NEGOTIATIONS ON PRESERVATION OF KOSOVO BORDERS?

AIM Pristina, 16 May, 1998

When on 9 May, the Contact Group, with reservation of Russia, reached the decision on re-imposing sanctions on Belgrade, it seemed that the problem of Kosovo could end in no other way but soaked in blood. Escalation of the conflict in Kosovo just confirmed fear about inevitability of the war which, according to certain predictions, would seriously endanger not only stability of the Balkans, but also that of Europe.

Neither the Serbian regime nor the leaders of Kosovo Albanians showed any readiness to make even the slightest concession in their diametrically opposed stands. They not only had quite different views on the status of Kosovo, but which was more important and more urgent in the current circumstances, they had diametrically opposed approaches concerning meeting "preliminary conditions" for the beginning of "unconditional negotiations", that is, concerning the manner in which a framework and the "initial formula" for negotiations was sought and defined. Milosevic had organised the referendum against foreign mediation in resolving the issue of Kosovo in order to add to the practically unison stand of Serbian parties concerning the "internal problem of Serbia" the power of the plebiscitary declaration of the will of the nation. It seemed that by doing it he had cemented the firm and unyielding policy of Belgrade. The Albanians on the other hand did not wish to give up the option of independence. They insisted also on unfailing foreign mediation in negotiations as guarantors of the agreement, as well as on negotiations with a federal and not a Serbian delegation of negotiators.

Despite everything, just a day after the Contact Group faced refusal of any cooperativeness of Belgrade and a deadend of further political action, the United States sent a team of ambassadors headed by its specialist for mediation, Richard Holbrook, the architect of the Dayton accords. Holbrook silently and apparently with no great ambitions started his mission of shuttle diplomacy along the itinerary Belgrade-Pristina-Tirana-Belgrade-Pristina-Belgrade, and after just three days, quite unexpectedly, stated the sensational news that a meeting was agreed between Slobodan Milosevuic and Ibrahim Rugova was scheduled to take place in Belgrade. The meeting was held on 15 May. The participants say that the meeting was open and useful, although differences in standpoints remained big. It was agreed that talks of authorised delegations would begin next week. The question of the mediator has not been clearly defined yet. It is obvious that the actual informal but present and influential mediators will be the Americans, and that a formula will be found for the mission of Mr. Gonsales or somebody else who would take his place in the role of the representative of OSCE and EU in negotiations. Details about the initial agreement on the beginning of negotiations will probably be clarified in the next few days.

The intervention of American diplomacy re-opened the prospect of a political solution for the issue of Kosovo, although in the meantime conflicts in Kosovo continued with undiminished intensity. Moreover, the Serbian party engaged new police and military forces, while the Liberation Army of Kosovo (OVK) kept broadening the territory of its operations. It is assumed that the OVK now controls partly or completely 30 per cent of the territory of Kosovo, with the tendency to further broaden it. The OVK is quickly spreading especially in places with mostly or exclusively Albanian population, and in Kosovo about 90 per cent of villages and towns are such. The question which arises is whether the just initiated political negotiations will bring about a shift or pacification of the situation in the field?

The Serbian regime is applying the Bosnian scenario in Kosovo. Special police units (under direct command of Jovica Stanisic, head of the Serbian state security service), with a pretext of being in pursuit of Albanian "terrorists", first attack "suspicious" houses and settlements, regardless of victims. Indeed, in the first "clashes" unselective liquidation of civilians and everything that moves is ordered, in order to cause general panic and flight of the population. Just as there was the Bjeljina massacre in the beginning of the war in Bosnia, in the beginning of this undeclared war there was the March massacre in the villages of Drenica Lisan, Prekaz, etc. and similar is repeated now in the surroundings of Decani and Djakovica. The attacks of the police and special units force the local population to make a choice between two extremes: either to remain at the mercy of phalanxes of murderers or to join the defensive formations of the OVK. It is clear that almost all those capable to fight are joining the OVK.

