CHANGES, BUT ONLY IN THE NEXT MILLENNIUM!

Ten Days After Elections in B&H

AIM Sarajevo, 22 September, 1998

These, 1998 elections, according to the general assessment of the West, were the most democratic elections in history of Bosnia & Herzegovina. Although results still have not been confirmed, it is becoming more and more certain that the ruling nationalistic parties have reasserted their advantage over the opposition, and unpleasantly alarmed the organizers of the elections (the international community) by the fact that an experiment of limited protectorate over a country in the name of strengthening democratic alternative cannot succeed in just two years. Not even when the protectors, like High Representative Carlos Westendorp or ambassador Robert Barry, declaratively advocate "changes and new persons of the political scene of B&H", without hesitating to openly support the Social Democratic Party of both entities. The Balkan has once again shown that from the grasp of nationalistic collectivity, it can be saved more easily by political compulsion and dictate than any advise of the West, even when it talks about reconstruction of the country, future prosperity and better life for all.

It is a fact that in all pre-election presentations of almost all the parties, these B&H elections have focused on the economic and social aspect of the B&H state much more than in the general elections in 1990 and 1996. However, failure in implementation of the Dayton accords for B&H - especially its parts which a priori weaken the electorate of the ruling oligarchies (return of refugees, punishing war criminals, privatization or promotion of non-nationalistic values of the state) - conditioned powerful incorporation of the ethnic element into comprehension of the economy and future development of the state. The new Bosnian paradox of nationalistic-partisan economy according to the principle "we and ours" as opposed to "them and theirs" has become the foundation (more precisely the obstacle) to any talk about moving the economy of B&H from the standstill, so that only in this context can one understand why the voters placed their trust again in those who they themselves had accused of corruption, embezzlement, war profiteering, nepotism, usurpation of property and similar. In the environment of the still domineering nationalistic policy, "our sins" were forgiven (even in the case of war crimes or responsibility for the war) by far more readily than any change for the better if it were coming from ethnically "the opposite side".

Unofficial election results - according to which Izetbegovic's coalition is in the lead in the B&H Federation allegedly with 52 per cent, Serb Radical Nikola Poplasen has a big chance to take Biljana Plavsic's post of the president of Republika Srpska, the favourite of the west, Kresimir Zubak, has not even by far threatened chances of Ante Jelavic, candidate of the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) for the Presidency, and Social Democrats are concerned whether they will win in the canton of Tuzla-Podrinje where they counted on a certain victory - seem to be the most crushing for international mediators in B&H who had expected and openly announced a great changes on the political scene of B&H. But, their declarative support to democratization and absence of true action in this direction, proved on the contrary to be more like some injection for revival of nationalist absolutists than promotion of democratic alternative to three ethnic totalitarian regimes in B&H. Example number one: although Dayton accords prescribed the change of election rules according to which candidates for the supreme institutions of the state would have to be elected by representatives of all three etrhnic groups, this has never happened, so that members of B&H Presidency still represent only the Bosniacs, the Serbs and the Croats. Therefore, to such posts and according to this principle no social democratic, liberal or other candidate of the political centre or left of the centre can be nominated, but solely rightist, nationalistic ones who these rules are convenient for. Example number two: introduction of the sanctions against Sarajevo for failure to implement the Sarajevo declaration on return of refugees, instead of underlining responsibility of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), encouraged the power wielders to appear once again as absolute Balkan leaders who nobody dares antagonize.

Instead of replacing those who are responsible for preventing the return, exclamations arrived from the SDA and Izetbegovic himself that nobody could order them about to throw out "their own people" from refugee apartments (they had illegally taken possession of), and a couple of days before the elections, the international community, perhaps as a prize), lifted the sanctions imposed on Sarajevo, and in this way promoted the authorities in B&H as stronger even than they are. Example number three: All Krajisnik's undermining of the Dayton accords, obstructions to democratization of Republika Srpska, obvious implication in war crimes committed in B&H, as well as numerous financial embezzlements and smuggling have not been sufficient incentive for any serious action against Karadzic's close associate. The first crushing results of the elections which imply that the coalition of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Radicals is in the lead in RS brought Clinton's special envoy Robert Gelbard to Bosnia in order to, it is claimed, initiate indictment of Momcilo Krajisnik by the Hague tribunal. It seems, by the way, that extradition of Karadzic and Mladic to the Hague has been completely forgotten. Astonishment of the international community by immaturity of the voters is not smaller than the astonishment of both the voters and the politicians by what the personnel of the OSCE has been doing for ten days already, which is usually called "counting of votes" while in Bosnia it increasingly seems to be "election engineering" with the true meaning "fixing results". The international community, personified by the OSCE and the Office of the High Representative, has found itself in the midst of elections which are according to the number of votes between those in 1990 and those in 1996, ruling nationalists who are weakening after all, immature oppositionists, and still manipulated voters. But, since nobody in B&H seems to be in a hurry to see changes, least of all those who live the worst, why would the international community be in a hurry, whose representatives live well over here and are comforting us that for democratization in Poland, six rounds of elections were needed. Therefore, we shall go to the polls in 1999 again, then in 2000, and if necessary for the changes at least like the Poles - six times!

Drazena PERANIC

(AIM, Sarajevo)