DEVELOPMENTS ON THE POLITICAL SCENE AND THE LIBERATION ARMY OF KOSOVO

AIM Pristina, 31 July, 1998

The latest Serbian military offensive in Kosovo, which may not be over yet, arose concern which had not been so directly evident in the individual and the collective consciousness of Kosovo Albanians and opened the question of the price of the proclaimed targets of Kosovo Albanians: freedom and independence of Kosovo. This has not yet matured to become a topic of public discussions, but in the context of the analyses of economic, demographic, political, psychological, social and other consequences of the latest Serbian offensive and major inter-Albanian quarrels, the possibility that it will be opened in the foreseeable future should not be eliminated. Indirectly, it is already present in the public, but mostly as an argument in the exchange of accusations between polarized Albanian political forces in which the Liberation Army of Kosovo (OVK) is also involved although in a more or less concealed manner.

For the Albanians and their politicians, this is a highly complex psychological and political issue because it opens the extremely sensitive problems of freedom, war and peace, as well as of relations with Belgrade and the international community. In this sense, the question of removal of the taboo from the OVK is also very sensitive. The current political and psychological situation is not convenient for that. In the past few days, the OVK has suffered political and psychological blows, to a minor extent even military defeat, which Kosovo Albanians take personally as their own because the OVK has become a model of identification of political and practical behavior for them. This question is all the more complex because much concerning the OVK is still concealed under a veil of secrecy and mystery.

In any case, the latest developments in Kosovo are taking place in very complicated circumstances. After eight years of the policy of the so-called passive resistance and then several years of sharp rivalry between protagonists of this policy and supporters of the so-called policy of active non-violent resistance, in a comparatively short time, war started in Kosovo. Before this happened, many had warned about this threat, but nobody dreamed that things would accelerate so quickly. In this way without the transitional period of adaptation, Kosovo Albanians almost overnight shifted from expectations to achieve a solution by peaceful means with the help of the international community, to seeking solution by armed resistance.

Psychologically and politically, it is not at all easy and cannot pass without consequences to make such sudden shifts. But, it seemed that many Albanians quickly adapted and accepted the new course. Now it is evident that the crossing between the previous and the state of war is not over yet. The impression about a quick successful adaptation was created by two political and psychological factors. The Albanian uprising in the past six months was constantly ascending. Neither Serbian offensives nor all Serbian military and police operations, including the so-called first major offensive that took place in the end of May and the beginning of June could stop the avalanche of the Albanian rebellion. The Albanians acquired self-confidence which in the months of its ascending seemed quite unrealistic. But, the events took their own course, and Serbian operations in western and other parts of Kosovo just reconfirmed the motive and decisiveness to persist in it.

Demolitions, houses set on fire and ethnic cleansing of Decani and about 40 Albanian villages in the bordering region with Albania, between Decani and Djakovica, were compensated for by the failure of the Serbian offensive in other directions and new breakthroughs in central parts of Kosovo. The first public political centre of the insurgent movement was created in Malisevo. Due to its geographic position, Malisevo could not have any special significance as a military stronghold, but as a political centre it served well, but also as compensation for the losses and as a psychological barrier to spreading of doubts and disonant political voices. Although deeply suppressed, as an echo of the global relations, such voices could be discerned before, both within and without the OVK. However, because of massive identification with the OVK, dissonance within it was interpreted in public as an insignificant reflection of quarrels among irresponsible politicians and their political parties. Of course, such impressions were justly partly true. Relations among Albanian subject were much more complex.

The public could see just a part of all that and to judge only about big quarrels among the politicians and political parties. It mostly did not know that the differences within the OVK were much greater and that the mutual negative influence of the political and the military group were much more harmful for the unity of the Albanians than it could have been imagined. There is no firm evidence, but on the basis of more or less masked allusions and ambitions, it can be claimed that the politicians and political parties have played their role better. However, it should be noted that they had a great advantage because they enjoyed full support of great powers, contrary to the OVK which was an uncertain and unstabilizing factor for them. This was most obvious during the current Serbian military offensive against the Albanian insurgent movement.

Although it was evident that the global situation in Kosovo demands inter-Albanian cooperation, coordination and harmonization, mutual relations between the political and the military group were not constructive. On the contrary, they were extremely competitive and rivalling, each of them tried to constitute a monopoly and have absolute domination. Such tendencies were also evident in the attempts to smooth differences within these two groups, although it should be stressed that it is possible to speak about relations within the OVK only on the basis of assumptions.

