Has Djukanovic Capitulated?

After Belgrade Talks of Yugoslav, Serbian and Montenegrin President

AIM Podgorica, 21 July, 1998

Montenegrin public, especially voters of the coalition "For a Better Life", were shocked on Friday evening to hear at the central TV daily news program the statement from the Belgrade meeting of three presidents - Milosevic, Djukanovic and Milutionovic - in which they asserted that they had unanimously adopted conclusions on amending the Constitution of FR Yugoslavia, strengthening the information system via Yugoslav Radio-Television (JRT), and fighting terrorism in Kosovo by all means. The first impression of the majority of the Montenegrin public was disbelief that its leader Djukanovic had agreed to all the concessions and practically signed capitulation to Milosevic. Coalition partners of the Democratic Party of Socilists (DPS) Kilibarda and Rakcevic were also caught by surprise - the former said with restraint that it was necessary to negotiate with Milosevic, but that it was also necessary to be careful "because he has tricked everybody", while Rakcevic concluded that such an agreement contributed to reinforcement of the position of the federal president. Both partners of Djukanovic's DPS have warned that they would watch further developments closely and in case of actual realization of the mentioned items, they would leave the coalition.

Advisor of president Djukanovic for the constitutional system Miodrag Vukovic and secretary for information Bozidar Jaredic tried to alleviate the negative echo of the agreement of president Djukanovic, and tried to convince at great length the disappointed supporters that constitutional amendments referred more to the Constitution of Serbia than that of Montenegro, that advocating JRT had nothing to do with the JRT as it was at present, which belonged to "YUL not to Yugoslavia" and that concerning Kosovo, Montenegro was in favour of a political solution of the problem, with mediation of OSCE and respect of the citizens and ethnic rights, and that mentioning of terrorism was just an incidental and protocolar formulation.

When it turned out that such pretexts had not much effect, indirectly, the authorities started rumours that nothing would come out of this agreement, and that Djukanovic was just bluffing Milosevic in order to squeeze out the main concession - relieving of federal prime minister Momir Bulatovic of duty. At the press conference today, vice-president of the National Party, member of Djukanovic's coalition, Predrag Drecun, declared that Milosevic had promised the Montenegrin president that Bulatovic would be relieved of duty by October, and that the post of the prime minister and seven ministerial posts would be offered to the coalition "For Better Life". This statement was accompanied by the conclusion from the statement given after the meeting of president Djukanovic with the delegation of OSCE that the agreement with Milosevic was valid only if Bulatovic were removed.

That this topic had been mentioned at those talks was proved best by Bulatovic's own reaction and that of his party. They claimed that by the agreement with Milosevic, Djukanovic had recognized the federal government because he had approved everything it had already initiated under Bulatovic's command

• from the amendment of the Constitution, over reinforcement of the JRT, all the way to the struggle against terrorism in Kosovo. Based on all that, Bulatovic's party concluded that Djukanovic had signed capitulation to Milosevic. Such sharp reaction of the Socialist National Party (SNP), although customary in their evaluation of work of the president of the Republic who by the way they do not recognize, this time also showed evidence of concern of Bulatovic's party for its own destiny, because in case of Bulatovic's departure, the electorate of this party would practically be reduced by half. "Bulatovic's position is stable", vice-president of the SNP Predrag Bulatocic, explains, although his appearance left the impression that even he himself did not believe what he was saying.

The closest to the truth would be the conclusion of the leader of the SDP Zarko Rakcevic that NMilosevic was in fact playing a game between Djukanovic and Bulatovic, trying to quarrel them as much as possible, weaken them both and in this way reinforce his own position. His party comrade Stankovic believes that Milosevic is not intendinding to stop looking for subjects in Montenegro, so that the authorities must constantly be on the alert. "One should just recall coalition Together, its great victory and what is stands for nowadays in Serbia, and be cautious with Milosevic, because he never gives up and manages to draw a maximum benefit for himself from even apparently hopeless situations", Stankovic believes.

There are many who share Stankovic's opinion, so that the comparisons with the Together coalition can be heard as a frequent illustration of political circumstances here in describing Milosevic's intention to destroy the coalition "For Better Life". That he has already managed to shaken relations among partners is illustrated by the fact that each one of them reacts differently to this agreement - Djukanovic's DPS is silent and his media mostly pass this topic over in silence, the Nationals explain that Djukanovic has agreed to something quite the opposite from what it may look like after the first reading of the agreement, while the SDP shrinks from it and fears that this was a step backwards on the way of the coalition towards better life. Of course, it is hard to believe that the Milosevic-Djukanovic agreement will seriously shaken the coalition, but that it may be the germ of such a process should not be doubted. Everything will depend on further developments. It is obvious that there will be plenty of quibbling and that only in a few months' time it will become evident who this was useful for. It is hard to believe, though, that even for such large promises as those Djukanovic had given him, Milosevic will agree to replace Bulatovic and hand over the extremely powerful post of the federal prime minister to Djukanovic. If he agreed to something like that, it would practically be his beginning of the end. There are opinions, however, that this would not be surprising and that pressured by enormous and unsolvable problems, Milosevic would let Djukanovic take over, and through him the international community, in exchange for being left alone at the post of the ceremonial president of the FRY.

It is more probable, however, at least on the basis of behavior of the Yugoslav president, to expect his attempt to outwit his rival from Podgorica, and even agree to make certain concessions, even to remove Bulatovic, but after he reinforces his position and power through constitutional amendments, and in this way practically deprive the post of the federal prime minister of every sense, and along with it the concessions he has made on its account.

Of course, Djukanovic is not naive either. His situation is much more comfortable and he has no reason to hurry with effectuation of the agreed and concessions to Milosevic. All this could lead to a stale-mate position in which this agreement would remain a dead letter, and Djukanovic and Milosevic would maintain the so persistently practised relation of two irreconcilable and passionate opponents. Such a possibility is corroborated by daily political reality - true war between the federal and the republican government over taxes, customs, everything, which all gives the impression that it is too late for any chance of revival and reinforcement of the federal state, because as a local analysts once said "it is impossible to bring a corpse back to life".

Marko Vukovic

AIM Podgorica