American Diplomacy in Kosovo

RADICALISATION OR CALMING DOWN OF THE WAR

AIM, BELGRADE, July 4, 1998

The unplanned and accidental Holbrooke's meeting with the representatives of the Kosovo Liberation Army (OVK), as it was described by James Rubin, spokesman for the State Department, could in many ways mark a turnabout in the Kosovo crisis. A photo in which Holbrooke is sitting next to an armed OVK member went around the world provoking different reactions, but also causing many dilemmas. The photo of an uniformed intellectual (who later on turned out to be a poet) holding a kalashnikov in his hand, "a commander in charge of ethics, morality and policy in the region" who never left Holbrooke's side, was actually a part of political marketing which symbolically, but clearly, showed the change in the US attitude towards the OVK.

The gradual change in the American attitude which culminated in Holbrooke's meeting with the OVK members and the American admission that it has started official negotiations with the OVK which will last until the OVK stops its actions, was firstly reflected in the statement of Robert Gelbard, Special Representative for the Balkans, in February 1998 when he called the OVK "a terrorist organisation" and after that in James Rubin's statement of June 15, 1998 who said that "not every action of the OVK could be considered a terrorist act" to be finalised in Rubin's response of June 24, this year to a question whether the OVK was a terrorist organisation. He said: "No, we never said that".

In other words, the change of attitude towards the Kosovo problem is obvious and clear. This multiplied the questions which bring much uncertainty and dilemmas regarding the end of war in Kosovo just before Holbrooke's latest visit to Pristina and Belgrade: What was the intention of the dialogue initiated with the OVK and was it done with or without the knowledge of Slobodan Milosevic? Was, perhaps, the intention to weaken or, quite the opposite, to strengthen the Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova? Was the plan to recognize the state of affairs or maybe to create situation on the ground? Local cynics also take into account the fact that Holbrooke is getting ready for the voting in the lower house of the Congress, which in mid July should confirm his appointment for the new US Ambassador to the UN (and he stands a greater chance if he shows that he is not "soft with the Serbs" , i.e. "lenient towards Milosevic")?

The last question, or better said calculation, is too personal to be possible, but cannot be discarded as a piece of personal contribution in the mosaic of American policy towards Kosovo. But, first things first.

The latest American move in the resolution of the Kosovo crisis could also be interpreted as an intention to pacify the OVK by putting it under political control or to recognize the so called Kosovo Liberation Army as a warring side, either independently or as a controlled armed force. At this stage of negotiations between the US and OVK representatives, it seems that talks are directed towards putting the OVK under the political control of the Kosovo leader Rugova and thus pacify it. This partially answers the question whether the intention was to strengthen or, perhaps, weaken Rugova's positions. However, although this would strengthen Rugova's position vis-a-vis Belgrade and his rivals among the Albanian leaders, his position on the inter-Albanian Kosovo scene would, in fact, become weaker as it would depend on the future cooperation with the OVK, and even more than now, on his cooperativeness with the USA. In other words, the American intentions might be to centralise the responsibility for the developments on the ground so that possible violations of the agreement could not be justified by the uncontrolled OVK activities.

If this was truly the intention and if it was thus presented to Milosevic, it is highly probable that Holbrooke's meeting with the OVK was approved by the FRY President. In other words, after the responsibility of the Serbian side was centralized, with the approval of the international community, in the figure of the FRY President, who according to the Constitution is not authorized to decide on major political issues such as the destiny of Kosovo, the same has to be done on the Albanian side. Then it will be easier to exert influence on the negotiators. A favourable circumstance for the acceptance of a possible agreement or forced solution, is the fact that Milosevic controls the "extreme patriots" - the Radicals - who are his coalition partners, while Rugova, if he takes the lead of the OVK, would be in control of the only potential obstacle on the Albanian side. In other words, the intention is to create the situation on the ground by "recognizing the situation", i.e. by including the OVK in the negotiating process.

But, what will happen if these plans fail or if there are some other calculations directed to the radicalization of the Kosovo problem with a view to achieving quicker, but more brutal solution?

Is it possible for the Kosovo Albanians to reach their political objective in a peaceful manner? A political objective they will not give up - independent Kosovo. Would it suit Milosevic to keep Kosovo and Metohija within Serbia and FRY if he is unable to control it and get deputy and delegate mandates from there? Would his party ever win the elections without these mandates? All these questions carry the answers in themselves, but point to a possible different direction which the Kosovo crisis might take, a direction which would most probably lead to the further escalation of conflicts. Obviously, the stand of the international community is that the Kosovo problem has to be resolved within the unchanged borders which is what the Albanians are fighting for by trying to show that what in Kosovo they are engaged in an armed rebellion and not terrorism.

Their dosages of violence provoke excessive Belgrade's reactions so as to point to drastic violations of human rights which gives them the right to rise in revolt. Also, by their armed actions they show that Kosovo and Metohija within the borders of Serbia, represent an instability factor in the region and that only the creation of a new Albanian state would serve as a stability factor. However, killing of civilians, kidnapping and intimidation of non-Albanian population directed to ethnic cleansing discredits the so called liberating movement and shows what kind of state it is fighting for: either totally ethnically cleansed or a state in which non-Albanians would be considered a disruptive factor. It is, therefore necessary to put such OVK under political control.

When it comes to President Milosevic of FRY, whom the spokesman Rubin, one might say rightfully, called "chief of the OVK recruiting board", there is no doubt that his wrong moves were precisely what made the situation in Kosovo even more complicated.

But, even members of the G-7 have supported his unconstitutional decision to take the responsibility for the resolution of the Kosovo problem, thus welcoming the violation of the Constitutions of both FRY and Serbia, according to which the FRY President is not authorised to take such a responsibility. However, important international figures have gone even further: wanting to prevent the escalation of conflicts in Kosovo they were even willing to break international acts and principles. As a result, recently Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission, and Hans Van den Broek, Foreign Affairs Commissioner of the European Union, have announced a possibility of NATO's military intervention in Serbia, even without the mandate of United Nations. Namely, they claimed that "the international community can act in Kosovo even without the UN approval in case of massacre, war crimes or crimes against humanity".

After all is said and done, if the "processes" initiated in Kosovo get out of control the international community might have to face several dangerous precedents: it would have to talk to an entity which resorts to violence (terrorist actions) with the view to achieving its political aims; it would have to break the international principles and legal acts for the sake of "stability in the region"; and it would have to change its hitherto international and legal approach towards regions of countries in which minority population represents a majority. All the three precedents could cause unforeseeable consequences both in Kosovo, as well as world at large.

Zoran Lutovac (AIM)