Serb-Albanian Negotiations

Testing Recipes

To both sides - the Serb and the Albanian - it is clear that the maximum of their objectives are unfeasible. Therefore, Kosovo Albanians must give up their demand for independence, and Serbia must agree to a maximum autonomy. The only problem is how they will fit that into their previous vows and promises

AIM Belgrade, 6 September, 1998

After the latest meeting of president of FR Yugoslavia and Christopher Hill, American ambassador in Macedonia and mediator between official Belgrade and political leaders of Kosovo Albanians, a statement was issued from the office of the former saying that renewal of negotiations was necessary "for establishment of a certain level of autonomy for Kosovo". It was published that the agreement would be revised after three to five years. Immediately after the meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade, Hill met the leader of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (Alb. LDK), Ibrahim Rugova in Pristina.

"Priority in the first three years of implementation of the agreement will be given to establishment of democratic institutions, revival and ensurance of human rights", declared the American diplomat at the press conference and added that both sides had agreed about that. What the quoted actually means has not been explained to the public. According to unofficial diplomatic interpretations, it is a transitional solution which implies postponement of the definite determination of the status of Kosovo for three to five years. This period should in fact offer a breathing space and it is expected to significantly pacify the situation. Opinions differ concerning the question whether this is possible and whether it will actually be effectuated. The official Belgrade and political representatives of Kosovo Albanians, according to Hill's words, will not begin direct negotiations, but they will continue as until now - through a mediator.

The agreement about the transitional solution for Kosovo has two dimensions. One refers to international diplomacy, the other to the actual situation in Serbia and Kosovo. It is believed that Milosevic was shown the "green light" by the international community to square accounts with the so-called Liberation Army of Kosovo (Alb. UCK) during the summer. This happened partly because of the operations of this paramilitary organization (attack on Orahovac) and partly because while the UCK grew stronger, the political position of Rugova grew weaker. "There was no 'green light'" says a diplomat in Belgrade. "However, the UCK proved to be totally uncooperative. At one moment it seemed that people in Kosovo would be left without a competent representative". Although the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) of Serbia and the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) re-established control over the greater part of territory held by armed Albanians, persistent combats show that the UCK has not been crushed. Political representative of this organization Adem Demaqi announced the new method of their operation: guerilla surprise attacks instead of conquering and control of territories.

Should bloodshed continue during the autumn and winter, with the previous and new demolitions and refugees, humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo would really become inevitable. Its direct result would be definite collapse of all reasonable life in Kosovo. To put it simply, the province would be left at the mercy of various bands of outlaws, the army and the police. In this context, pressure on Milosevic has been renewed: ban of flights of the national airline has been announced; at the Russian-American summit in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton have adopted a joint declaration demanding from Belgrade urgent initiation of negotiations; it is hinted that the question of military intervention in Kosovo could be put on the agenda of UN Security Council, etc. "Milosevic must realize that the 'green light' which is mentioned so much in Belgrade, has been turned off", says the mentioned interlocutor. "Perhaps the 'red light' has not been turned on yet, but there is not an eternity for negotiations either".

Even if the semi-war situation in Kosovo accompanied by renewal of national homogenization was conventient for the president of FR Yugoslavia until recently, it is highly questionable for how much longer it will continue to be that. It is assessed that conflicts and everything linked to them cost Serbia over one million dollars a day. This is not a small burden for a country with destroyed economy and with no hope for privatization or sale of large systems such as the sale of a part of the state post office, so that nobody can forecast with certainty what development of political circumstances will be in the long run. But the fact that worries Milosevic much more than the status of the state is that the current situation is highly profitable for the coalition partner of his Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) in the gotvernment of Serbia - the ultra-nationalistic Serb Radical Party (SRS) of Vojislav Seselj. It is believed that pacification is not convenient for this party, and that it is trying to blackmail its partners in power that it will leave the government with the accusation that "Milosevic has sold Kosovo".

Seselj proclaimed the agreement between Milosevic and Hill as unformal and unobliging talks, simply - political chatting: "The only thing that is possible is an autonomy of the Albanians as a minority in Kosovo, and not the autonomy of Kosovo", declared Seselj. To what extent the leader of the Radicals, known for his demagogy, really means what he says, it is hard to assess. It is certain, however, that he has renewed the war-mongering propaganda and reminded of certain conditions under which he has entered the government, such as the citizenship for all Serb refugees. Other parties in Serbia are warning against negotiations which are taking place far from the public and outside all political institutions. President of the Democratic Party of Serbia Vojislav Kostunica believes that this is yet another concession of Milosevic which will lead to "either open or concealed protectorate in Kosovo". It is also stated that the publicised "transitional solution" for the province in fact requires amendment of the constitutions of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, it seems that both parties - the Serbian and the Albanian - are quite exhausted. It is clear to both (and the international community made sure that it is) that their maximum demands, which brought about the escalation of the conflict in Kosovo, are at least for the time being unfeasable. This means that Kosovo Albanians must give up their demand for independence, and that Serbia must agree again to a truly broad autonomy of Kosovo. The greatest problem politicians of both parties are faced with is that they must find a solution which they will be able to present as fulfilment of their previously made vows and given promises. In this context, they are seeking for various recipes and they rely on short memory of the Balkan people. Different solutions are mentioned which are applied in the world, such as the model of "Southern Tyrol" which, allegedly, the Serbian party is insisting on, or "autonomy plus, republic minus" which is believed to be acceptable for the Albanian party. This is a model which would be based on the 1974 Constitution of SFRY and which would ensure an even broader autonomy than the one prescibed by this constitution, but which would nevertheless not give Kosovo the status of the third Yugoslav republic. Whichever the "recipe" may be chosen it will be better than what things are like now in the province. However, there is no foundation for too much optimism. Internal tensions among politicians of both parties

• the Serb and the Albanian - are often higher than those which are claimed to be the cause of the conflict between the two ethnic groups.

Philip Schwarm (AIM)