Split in the OVK Creates Kamikaze?!

Pristina Sep 7, 1998

AIM Pristina, 3 September, 1998

In mid August it seemed that the one-month long Serbian offensive in Kosovo was completed. The artillery had accomplished its mission, but the outcome of battles fought since mid July was decided by mobile armoured units.

In the end of May, Belgrade had undertaken an offensive of almost identical proportions and objectives, but it was more or less completed after a week. Probably Belgrade had not been certain how Western countries would react to its so-called excessive use of force, but the May-June offensive proved to be very "useful" if for no other reason as a "dress rehearsal" for the latest offensive. It turned out that Belgrade need not fear too much because of verbal threats of Western countries. As concerning the forces of the Albanian rebellious movement, the problem was considered as a matter of "technical nature" which could be resolved by greater concentration of forces and application of the rule "strike with full power".

The necessary concentration of forces was completed in approximately one month. This is certainly an interesting topic for military planners and experts in Belgrade and those interested in developments in this and broader region. But for the public, the course of the current offensive is much more interesting, about which it is already possible to say some things although it is not over yet. After just a few days of the offensive which lasted for almost a full month, during a few more peaceful days, it was evident that neither any of the forces nor armament have been withdrawn from Kosovo. This means that the pause was needed for regrouping in order to renew operations or carry out local operations aimed at achieving certain isolated objectives. Later on, in mid August, a comprehensive operation took place of what the Albanians call ethnic cleansing or emptying of a broad belt along the border with Montenegro between Pec and Decani, and a week later, operation was renewed in the broad region of southwestern Kosovo - from Orahovac across Malisevo, Suva Reka, Stimja, parts of Urosevac and Lipjani municipalities, all the way to southern Drenica. Due to the scope and fierceness of the conflict in this region, spreading of the conflict in the bordering region with Albania was unjustifiably disregarded, as well as that in the region of Djakovica in the direction of Prizren, but also the almost everyday skirmishes in the bordering region near Prizren and flaring up of conflicts in the mountainous region of Rugova above Pec.

Immediate objectives of the offensive are weakening and possibly smashing of the military network of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (OVK) and pushing it back, in other words grouping the Albanian population in certain limited and isolated regions. However, the longterm and significant objectives, it proved, remained realization of the policy of moving the population and wherever possible creation of territories cleansed of the Albanian population. After pushing back and grouping the Albanians only in certain small parts of western Kosovo, the same is attempted in the region between Pristina and Prizren in order to group the Albanians in central parts of Kosovo.

Analysts of the developments in Kosovo believe that as a humanitarian solution of the inevitable results of war confrontations, the world will accept creation of specific natural reservations for the Albanians, either outdoors or in towns such as Djakovica, Prizren and Pec. Massive sniper fire, broadening of the network of so-called police control points and incessant arrests are all used for this purpose. As a kind of camps firmly controlled by Serbia, these reservations would at first serve as a means for isolating the OVK. In diplomatic efforts they are considered to be stakes for all kinds of pressures in bargaining about the status and division of Kosovo.

Such intentions were evident during the entire period of armed conflicts. The first act of each and every Serb operation is systematic demolition of Albanian villages and settlements. After they are shelled and deserted, the customary ritual follows: plundering of valuable movables, destruction of food and livestock, and in the end, setting the remains of houses on fire. The ritual includes setting the crop in the fields on fire or preventing farmers to collect the crop. This manner of destruction of the Albanians cannot be explained as anything else but as an intentional effort to at least prevent them to return to their homes. There is plenty of evidence on various forms of destruction of the Albanians and indescribable human suffering.

In such a situation, what is the meaning of Serb leaflets thrown from airplanes which invite the Albanians to return home because "the army and the police guarantee their full personal safety and that of their property"?! Fear, insecurity and lack of confidence have done their bit. How can anyone return to homes which have been intentionally demolished? Albanian political representatives say that this is cynical, absurd... But, they are unable to see or do not wish to admit that they too are engrossed in such or similar hypocrisy especially in relation to their own people. What does endless repetition of trite illusions means when the Albanians are on the verge of humanitarian catastrophe? Not even in the current conditions has any one of them been able to overcome the personal egoism and courageously and responsibly initiate or contribute to partnership and cooperation aimed at reaching an agreement on the minimum of joint political and social interest of Kosovo Albanians.

On the contrary. When two weeks ago, attempts of their political union failed, it was just a matter of time when disunity in the OVK would come out in the open. Ten days after Rugova had nominated his negotiating team and the OVK elected Adem Demaqi to be its representative, a new regional staff of the OVK was elected for the region formed by the triangle Djakovica-Pec-Decani, authorised for full decision-making. But, by formally declaring themselves in favour of the so-called state institutionalisation, it became obvious that this part of the OVK inclined towards Rugova's political group. The other faction gathered around Adem Demaqi is still opposed to this, believing that every attempt to effectively change the existing situation on the territory controlled by Serbian authorities would be radically prevented. One of the explanations is that the war and before that the long lasting tensions confirm this in the best possible way. There are indications which lead to the conclusion that parts of the Albanian leadership headed by Rugova were at one moment in a dilemma about institutionalisation, but that they have persisted with this option in order to prevent possible radicalization of the Albanian population. People are often reminded that Rugova was the one who resisted institutionalisaion. However, he often explained his resistance by inconvenient current circumstances, but almost never by essential reasons. Only once, a few years ago, pressured by general demands for constitution of the parliament or scheduling new elections he used to say that Kosovo parliament and other institutions should be constituted after the agreement with Belgrade on the status of Kosovo.

As time went by, everyone, including those who did not sincerely believe it, became prisoners of the so-called institutionalisation. Since some time ago, other possible delusions were added to this. The most striking is that the Albanian political movement and the OVK can unite and simultaneously prevent their current and further splits only if state institutions become operational, that is, if the OVK agrees to be controlled by them.

If things are presented in this way it becomes clear that the Albanian politicians do not quarrel so passionately because of something that is essentially significant for the destiny of the Albanians and Kosovo. They are quarrelling because of the elections and election results which cannot move forward the Albanian problem. Quarrels about institutionalisation are linked to that. Wasting great internal energy on their delusions, completely uninventive Albanian politicians let themselves be swept by the swift current of developments. Only recently they have begun to notice that this current is threatening everything, their positions inclusive. They are still not aware that their behavior and the developments will just deepen the inter-Albanian regional splits and perhaps cause dangerous vertical divisions as well. The violent and unorganized manner of weakening the OVK should not make anyone happy: neither Belgrade, nor the great forces, nor the other part of the Albanian movement, nor the rest of the environment, analysts of Kosovo warn, despite the fact that they have all, each in its own way, so far done exactly that. Desperate as the Albanians are, it is hard to believe that this will not create several tens or maybe even more kamikaze. It is not difficult to assume what might happen in this and the broader region with so many desperate people grouped in various political and armed phalanges...

AIM Pristina

Fehim REXHEPI