Relaxation of Tensions between MONTENEGRO and SERBIA

Playing Hide and Seek

AIM Podgorica, July 3, 1998

The news carried by the Podgorica "Vijesti" that Montenegrin authorities have struck a deal with Belgrade on joint elaboration of a platform for negotiations with Croatia regarding Prevlaka - caught many in Montenegro by surprise. Just a few days earlier, Montenegrin Foreign Minister Branko Perovic harshly criticized the behaviour of the Federal Government which, without consulting Montenegro, sent a proposal to the United Nations for the settlement of this issue with Croatia. This was interpreted in Podgorica as another of many Milosevic's pressures on Montenegrin authorities which, since Momir Bulatovic's appointment for Federal Prime Minister, refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Federal Government.

But now, literally overnight, an unexpected turnabout has occurred: in the several couple of days Momir Bulatovic's "unrecognized" Federal Government and the "legitimate" Government of Montenegro will jointly formulate the final version of the platform for the settlement of the disputable problem of Prevlaka. Has there been a turnabout in Djukanovic's policy? Namely, during electoral campaign, as well as afterwards, the Montenegrin state top leadership did not shrink from using harsh political words against Milosevic, the SPS and its coalition partners the SRS and the JUL. Naturally, the other side was by no means tender towards Montenegrin reformists, calling them thieves, smugglers, etc. After the elections, the tension additionally intensified when the Montenegrin Parliament adopted a Resolution demanding from the military leadership to return Montenegrin soldiers from Kosovo, as well as by an insolent decision of the military top brass to deploy recruits from Montenegro to barracks all over southern Serbian province.

What has happened in the meantime to bring about the re-establishment of the relations between the official Belgrade and Podgorica? Namely, when some forty days ago Momir Bulatovic was enthroned as Federal Prime Minister he openly said that he had not taken the job just in order to secure a position for himself or run away from the electoral defeat in Montenegro. On the contrary, the SNP President claimed that this was not a "temporary solution", but that he seriously intended to finally "deblock the operation of the federal administration" in coordination with the federal President Milosevic. Indeed, although politically shaken by the defeat of his own party at the elections, Bulatovic did not sit on his hands. Soon after that, federal administration presented to the public a solution of the Prevlaka problem, thus showing that it did not intend to let Montenegro take the initiative in bilateral negotiations with the Croatian side.

Only few days later, the federal administration declared a new boycott of the Slovenian goods, justifying the move as a retaliation against Slovenia for its stand towards Kosovo. Consequently, obeying the decision of Milosevic and his coalition partners from the JUL and the SRS, Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade ordered the Federal Customs Administration to deny customs clearance to goods coming from Slovenia. This decree, which was adopted overnight, probably affected many enterprises in Serbia which have re-established cooperation with the Slovenian enterprises but, undoubtedly, Montenegro was hit hardest: 179 motor cultivators, worth about 1,8 million DEM, were suddenly "frozen" in the port of Bar without a possibility of getting through customs.

This act of the federal administration also thwarted the realization of the already signed credit arrangement under which Slovenia was to invest in Montenegrin agriculture and tourism 4.5 million DEM by the end of this month. Information that the Federal Government has proclaimed a boycott of the Slovenian goods without previously consulting the FRY Assembly, only proves that Milosevic thought this to be an extremely important political decision which could not be procrastinated by lengthy parliamentary debates.

It was the third move of the federal top ranks that reverberated most powerfully in Montenegro. Just in one day, the Federal Prime Minister, whom the Montenegrin authorities refuse to recognize, got rid of 22 federal officials from the list of Montenegrin cadres. The criterion was simple and therefore, implemented promptly. Bulatovic had no mercy. Everyone who, even indirectly, showed loyalty to Djukanovic and other top Montenegrin officials, got a one-way ticket to Podgorica: Chief of the federal protocol, Prime Minister's counsellors, Assistants and Secretaries to Ministers, etc. Many saw this Bulatovic's decision as a move of a politician who is a poor loser.

