1998 ELECTIONS: TRIUMPH OF THE COALITION "FOR A BETTER LIFE"

Milosevic's Crushing Defeat

AIM Podgorica, June 3, 1998

Even the leaders of the coalition "For a Better Life" were surprised at dawn on June 1. They certainly expected to win, but not an absolute triumph. What was six months ago just a thin line became a true gap - at October presidential elections some five thousand "muscled in" votes had decided the winner; now the difference in the clash between two dominating blocs in Montenegro can be expressed in dozens of thousands (169,674 to 123,552). In a short time Montenegro had to decide twice which way it will take. In October it reluctantly rose its head, but now it had a broad front of opposition to Milosevic. Figures speak louder than words: if votes won by the proven enemies of the project Greater Serbia - the Liberals, as well as some other minor parties - are added to those polled by a three-member coalition, it turns out that almost two thirds of citizens have said "NO" to the policy of the Dedinje couple.

The heavy silence that fell on the head offices of Bulatovic's party in the morning hours when the results were already known, tellingly spoke of the seriousness of their defeat. A throng of anxious followers under the SNP flag waited for hours in vain for the first sounds of songs of victory. None of the leading men had strength to tell them the bad news - slowly, with their heads down, people went home.

Under any other circumstances Bulatovic would have every reason to be happy: he took one third of the electorate and represents the strongest opposition. The problem lies in the fact that both he and his party derived their strength from Belgrade. Financially and media-wise aided, they were sent to battle with the sole task of wiping out Djukanovic and his coalition partners and bringing back Montenegro under the wing of Milosevic's regime. It seemed that in their analysis the leaders of this party had everything carefully planned. They have renounced the votes of minority groups in Montenegro in advance, obviously expecting overwhelming support of those who consider Montenegro a Serbian Sparta, as well as of those whose basic political credo is the union with Serbia. Until now that always brought them some 20 percent of votes. They counted that when everything was put together they would still have the majority of the followers of the former DPS on their side and that the sum of votes Djukanovic took at presidential elections would be reduced by at least 20 percent belonging to the followers of the LSCG and minority parties (SDA, DS, DUA).

Their calculations proved totally wrong. Figures tell that Bulatovic lost over forty thousand of votes. Numerous Serbian parties - which ran on their own - accounted for over twelve thousand votes (more precisely 12,676) which means that, apart from this, another 30 thousand sympathizers left Bulatovic's party.

It is possible that this was a price Bulatovic had to pay for his aggressiveness. His "enemies" were the Albanians, Croats, Moslems, but also all those Montenegrins to whom Cetinje was closer than Belgrade. Likewise, the naming of Bulatovic for the Federal Prime Minister, was planned as coup de grace whereby the SNP would rise and show the Montenegrins who was in power and whom they should vote for. It now seems that this was the crucial mistake which exposed Bulatovic and made him in the eyes of his followers what was never appreciated in Montenegro - a weakling abandoning his people.

Now Bulatovic is in a difficult position. Already in the first days after the elections his party members started slowly dropping out: according to the well known Montenegrin tradition, many turned to the winner. The others, which will have no place in the apparatus, will feel betrayed and scared. And Bulatovic himself will very soon learn the hard way how much Belgrade cares for losers. He had two chances and both times he let Milosevic down. Now, instead of his leader, all sorts of Percevics, Dacics, Ristics will buttonhole him issuing orders. And while he "enjoys" in his function of the Federal Prime Minister he will be used to harm Montenegro as much as possible.

Still, the greatest loser in the May elections is not Bulatovic, but Milosevic. Now his is the greatest responsibility for the destiny of the joint state of Serbia and Montenegro. If he continues to ignore the will of the people of the smaller federal unit and does not relieve Bulatovic and allow the replacement of the Montenegrin delegation in the Chamber of the Republic of the Federal Parliament, he will then risk losing the last republic of the former Yugoslavia. It is more realistic to expect that Milosevic will continue to behave towards Djukanovic in the same way simply because he went so far in this confrontation that he now has only theoretical chances of patching things up and making the situation tolerable. On the other hand, although a rational politician, Djukanovic will hardly agree to make peace with Milosevic even if the latter offers him that - it is evident that he will insist on the gradual restriction of the authority of the federal president and has therefore demanded from Milosevic to oust Bulatovic as the FRY Prime Minister and to offer that position to his winning coalition.

Djukanovic's coalition "For a Better life" did get most votes, but at these elections the majority did not vote for parties, but rather against the diktat of the Belgrade regime. There was no place for "neutral persons" in such positioning of the electorate.

