OPPOSITION AT THE CROSSROADS

AIM Zagreb, 18 July, 1998

Departure of five leaders of the Croatian opposition (Racan, Gotovac, Tomcic, Jakovcic, Cacic) to the USA according to its outer manifestations is the central political event of this unstable summer, but to what extent this will help the disunited and undecisive opposition is a different matter. Having returned after talks with Madelaine Albright and the leading team of her associates, the five tried to make the impression of an excellently completed job, and the differences in interpretation of some key American stands that had appeared in declarations given on the other side of the ocean were polished off.

However, this is just the sweet verbal icing put over deep crevices among the opposition which for years now has not been able to make a joint strategy of the struggle for power, and no matter to what extent the journey to the USA may have seemed as a good opportunity for a shift, one could prove that it is just the opposite. The greatest challenge for the fragile togetherness came just before taking off for the United States. That is when the Social Democratic Party (SDP), nowadays by far the greatest opposition party, broke the agreement that the opposition would come out with a joint draft of the new election law before the journey to the USA, in order to eliminate the regime's accusations that Racan and the others were travelling over the ocean to be given instructions for the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

Instead of a joint draft, the SDP submitted its own proposal, justifying this by danger that a joint draft would have been prepared too late and that the leaders would be forced to fly to the USA without this shield from accusations of the regime. Perhaps this explanation would have somehow been accepted by other parties - who did not think it was especially important to pay so much heed to the opinion of the regime - if the draft had not been co-signed by the Croat Social Liberal Party (HSLS) of Drazen Budisa. This party had several months ago stepped out of the program of minimum cooperation with other opposition parties, having made it public that its objective was tactical rapprochement with the ruling Croat Democratic Community (HDZ), in order to take over ten per cent of its electorate. In consistency with this treachery, the HSLS refused the invitation to visit the USA, and in this was deepened the gap between itself and the others, at the very moment of the sensistive test of solidarity among the opposition parties.

While still in the USA, assurances arrived from the SDP that it had been forced to step forward concerning the election law and that there was no obstacle for the opposition to appear with a joint draft law in a very short time after all. But in other opposition parties, they are sceptically shaking their heads, with a premonition that it could be just another tall story of the Social Democrats, while the joint legal initiative of the SDP and the HSLS could, on the contrary be the expression of true intentions of Racan's reformed ex-communists. This forecast is not unconvincing, because, by joining its destiny to the HSLS, Racan's party could neutralize at least a part of constant suspicion that it was conspiring or at least dreaming about "revival of comunism". Budisa's party's benefit from this union would be that it could prove in this way that it had not squandered its entire reputation of a once eminent and powerful opposition party.

In any case, by the unexpected step towards the HSLS, the SDP has moved the opposition another step further away from the possibility to create a large coalition, like at the time of its greatest election success (victory in the elections in Zagreb in 1995, and in Rijeka two years later). This is especially discreditting for the Social Democrats because they were the motor force of the coalition union when less than ten per cent of the voters were inclined towards them, and nowadays when a few polls showed that this figure went up to twenty and even more per cent, their enthusiasm has evidently diminished. Therefore forecasts seem convincing that this party is actually get ready to run on its won in the elections, supported perhaps only by a few minor parties which could by no means be a serious partner to it.

But, even if the share of the SDP in the electorate were considerably bigger (25-30 per cent), ambitions of this party to win power on its own would not be realistic, so that the SDP will probably have to reconsider cooperation with other opposition parties. The question that arises is whether this shift will come quickly enough to interrupt the accelerated decline of confidence among opposition parties, and squandering of the capital acquired in the first collective presentation of the opposition at the most prestigious political market in the world. Although diplomatic tactfulness of the Americans did not permit them to say so openly, they unambiguously supported the gathering of Croatian opposition. Moreover, this was their main landmark in the evaluation to what extent the opposition could contribute to democratization of Croatia and, what is the most important for them at this point, help in resolution of the situation in B&H.

Therefore, it is not surprising that not long before the US tour of the Croatian opposition, it leaked from American sources that Clinton's administration was playing a simultaneous exhibition on two boards. On one, it is making combinations with the opposition and estimating its political orientation (attitude towards nationalism, multiethnic states, etc,) and its force. On the other, it is opening the possibility to offer support to the moderate faction of the HDZ (the "headquarters" of which are in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mate Granic, but with quite a lot external members such as Greguric, Valentic, Jarnjak, and others). According to some assessments, this simultaneous exhibition will last until a lasting solution is found for B&H, and as recently Robert Gelbard explained, it consists of victory of "pluralist" in all three ethnic groups in this country.

The first group visit of Croatian opposition to the USA is beginning to resemble a crossroads, although veiled by still non-transparent events and processes which will follow, among other primarily the outcome of the forthcoming parliamentary elections in B&H. Therefore, nobody should be surprised that rhetoric of regime officials and media changed after their return to the country. Now they are welcomed by derision that Albright had received them against her will, and then refused to talk through an interpreter because she was obviously not interested in what they had to say. In this way the HDZ revealed that in the whole story they were were hurt the most because for months now Tudjman has not been able to arrange an invitation to the USA, and that the agreed invitation for Mate Granic arrived only after the five-member opposition delegation had returned home.

The opposition should be more concerned about the situation within its ranks than the customary gossip. After the visit to the United States, regardless of how stimulating it may have seemed, it does not look any bettr, it might even be worse. It leaked in public that one of the leaders of the SDP who still did not wish to make his name known intends to abandon the party and found his own. He is a man who is much more popular outside the party than in it, because for quite some time he has distinguished himself by the attempts to pull the SDP towards the "centre" (as he himself says, but it often resembled more a discrete coalition with the HDZ). But he is now wisely advocating a large coalition of all or majority of opposition parties, obviously calculating that if an open clash occurs between him and the party, it would discredit the party and bring him a profit.

MARINKO CULIC