WHAT IS THE LIBERATION ARMY OF KOSOVO?

AIM Pristina, 3 July, 1998

Until the beginning of 1996, the Kosovo public had not been aware that the illegal Albanian organization which represented itself as the Liberation Army of Kosovo (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës - UÇK) even existed. Contrary to numerous illegal groups and organizations which have operated during the entire period since the Second World War, the UÇK is the first which presented itself to the Kosovo public as the perpetrator of armed operations. With its first statement dated 16 February 1996, the UÇK claimed responsibility for several simultaneous bombing operations and armed assaults in Pristina, Kosovska Mitrovica, Pec, Podujevo, Suva Reka and Vucitrn, in the night between 14 and 15 February, 1996. The target of these attacks were buildings where Serb refugees from Croatia were accommodated. Nobody was killed and there was no significant damage done. In the first public statement signed by the Main Staff it was said that the attacks were carried out by guerilla groups of the UÇK in the listed places. Underlining that these attacks were just the first warning, the Main Staff announced that it was in the interest of peace in the Balkans, both for the Serbs and the Albanians, to stop with colonization of Kosovo, with terror and emigration of the Albanians, and the occupation of Kosovo. Urgent beginning of negotiations was demanded concerning withdrawal of Serbian military and police forces from Kosovo. The war would be inevitable if goals the Albanians had declared themselves in favour of in their referendum were not accomplished by peaceful means, it was also said in the first statement of the UÇK for the public.

Later on, in the period until the end of November 1997, when a frontal armed conflict broke out between members of the UÇK and strong motorized and armoured units of Serbian police, the target of the UÇK were police patrols and facilities, as well as individuals - members or associates of serbian police services and Serbian authorities. In the latter category, the target of the UÇK, the most numeorus were the so-called honest Albanians as the Albanians call them, that is loyal citizens of Serbia, as the Serbs call them.

The first public announcement of the UÇK was at first accepted by the Albanians as the appearance of yet another illegal organization such as those which existed in Kosovo in the past decades. That is the reason why the UÇK did not draw any particular attention. But, by its persistent announcements and new armed operations, in time it imposed itself on the Albanians as a very hot internal topic. It is interesting that very vehement discussions took place concerning this topic, but only in private. In public, the UÇK was a taboo topic. In Albanian media it was mentioned only when it issued statements for the public. It was not a pleasant topic of talks for the politicians either, because many of them did not wish to believe in its existence. But, deterioration of the general situation in Kosovo reached the level when it was impossible to avoid the change of opinion and public declarations concerning this topic.

Due to ignorance of even the most fundamental facts about it and the absolutely predominant opinion both in politics and in public that the solution for Kosovo should be sought solely by political means, despite hot internal disputes, the Albanian politicians decided to deny the existence of the UÇK. An enormous majority of the Albanian public chose to do the same. The main argument in favour of such a stand was the lack of any information about it. In private conversations, the main argument was disbelief that the Albanians could create such an organization which carried out its operations almost flawlessly. It was also hard to believe that the powerful Serbian military and police machinery along with its informers was not capable of coping with this type of operation of the Albanians in Kosovo. That is why, despite general expectations that such an organization should appear, most of the Albanian public accepted the stand of its politicians that the UÇK was a creation of the Serbian secret services.

The only public and political figure which did not accept this stand was Adem Demaqi. Perhaps there were others too, but he was the only one who had the courage to come out in public with the opinion that the possibility of existence of an Albanian organization which called itself by this name should not be eliminated. In his first public appearance concerning this issue he statistically presented the possibility of its existence as 50:50. This ratio was just a statement for the public, but it seems that Demaqi was personally convinced that it existed. This is corroborated by his quick evolution towards conviction that the UÇK undoubtedly existed and operated.

Although broadly accepted almost as an undoubted truth, it should be said that the assumption that the UÇK was a creation of the Serbian secret services did not completely eliminate the grain of doubt in a significant part of the public. Once it was accepted, even if vaguely, it was easy to manipulate the explanation that the Serbian authorities were using the apparition which presented itself as the UÇK in order to discredit the Albanian peace movement, especially in the eyes of the world. Since the Albanian movement or rather its absolutely predominant part headed by Ibrahim Rugova in achieving the proclaimed goals, relied solely on the support of the world, it was logical to conclude that presentation of the movement as a terrorist organization was in the top political and diplomatic interest of Belgrade. These explanations now seem naive, because neither did Rugova have the support of the world for the proclaimed goals, nor could they have been achieved solely by the support of the world. But, that is how it had appeared when the Albanians, not only in Kosovo, argued heatedly whether the UÇK existed or not.