Although there are ample reasons for such interpretations, it nevertheless seems that this was a large-scale action which confirms the thesis that, despite Djukanovic's sliding victory at May elections, Milosevic will not stop pressuring Montenegro. Namely, by eliminating from the federal top ranks cadres loyal to Djukanovic, Montenegro is definitely isolated from the decision-making process at the federal level. Thanks to deputies from Bulatovic's SNP, Milosevic has long ago won the unrestricted power in the Federal Parliament and can even pass many laws detrimental to Montenegro. True, at its last session the Montenegrin Parliament adopted a law excluding Bulatovic's men from the Montenegrin delegation in the Chamber of the Republics. However, the fact that sessions of the Federal Parliaments have not been convened for quite a while, shows that Milosevic will not so easily allow Djukanovic to obstruct the work of the Federal Parliament and is probably waiting for the decision of the FRY Constitutional Court whereby the Montenegrin new law will be proclaimed unconstitutional. In this way the mandate of the federal deputies from the SNP ranks would be extended and Djukanovic would be forced to find another way of realizing his publicly proclaimed intention to democratize the Federation.

Thus, apart from being blocked in the Federal Parliament, Djukanovic no longer gets important information on the developments in the federal administration. It was precisely thanks to the work of his men in Belgrade, that the Montenegrin President was once in the past informed on time of the secret preparations of the law on the joining of security services, as well as of some other Milosevic's ideas and, what is most important, had the time to elicit the support of the Montenegrin public for his opposition to the official Belgrade, through the media. In future, the Montenegrin authorities will learn of the decisions of the federal administration only after they are published by the media. This particularly concerns Belgrade's diplomatic plans, as well as the coordination of actions of the federal police and the military.

It thus seems that Djukanovic is further than ever from any possibility of influencing the federal authorities and Milosevic has clearly shown him that if he wanted the federal state to function at all, he will have to contact him personally, same as he did at the session of the Supreme Defence Council. For, Djukanovic can no longer play with the refusal to recognize the Federal Government and Milosevic's men, because he is obviously unable to prevent the effects of their actions on Montenegro.

Is this a combination of reasons which made the Montenegrin President to reach, at least temporary, an agreement with Milosevic? According to top Montenegrin sources, early this week Djukanovic met Milosevic "face to face". No one knows what did they talk about. No information about the meeting was released, nor was anyone in Djukanovic's office willing to confirm this. The news about the cooperation of Montenegrin and Federal Governments also fits in the analysis which speak about the relaxation of tensions between Belgrade and Podgorica. Along these same lines is the information on the future editorial concept of the state-run media. Namely, at this week's meeting of editors-in-chief of Radio and TV Montenegro, and "Pobjeda" with the state top leadership, "it was warmly recommended" to representatives of the Montenegrin state media that they should not insist on negative qualification when speaking about Slobodan Milosevic, as well as to give more moderate reports on the Kosovo events.

Still, it is too early to speak about a definite rapprochement between Podgorica and Belgrade. The differences in their reasoning about country's development strategy are too great to be so easily overcome. Also, it is hard to believe that Milosevic could ever place his trust again in Djukanovic and the reformists from Podgorica. But it would be hard for Djukanovic too, who has built his international image on his opposition to Milosevic's policy, to explain to foreign diplomats how are the Montenegrin reformists building bridges of cooperation with the Serbian leader.

It seems that something else is in question here: in all likelihood, the Montenegrin authorities have engaged in a risky battle of wits with Milosevic in order to reduce the intensive economic and political pressure on Montenegro. On the other hand, it probably also suits the Federal President to keep further conflicts with Montenegro at bay while situation in Kosovo is so inflammable. In military terminology such maneuvering of both sides is called, re-deployment of forces. The question is: after playing hide and seek who will, when a new conflicts break out, be stronger and better prepared for the final showdown?

Drasko DjURANOVIC

(AIM, Podgorica)