ECHOES OF THE MILOSEVIC-YELTSIN MEETING

AIM Pristina 18 June, 1998

Noisy diplomatic and other reactions in many world capitals were not even felt on battlefields in western Kosovo. Moreover, armed conflicts acquired intensity and even spread. After big words and the roar of about 80 NATO airplanes around Kosovo, everything died down in expectation of the results of the talks in Moscow. It is hard to tell how these talks were conceived and why, as well as who expected what of the meeting Yeltsin-Milosevic. In any case, it turned out that their talks brought the only thing that could have been expected: for all directly and indirectly interested parties, results of the talks in Moscow mean bringing things back down to earth. This is probably the only positive result of the meeting, and it marks the end of the first phase of reactions of the world to the situation in Kosovo.

If one should compare diplomatic actions with development of the situation in Kosovo, there is an obvious discrepancy, even a dangerous disassociation between the two processes. This is not the result of an intentional avoiding to face the essence of the problem, but of inadequate, not to say wrong assessments of the significance of the problem and its possible development into a major crisis with dangerous broader consequences. Everything indicates that the armed conflicts in Kosovo have acquired their internal logic of development and that they have become insensitive to inadequate diplomatic rhetoric reactions, regardless of how sharp they may be. If diplomatic engagement to find a solution is serious and sincere, it is clear that words must be corroborated by effective persuasiveness.

The developments in the field speak about the range of rhetoric. On the very day of the meeting between Yeltsin and Milosevic, intensive armed conflicts continued in Kosovo showing the tendency to flare up. In Moscow, Milosevic declared that he would put a stop to use of violence against civilians. The following day, according to the still unconfirmed data, the result of the conflicts in the past two days was a few ten killed persons only on the Albanian side. Majority of them were killed during ruthless shelling of Albanian villages and parts of towns where they live. Based on experience, it can easily be assumed that the most numerous victims will be the civilians. Numerous houses were either demolished or burned to the ground, and several ten thousand homeless persons were joined by thousands new ones.

Conflicts in the past two days were not only severe but very widespread. In the north of Drenica shooting was the most intensive. This region is the site of conflicts for several months already because of the major communication line between Kosovska Mitrovica and Pec which has been blocked for a long time. It is equally "hot" in the south of Kosovo which is bordering the region of Drenica. The site of the conflict is the middle of the main road Pristina-Prizren, the mountain pass Qafa e Dules between Shtimje and Suvereka. This front was opened a few days ago near Caraljevo and due to its strategic, economic and political significance may become equally important, if not even more important than the bordering region between Decani and Djakovica. The main road between Pristina and Prizren has so far been the only more or less safe communication which connected the west with the rest of Kosovo. Main parts of of this region silently passed into the hands of the Albanian armed movement. Significance of this territory lies in the fact that it is to the south of the airport and great military base on the hill of Goles. If this main road should be blocked, the western part of Kosovo will be surrounded and Prizren cut from the rest of the world. In this way conflicts in Kosovo are getting closer to the Macedonian border. If this fact is disregarded, and the situation observed only within the borders of Kosovo, encirclement of western Kosovo will be a great challenge for both parties in conflict, and probably even for the world. Significance of their current conflicts will be reduced, but prospects of broader strategic conflicts will be opened, which can hardly be imagined as a limited Albanian-Serb confrontation only within the borders of Kosovo.

The Moscow statement signed by Yeltsin and Milosevic is extremely one-sided and it cannot be considered even as an attempt which would offer some hope as part of the general endeavours to prevent deterioration of the situation in Kosovo. It does not include even the first step in interruption of all armed conflicts: ceasefire, separation, possible reduction, withdrawal or regroupung of armed forces, etc. The only thing it does say is that they will be withdrawn into places of their normal dislocation in accordance with reduction of alleged terrorist activities. The west demands withdrawal of a certain number of troops from places of conflict or from Kosovo. The impression is, however, that this question has just been hinted at, which has by no means been done by accident in view of its far-reaching consequences.

If this highly sensitive problem is disregarded, the first question that arises is ceasefire. There can be no interruption of violence without agreement about it. This would imply recognition of the situation in the field which has various political and legal implications. Milosevic said in Moscow that he would not negotiate with representatives of the Albanian armed movement whom he called terrorists. Interruption of violence was defined in Moscow only in the context of good will of Belgrade which implies its unlimited right to fight against alleged terrorism. This practically means that Belgrade retains absolute freedom of action which gives it the right to use force whenever it sees fit. That is why there is no special sense in the obligation to enable free movement of people, accredited diplomats and humanitarian organizations, because Belgrade can limit freedom of movement at any time by referring to the situation in the field.

In Moscow, Milosevic promised free return of refugees and others to their homes they had abandoned in the past weeks and months. It is, of course, clear to everybody that women, children and the feeble will not return to their homes when they may be attacked any moment. That this is an attempt of window-dressing is proved by persistent propagandist rhetoric according to which there in the past armed interventions in Kosovo there were no civilian victims, nor fleeing of the Albanians from their homes. Serb propaganda is still repeating the absurdities such as the one that the Albanians were in fact killing each other and demolishing their own homes. Promises of Serbian authorities that they would help in reconstruction of Albanian settlements and homes, the Albanians interpret as a specific form of black humour which can be conceived nowhere else but in Belgrade.

That is why for the Albanians that part of the Moscow statement is not credible either. Representatives of the Albanians, not exactly politely, rejected the offer of their Slav brethren. President of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo Adem Demaqi, assessed the statement as Milosevic's attempt to buy time at the moment when he has less and less time at his disposal to act in facvour of a peaceful solution of the problem of Kosovo. Coordinator of the Albanian negotiating team Fehmi Agani says that there is nothing new in the statement, especially concerning efficient interruption of armed conflicts and improvement of the security situation. Member of the negotiating group Blerim Shala says that there is not a word in the document on withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo, nor about mediation that the Contact Group insists on. All three of them express great doubt about sincerity of Milosevic's offer for negotiations and they question continuation of the Albanian-Serb talks. Kosovo government in exile rejected the possibility of negotiations under conditions dictated by Miloseic and appealed on all Albanian political forces, as well as all the Albanians, to unite in offering resistance, as it was said, to the fascist regime in Belgrade. There is still no statement of the Liberation Army of Kosovo, but its spokesman Jakup Krasniqi, two-three days ago said that there could be no negotiations without withdrawal of Serb forces and a powerful mediator.

All things consisdered, it seems that Milosevic had gone to Moscow to buy time. According to that which was signed there, Yeltsin showed understanding for the ambitions of the younger Slav brother. But, at the moment, nobody could say how far the sponsorship of the elder brother reaches, because he has similar and specific problems. In any case, at least in the eyes of his public, Milosevic tried to, and in this complex tactical game got support from Moscow in turning things backward. He seemed to have tried to turn the clock backwards for at least a month, to the time of preparations for the meeting with Rugova. This was propbably the minimum objective, and the maximum was to go back to the period before armed conflicts had broken out. How useful that will be for him in his relations with the West, remains to be seen. According to his words at the press conference, Milosevic had gone to Moscow to get essential support from Yeltsin for a longterm resolution of the Kosovo crisis based on the principle of ignoring the Albanians. It appears that Russia has given him such support, because Yeltsin and Milosevic would not have signed a document which decides about the destiny of the third, that is, which gratifies the wishes of only one party. But such an approach to the problem of Kosovo is not realistic. The best proof of that is the situation in the field where an increasing number of the Albanians on a broadening territory are rejecting Serbian rule of Kosovo.

AIM Pristina

Fehim REXHEPI