It is interesting that the same logic was followed by Serbian authorities as well. They impatiently looked forward to every incident to attribute the responsibility for it to the UÇK. It was qualiofied as a terrorist organization. Despite the fact that a certain quantity of restraint was officially expressed, in individual public appearances of the officials and other politicians, in media and generally in the propagandist war no room was left for any doubt. It seemed that they could hardly wait for an incident to occur to present not only the UÇK but all the Albanian political parties as terrorist ones which allegedly secretly inspire, direct and support its armed operations.

Only in the end of November last year it could be stated that Serbian authorities and their services had no clear picture what the UÇK was and how it operated. It was possible to assume that the UÇK had always been a big mystery for the Serbian authorities from contradictory statements of Serbian officials who were in charge of the so-called security and from trials. Not a single eye-witness, not a single arrested and not a single material piece of evidence was provided to corroborate that the indicted and eventually sentenced persons actually belonged to this organization or had been direct perpetrators of armed operations.

It turned out that great energy invested in propaganda against the UÇK and the Albanian movement contributed greatly to its popularity. The impression is that Serbian propaganda contributed the most to pulling out of the UÇK from deep hiding, and even to its development into a public political factor, and not only in Kosovo. It was probably decisive for such quick popularization of the UÇK among Kosovo Albanians. As mentioned, the UÇK was not at all mentioned in Albanian media, and the effects of Serbian propaganda were quite the opposite from the planned ones.

The turn for everybody occurred on the 25 and 26, and then on 28 November 1997 in Drenica. Inhabitants of some villages in Drenica round Lause, offered resistence twice to entrance of police forces into the region during the afternoon on 25 November. In the second attempt, a punitive police unit accomplanied by a few armoured vehicles was also repelled. The next day, on 26 November, the operation continued but with much greater forces. A convoy of armoured and other vehicles, at least ten of them, set out in the morning from Kosovska Mitrovica. After less than two hours it arrived to the site of developments of the previous day, but it was received in the same manner. The first true armed conflict in Kosovo between armed Albanians and Serbian armed forces took place until about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. There were about ten dead and wounded on the Serbian side and three wounded civilians on the Albanian, one of whom later died.

At his funeral, members of the UÇK presented themselves for the first time to the Albanian public, with masks on their faces, but nevertheless as tangible individuals. During the funeral ceremony, on 28 November, three armed and uniformed men stepped up on the platform. They presented themselves as members of the UÇK to about 20 thousand people present at the funeral. One of them addressed the masses with a written speech in which, among other, he said that the situation in Kosovo was unbearable, and announced that their killed comrades would be avenged, and that persistent struggle for liberation and union would continue. The short silent awe caused by the first sensational public appearance of members of the UÇK was interrupted by outbursts of emotion of deepest respect towards the UÇK, and then, the present masses chanted "UÇK..." for a few minutes. The highest representatives of Albanian political parties were also present. The fact that not a single one has to this day uttered a word about how he had felt at that moment, is certainly not just pure coincidence.

Some members say that the first groups of the UÇK were formed in 1992, and others mentioned 1993 as the year of its foundation. Numeorus analysts think that it is a product of broad discontent among Kosovo Albanians deprived of their rights, as the result of many years of massive violations of human, ethnic, but also political rights acquired in former SFR Yugoslavia, during which their lives were exposed to brutality of the regime because they refused to recognize its discriminatory laws. In any case, after its first public appearance in mid February 1996, November events in Drenica marked the end of a very significant development phase of the UÇK, and for Kosovo, the beginning of a new one the effects of which became visible only in the end of February and the beginning of March this year. This should not be interpreted as proof that it is responsible for armed conflicts and breaking out of the uprising in spring this year. The armed uprising of Kosovo Albanians as the response to the unbearable situation imposed by Serbian authorities was unavoidable. If it had not been for the UÇK, some other Albanian organization would have appeared to head the uprising.

The sensational appearance of members of the UÇK suddenly ended every doubt about the existence of this armed formation of Kosovo Albanians. All Albanian parties active in Kosovo issued statements about it. They all assessed that it was a new fact in the situation in Kosovo which could not be denied any more. Stressing that goals were identical, every one of them tried to keep the distance from it in view of signidficant differences in application of means used in the accomplishment of identical goals. Only Rugova with his group within the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DSK) preserved the old stand of doubt in its existence, occasionally repeating the possibility of its existence in the form of Serbian or other intelligence service. He then started permitting the possibility of its existence saying that it consisted of frustrated individuals, and finally he reached the current formulation about groups which were defending their homes.