The LSCG, a party without whose participation there would be no Djukanovic's victory and stories about reforms and "the raising of Montenegro", paid most dearly for the wrong assessments of its leadership. Perovic and this party's leadership obviously failed to see or did not want to understand that the DPS did not simply disintegrate last year; since then Montenegro has split into those who are in favour of Montenegrin interests and those who are for its subservience to Belgrade. In thus divided Montenegro it was risky to play the role of a tip on the scales - which the LSCG wished for. With the evident building up of tension between Serbia - Montenegro it was even a greater risk. Treating Djukanovic and Bulatovic in the same way, which the LSCG top did during the entire campaign, caused great confusion among most of its members.

Attacks on the Montenegrin President made the Liberals weaker by the day although its political leaders never realized that. The information that a significant number of registered LSCG members voted for coalition and not their parent party, was a final blow for Perovic and the LSCG top leadership. Obviously, many Liberals saw in Djukanovic, i.e. the forces he stood for, the strongest opposition to official Belgrade. Slavko Perovic's electorate was evidently more inclined towards an informal Liberal alliance with the coalition, than to open conflict.

Probably guided by the same logic, members of the minorities voted for the three-member coalition. At the 1992 elections the united SDA won over ten thousand votes, while today taken together the two factions of this party did not win the confidence of even two and a half thousand Moslems. Similar was the reasoning of Montenegrin Albanians, so that the DUA and the DS got only two out of the envisaged five seats in Parliament.

It is hard to interpret the Montenegro turnabout according to the standards applied by the developed world. It is practically unimaginable in the West for 15 percent of the electorate to radically change their political opinion in half a year and not on account of some unimportant question, like tax policy or social care. Obviously, there has been radical change has in the way people see the key state and national interests, primarily relations between Belgrade and Podgorica.

The May elections were a kind of referendum on liberating Montenegro from centuries-old Belgrade shackles. And the results of that change are visible when the results are compared with those of a year ago. According to the poll of the "Damar" Agency in early 1997 over 65 percent Montenegrins opted for a joint state (including unitarian tendencies). In mid 1998 - some fifteen months later - for the first time since the creation of the federal state, the number of those who consider the FRY to be the best future framework for Montenegro, fell below fifty percent. Advocates of a unitary state were reduced to the level of a statistical error - only three percent. That is less than the sum of votes taken by Seselj's Radicals, Bojovic's party and other smaller Serbian parties to which a number of those who have voted for the SNP should be probably also added.

Therefore, the present victors, their party and personal interests notwithstanding, have to help Montenegro find an answer - what next. When they come out of their victorious trance, coalition leaders will have to see which way they are heading and what they have at their disposal. "This is our penultimate victory, our final victory will be scored when democracy wins throughout Yugoslavia", was the message of Montenegrin President immediately after election results were announced. However, before implementing the idea on the democratization of the broader Yugoslav area, the DPS leading officials will have to resolve some things in their own party ranks as it is the axis of the coalition. For the beginning, they will have to assess the "reform potential " of the party apparatus which has practically remained unchanged all these years. People who until recently carried out purges within University, state administration and state enterprises, sued and prosecuted according to party orders, will see this victory rather as a continuation of their uncontrolled power within their restricted area then a step further towards reforms. Their opposition to changes will be a true challenge for the electoral slogan "For a Better Life".

Djukanovic has no time to waste. If he wants reforms he has to work on two fronts. The clash with Belgrade has just begun. The convincing defeat of Bulatovic's SNP has forestalled the favourite game of the Federal President of not recognizing election results which don't suit him. In half a year he lost all power in Montenegro and his key foe has grown stronger and is now knocking at the federal doors. It is easy to guess what will be the first move of the Montenegrin top after June 15, when Parliament will be formed: replacement of the delegation in the Chamber of the Republics in an attempt to protect republican interests in the Federal Parliament from Montenegrin positions. If he wants to show that he still has some power over Montenegrins, Milosevic will frantically defend this bastion of power in the federation. There is no doubt: all federal mechanisms will be put to work in order to bring Montenegro under discipline and it is quite possible that it will be up to the Federal Constitutional Court to make the first move by proclaiming decisions of the Montenegrin Parliament unconstitutional.

Actually, the victory of the coalition has only created conditions for Montenegro to ask itself: what next? Even before the campaign, Djukanovic introduced the idea on democratizing Serbia from Montenegro. Perhaps this was but a pre-electoral marketing, but on the other hand, maybe it was a true wish of the first man of Montenegro. Now, when he gets a fierce answer from Belgrade, he will have a chance to see whether he was living in a fool's paradise or in real world. And the destiny of not only the coalition, but near future of Montenegro and the FRY, will depend primarily on the answer to that question.

Drasko DjURANOVIC