that talks and negotiations were pending. After a few days' time, this team came forward with its own proposal of the temporary solution of the problem of Kosovo in a document which consists of 16 items and which mostly lists institutions and duties and responsibilities of the administrative agencies of Kosovo very similar or identical with duties and responsibilities and the status of present republics of FRY. During the period of time the temporary solution refers to, Kosovo would remain part of one of these republics, after the expiry of which a referendum would be organized in which inhabitants of Kosovo would express their will about possible forms of independence.

Contrary to the negotiating team and Ibrahim Rugova who seems to have expressed a certain dose of political pragmatism when he assessed that efforts of the American mediator should be appreciated, legal experts and political analysts in Kosovo have shot a whole series of bitter comments and sharp criticism at the offered document, forgetting that it was just a provisional and draft document which, as such, necessarily has certain inconsistencies and imprecisions which are evident even in the terminology used in it.

Critical comments of this document are primarily of a legal and constitutional nature, which state that the offered solutions provide a limited form of self-administration, that in significant fields, responsibilities of Serbia and FRY are not only maintained but even increased, that the legal and constitutional position of Kosovo is not defined and that the offered solutions are far below the constitutional position of of the province in the 1974 Constitution. The critics claim that it is absurd to negotiate about rights and institutions which the citizens of Kosovo has once enjoyed and which were then abolished by force and unlawfully (the constitution, parliament, government, judiciary, including the constitutional court, etc.), which according to them should not at all be subject of negotiations. Certain analysts went even further and accused this plan of attempting to introduce institutions of tribal communities and societies (referring to some offered solutions on creation of certain courts by ethnic communities as well as certain voting and decision-making procedures in the assembly of Kosovo).

The other type of comments are mostly of political and moral nature. One of the arguments which is given is that this plan plays into the hands of Milosevic and that it just legalizes the situation in the field created by violence, which is also confirmed by the case of creating Republika Srpska (out of nothing), which just legalized, according to them, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia & Herzegovina.

It is interesting, even a specific paradox, that political protagonists on the political scene of Kosovo who used to be considered as liberal and moderate, have "radicalized their political discourse". For example, Shkelzen Maliqi concluded that this plan was "in fact legalizing acts of Serb violence and that it demanded from the Albanians to subject themselves to a destructive destiny, to accept humiliation and the situation created by violence". On the other hand, another member of the former advisory group G-15, Veton Surroi, who was believed to have been a politician very close to mediator Hill, having rejected the plan as a whole, established that it "once again proved that eyes were shut to human tragedy". The offered plan will be considered to be scandalous and unfeasible, with the comment that all it did was offer a chance to Milosevic to buy time.

However, political and intellectual circles in Kosovo are almost unanimous in the assessment that the main obstacle to signing and implementation of a possible agreement on temporary solution for Kosovo will after all be the centres of political decision-making in Belgrade which are rejecting every solution which would not leave Kosovo inside Serbia. Certain analysts even believe that the goal of the current military and police operations and, as stated, ethnic cleansing in western part of Kosovo, is creation of possibilities for implementation of a solution of the type offered by member of the Academy Jovicic, which refers to regionalization of Kosovo and abolishment of its political unity. It seems that one of the reasons for Rugova's pragmatism and his benevolence in relation to American initiatives is actually an attempt to resist implementation of such plans and to achieve such objectives.

True implementation of any agreement on any level of self-administration in Kosovo, analysts of political developments in Kosovo tend to think, requires fundamental democratic changes on the whole territory of rump Yugoslavia, that is, a change of political behavior not only of the authorities but also of the greatest part of the opposition in Serbia, which can hardly be expected in the foreseeable future, since the main discourse which prevails in mass media, especially electronic ones which are controlled by the regime, is a typical war discourse which produces conflicts and eliminates compromise as the logic of solving political disputes. Within that closed circle from which it is impossible to discern any way out, the possibility of a radical cut by western institutions (Contact Group, NATO) should not be eliminated, similar to the way previous crises on the territory of former Yugoslavia were solved.

AIM Pristina

Arben KRASNIQI