Regulation of relations between the UÇK and the Albanian parties, that is, the Albanian policy, is a very complex problem in resolution of which it will be impossible to avoid inter-Albanian tensions which have arisen in the past decades. If we disregard for a moment the recent tensions and strong personal and party ambitions, the questions of competative alternatives and their possible coordination arise. Leader of Kosovo Albanians Ibrahim Rugova recently expressed aspirations to put the UÇK under his control. However, there is no chance for anything of the kind, because in Kosovo, despite persistent referring to some state institutions, the administration has never been constituted according to the procedure the Albanians themselves have prescribed. On the other hand, Adem Demaqi with his party offered to be the political representative of the UÇK. Considering the UÇK to be part of the global, unique social and ethnic organism, the Albanian parties assess that it cannot and that it is very dangerous for it to become the army of a single political party.

Solution of this burning internal political issue is not in sight mostly because Kosovo state institutions do not exist, but inter-Albanian rivalry, intolerance and personal ambitions also create problems. The UÇK itself has not declared its stand concerning this issue. There are the former evaluations of its official spokesman, Jakup Krasniqi, that the UÇK is a non-partisan and non-ideological organization which considers that party pluralism in the current conditions is a luxury.

The complex problem of relations between politicians and rebels is further intensified by the contacts of the Americans with representatives of the UÇK and the hinted readiness of other western countries to follow suit. On the one hand this means actual recognition of the UÇK as a military and political factor in Kosovo. On the other, this imposes the obligation to obey certain rules of the game. In this game, the UÇK will not always be able to appear as a purely military factor. It is logical that the main role in the peace process is played by politicians, that is, the representatives of the people. That is why contacts with the Americans and others unavoidably impose on the UÇK the obligation to declare itself concerning its political representation. In view of the unsettled inter-Albanian relations and development of the UÇK in top secrecy, this choice will not at all be simple. It can, among other, lead to great inter-Albanian splits which will affect the UÇK itself. However, these are just some of the problems that international recognition imposes.

Despite being for the moment the most popular organization in Kosovo, the public still does not know the main elements of its structure, the methodology of its activities and its leaders. The only body which is appearing in public since the first public statement is the Main Staff. >From about 50 statements and public appearances of some of the allegedly high members of the UÇK, it can be concluded that it is a military and political organization. But, it is not known whether these spheres of activity are in any way formally established in its internal organization. existence of possible connections with other illegal Albanian organizations, on the one hand, and ambitions or offers of certain Albanian political personages and organizations to put it under their control or to appear as its political representatives on the other. For the time being, it is known that the UÇK is closest to the National Movement of Kosovo which is operating in secrecy ever since its foundation in

1. From public appearances of its leaders, one gets the impression that the National Movement of Kosovo is actually the political faction of the UÇK. However, they are refusing to say anything about it in public.

The least is known about its military structure and the system of command. On the basis of public statements of members of the UÇK, it can be concluded that apart from the Main Staff, there are at least two regional staffs, one for Drenica and one for Dukaxhin which covers the region of Decani and Djakovica. It seems that in the system of vertical subordination there are also two inferior local levels of command. However, it was impossible to establish whether this vertical structure is equally valid for all types of combatants and equally applicable for all units. There are territorial combatants linked mostly to local regions, and soldiers who either have military experience or who have had serious and extended training. Soldiers probably with different ranks, are the commanding cadre. Only they belong to the so-called mobile units. However, it is difficult to speak about the radius of their activities, as well as about the possibility of concentration for carrying out certain serious tasks. The system of command is not known either, nor how specialised groups and units operate. In the past few months, the rebels have worked hard on constructing communications on all areas they control.

It is usually believed that Albania is the centre for training units of the UÇK. This may be just partly true. Although there is no evidence about it, the most probable is the assumption that, at least in the initial phase, former officers of the Yugoslav People's Army, members of the police or combatants of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia had the status of the so-called soldiers. Among them there are probably others who have at various times and circumstances acquired military knowledge and experience in various countries. However, an enormous majority of the Albanian combatants have acquired their initial military experience on improvised training grounds on the territory of Kosovo controlled by the rebels themselves. All the combatants, including territorial ones, before they receive arms must have a short training lasting at least a month or a month and a half which includes physical preparations and handling arms.

That is why allegations that Albania is the centre for training Kosovo guerilla are exaggerated. Allegation that Albania is the main source of supply of Kosovo combatants with arms is equally exaggerated. It can only be said to be partly true that most of the arms are transported via Albania. But this does not mean that Albania is the supplier. Sources and roads of the arms can be strange and unpredictable, just as smuggling of them brings risky but high profit. Merchants have never cared for national colours.

AIM Pristina

Fehim REXHEPI