The current attempts to establish an Albanian executive body which would satisfy all the "cats and dogs" also speak about coplexity of relations within the Albanian movement. Even with the help of the pressure exerted by America, it was possible only to achieve principled agreement on establishing such a body. There is no agreement about either who will give the formal blessing to this body, or what it will be called. These are just apparently insignificant questions. Aspirations to have a monopoly and at the same time shrinking from it are very expressed among all. The group which boycotted the elections does not recognize the parliament. If it persists in this, it will not accept a government elected by that very parliament, which could also recall it, if relation of political forces changed. This group has no deputies and it is in favour of creation of a powerful executive political body only on the basis of agreement of all political forces, OVK inclusive. On the other hand, Rugova's group with its satellite parties will find it difficult to give up on its parliament and readily surrender a part of its power to a body which it will not be able to fully control. The posiition of Rugova who is considered to be the leading political figure by great powers and the president of Republic of Kosovo by the Albanians is not clear either. Formally, he has big power being at this post. The opponents who accept cooperation with his people would by no means agree to be Rugova's puppets, so they demand the post of the president and that of one vice-president in the future body which might have up to 18 members, at least two of whom should be representatives of the OVK. The political tangle is very complicated, but the Americans are declaring that they will disentangle it very soon.

Brutality in Orahovac in the beginning of the current Serbian offensive, intensifying of all forms of terror in the rule of Kosovo, extensive demolitions and immeasurable suffering of the Albanians caused a part of the Albanian population to waver and stop being concerned about the price of freedom of the Albanians and independence of Kosovo, but of course nobody would admit that. So far the demand for independence of Kosovo but to be achieved peacefully and not by war was estimated as an illusion which was until recently for several years advocated by the prevailing Albanian policy. Practically it was a policy of compromise. But, insisting for years on independence of Kosovo for reasons of propaganda, now when a compromise is necessary, this policy has become an obstacle for a diplomatic "meeting half way".

Publicly, every Albanian would make an ardent patriotic speech, but it would be difficult to claim that every one is intimately ready to accept to sacrrifice himself. These are very complex psychological and political dilemmas which show that many Albanians are still not quite clear about certain issues, either as individuals or as an ethnic collectivity. All things considered, many of them, politicians inclusive, do not mean what they publicly claim. Probably that is partly the cause of great inter-Albanian political animosities and sources of envenomed relations on the Albanian political scene. All this is emerging on the surface as a great lack of confidence and intolerance among them which are gradually but increasingly spreading among their fanatic supporters and partly even among ordinary people.

For some time in Kosovo the opinion prevailed (and it is still quite widespread) that the OVK would succeed in preventing vertical political division within the Albanian people. But, Albanian politicians were not ready to pass over this role to anyone. They knew that the OVK was politically heterogeneous and that the only thing it was united about was the platform of resistance to Serbian rule. It could have been expected that as soon as politics and diplomacy were imposed on the OVK from within or from without, its internal divisions would inevitably come out in the open. However, to be absolutely certain they would, for months and weeks the Albanian politicians worked, mostly secretly, on stirring up divisions within the OVK. It is becoming clear now that the Albanian public and the OVK have underestimated the role of politicians and political parties. It is true that their rating does not seem to be high among the people, but the world supports them and for as long as that continues, they will be able to impose themselves as representatives of the people, and as peace-makers.

The Serbian offensive added significant quantities of oil on fire of inter-Albanian dilemmas and problems. If it is true that the Serbian offensive is completed, it can be said it has accomplished certain results, though not all. The most tangible are several ten or hundred killed and wounded Albanians, about one hundred thousand Albanian refugees, thousands of demolished or burnt down Albanian homes, hundreds or thousands hectares of wheat in the fields set on fire, ethnic cleansing of significant parts of Kosovo... When speaking about certain political and psychological effects, results should be measured by the speed of the beginning and the course of the future Albanian-Serbian negotiations, or more precisely the concessions this military offensive could extort.

As it was published, president of FRY, Slobodan Milosevic said to the European three that the Serbian military operation in Kosovo was completed. However, this is not confirmed by developments in the field. The May-June offensive was also proclaimed completed, but operations in the bordering region have continued to this day and there is no chance that they will be over. That is why it is difficult to predict the final military outcome. The OVK has lost control over significant parts of the territory and it is in this sense approximately back where it was in the end of April or the beginning of May. But if armed groups of Kosovo Albanians look upon themselves as a guerilla, in a guerilla war territory should not be of major military significance, like the structure of command and armed manpower. In this context, the OVK has not suffered much damage, but its psychological and diplomatic rating has seriously been damaged. This is welcomed by Albanian politicians, Belgrade and foreign diplomacy, because it enables them to marginalize or remove from the game a player which cannot be fully controlled and brings uncertaintly to everyone.

Who has gained and who has lost in this game will be known in the coming weeks and months. In any case, after the current Serbian offensive, the general national uprising which has spread fast in the past months will have to be analyzed from within in the coming days and weeks. The Albanians as individuals and as an ethnic collectivity will have to make certain things clear and make certain decisions. At the moment it can only be assumed that these analyses could prove that the rebellious phase of the war is over. This may have a pessimistic conclusion: if a quick shift towards diplomacy is not made soon, in the next few weeks Kosovo may end up in a long war which will not spare anybody, not even the immediate neighbours of Kosovo.

AIM Pristina

Fehim REXHEPI