DO THE AMERICANS HELP TUDJMAN WITH THEIR PRESSURES

AIM ZAGREB, September 6, 1998

Now, there is no doubt that the Bosnian Croats have taken over the lead from the Bosnian Serbs and become the main troublemakers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are the main topic of concerned statements issued by international representatives which demand change in their behaviour during the election campaign and call for the imposition of drastic disciplinary measures. At the same time, they have become a measure of the successfulness of the international policy in B&H, primarily the American policy famous for its practice of drastically attacking the problems in contrast to the European policy, and destined to be a great success, but also, at times, a failure and a total miss.

This is probably best seen today when signs of political pluralism have finally appeared among the archaically single-minded Bosnian Croats. On the other hand, the totally needless disagreement between Madeleine Albright and Tudjman in Zagreb has revived their already impaired homogenization and brought the B&H HDZ closer to an electoral victory more easily and faster than the present situation in this party would ensure. But, even when they have difficulty making progress, as was the case in Zagreb following the unnecessary clamouring on account of which they lost their pace, the Americans, nevertheless, move forward in their typical spectacular way.

In Zagreb, the problem with general Stanko Sopta was raised during negotiations with the American delegation, but Tudjman dismissed it together with a large number of other complaints of the American side. But only two days later Sopta was to hit the headlines after he was suspended from duty by Kresimir Zubak for unauthorized transfer of troops across the state border and for soliciting votes in the B&H HDZ election campaign. Immediately thereafter the Head of the Orasje District, Marko Benkovic, was relieved of duty for disrupting the return of Serbian refugees and for threatening members of new Zubak's party. The cherry on top was the news in which Benkovic's name reappeared once again.

By a decision of the OSCE Appellate Electoral Commission, together with another 14 HDZ candidates Benkovic was removed from this party's electoral lists, including some of the top ranking current and former officials such as Ivan Bender, Stjepan Mikic, Mijo Tokic and Anto Marincic. To make matters worse for the main party of the Bosnian Croats, there are rumours that the number of the disqualified may be increased as the OSCE has announced its intention to remove from the electoral lists one candidate each day if the Croat Television continues with its biased coverage of the election campaign. Nevertheless, the worst threat to the B&H HDZ is contained in the letter of Eric Shinseki, the SFOR Commanding Officer, addressed to the President of this party, Ante Jelavic.

In this letter the American general expressed his profound indignation over the fact that Jelavic admitted publicly that the had ordered the movement of troops which was the cause of general Sopta's suspension. "If this is true", Shinseki wrote to Jelavic, "then it represents a very serious admission of guilt. I am not sure what political consequences this may have on elections, but I am duty bound to ask the OSCE leadership for its opinion". The Croatian press understood this to mean the possible elimination of Jelavic himself as the candidate for the B&H Presidency, from the electoral race which is interpreted as direct assistance to Kresimir Zubak, the only serious rival to Jelavic in the race the office of Croatian member in this body.

Finally, the B&H HDZ Presidency responded to all this by calling on the international representatives to stop this kind of punishment or else the party would consider boycotting the elections. "We are willing to continue to cooperate with the international community in the consistent implementation of the peace process, but find it necessary to seriously warn that we will reconsider our participation in the forthcoming elections as well as the participation of Croatian representatives at all levels of power in the B&H Federation in case our complaints are not taken seriously". This is not the first time the B&H HDZ has threatened to boycott the elections. So far this happened twice, once at the state level and the second time at the local level (Mostar), and both times it turned out that the idea was to secure a better starting position for the elections, which was accomplished in part.

Now, for the first time they threatened with the withdrawal of the "Croatian representatives from all levels of power in the B&H Federation". If it came true, it would practically mean the break up of the federal partnership established in early 1994 and the withdrawal of the signature under the Dayton Agreement which was concluded two years later. In other words, the problems have assumed unexpected proportions. Obviously, both sides have raised the stakes in this diplomatic game to such an extent that the possibility of a diplomatic happy end is less likely than ever before. Judging by all appearances, the one time threats of the top ranking international representatives in B&H that the same destiny that befell Karadzic's SDS could befall the HDZ have only now gained full weight.

On the other hand, Tudjman is already disconcerted by the loss of full control over the B&H HDZ as it threatens with the spreading of the pluralisation virus to HDZ in Croatia proper. In addition, the recent refusal of all the "Croatian" parties, except for HDZ and HSP, to attend a consultative meeting in Zagreb, has created a psychological impression that Tudjman is about to lose Bosnia irrevocably. In this situation he is now desperately clinging to "special relations" between Croatia and the B&H Federation interpreting them as a way for one to suck in the other, an agreement which was allegedly a part of the Washington Accords. It is for this reason that Zagreb sent the message that there was no chance for the Agreement on the Ploce Harbour to be adopted and applied until that part of the Dayton Accords relating to special relations was implemented.

In addition, already in the talks with Madeleine Albright in Zagreb, a threat, to be later elaborated by the B&H HDZ Presidency, could be discerned between the lines on the break up of the federal partnership. Tudjman then stated that the B&H Federation did not have any future without special relations because the Croats in this Federation had lost the right to their national symbols, diplomatic representatives and everything else that the Bosnian Serbs had long enjoyed. Regardless of the inappropriate place where they were uttered, these words evidently concern the forthcoming elections, i.e. they were a message to the B&H Croats not to relinquish Zagreb because Zagreb would never relinquish them.

But, the message was also well understood by both the Americans and Madeleine Albright who probably was referring to Tudjman when upon her arrival in Sarajevo she once again repeated the platitude that the division of B&H would not be allowed. Of course, such platitudes always sound good. Therefore they are useful as a smokescreen for clumsy diplomatic moves. A verbal clinch with Tudjman is certainly a such a move because it comes at a time when his positions in B&H have for the first time been seriously called into question by the means which might have halted this long awaited process.

MARINKO CULIC