In Kosovo, Belgrade is facing a big dilemma, whether to follow the upward spiral of war it has initiated by sending punitive police expeditions to Drenica and the bordering region with Albania, or to withdraw in time before it loses the comparatively more favourable starting position in political negotiations. The international community is now insisting on the existing borders and a solution for Kosovo within Yugoslavia, while insisting on the war as a solution could lead Belgrade into a situation of actual loss of control over the whole purely Albanian parts of the territory, risking even foreign intervention. Even if in the most convenient case, Serbia militarily put down the current Albanian rebellion, it would most probably be a Pyrrhic victory which would enable it to establish military administration, but not civilian, therefore, solely a colonial type of power, with no participation of the local population. Military or colonial administration in Kosovo could be disastrous for Serbia: maintenance of Kosovo would cost much more than possible exploitation of its economic resources. For the impoverished Serbia, Kosovo would be the suicidal rock tied around its neck.

Spring war operations in Kosovo were probably intended by Belgrade to be a general test for the relation of forces in the field, and not as a provocation of a new great war. At the same time, it was a test for the disposition and patience of the international community. It is possible that accelerated strengthening of the OVK and uncontrolled spreading of the conflict took things too far, beyond the planned proportions of the operation.

Perhaps that is where reasons lie for the sudden shift Milosevic has made, who acted as if had been eager for American mediation to begin political negotiations. It is clear that Milosevic could comparatively easily interrupt operations in the field if in return he would be given minimum guarantees that such a withdrawal could be justified by any even the least "honourable" reason (for instance, a possible favourable or temporary agreement on the status). However, in order to make a full turn, Milosevic will probably need guarantees that after withdrawal of the Serbian units, the Albanian units will also withdraw and be disarmed. If not, if only the Yugoslav army and Serbian police would withdraw, the Albanian units which are waging war might interpret it as a victory.

There is also the possibility that strengthening of the OVK is in a way part of the "plan" for accelerated military solution of the problem of Kosovo which weighs heavily around the neck of Serbia and Yugoslavia. However, it seems that strengthening of the rebellious units has exceeded expectations of Belgrade, in other words that the OVK has already threatened to become an army which would then require engagement of much more than police units - that of the army. It is already possible to hear comparisons with the Albanian uprising in 1944 which had also started in Drenica. At the time, the Albanian insurgents had about nine thousand combatants (in a few formations and without a unique command), while Tito mobilised and sent against them about 40 thousand combatants of the Yugoslav army which had just been formed out of partisan units. Since assessments say that the OVK has about 12 thousand armed members, regardless of the fact that their weapons are not sophisticated, and that their command and other potentials are insufficient, the growing force of the OVK must not be underestimated. Continuation of the conflict could in fact lead to Checnyazation of Kosovo and complete sinking in the mud, and in the end, military defeat of the Serbian military expedition to Kosovo, especially because Serbia seems to have big problems with recruitment of soldiers and policemen, due to mass evasion of call-up and desertion. It was easy to organise the war referendum on "Serbian" Kosovo when the manipulated masses were expected to put their "NO" on paper in ballot boxes, but it is not easy at all for many Serbian families to send to the slaughter-house in Kosovo their only sons who are not at all motivated to fight for a lost cause, guarding insecure positions and shaky fortifications in regions populated solely by the Albanians.

Lack of real patriotism, lack of motive and political and economic depression certainly influenced the Serbian regime to pacify passions and give in under pressure exerted by the Americans. Belgrade is now seeking alternative roads towards agreement with the politically more moderate faction of the Albanians headed by Rugova, which does not want to give up on its ultimate goal - independent Kosovo either.

On the other hand, faced with powerful pressure of the West and new sanctions, Belgrade does not have sufficient political and economic potentials, and least of all sufficient military manoeuvring space to persist with the violent solution of the issue of Kosovo in any way. Although it does not wish to admit it, Belgrade is aware that, whether it likes it or not, it has limited sovereignty in resolving the issue of Kosovo, and that continuation of military operations can lead to foreign military intervention. The NATO is already discussing it and preparing different variants of reaction to a possible spreading of the conflict. Belgrade was publicly warned about the doctrine clearly formulated by previous Bush's administration that Kosovo was on the demarcation line of the strategic interest of the United States and the NATO.

As concerning the Albanian party, political forces do not have control of the situation any more. Along with the split in the political movement which brought Rugova face to face with radical challenges of leaders of other organisations, such as Demaqi and Qosja, there is a third, much more serious force on the scene, the Liberation Army of Kosovo. Neither Rugova nor his opponents on the political scene of Kosovo control the OVK, and it is not certain that they can establish it quickly and without involvement of representatives of the OVK in the negotiating process.

Judging by reactions to the beginning of the Albanian-Serbian dialogue, the OVK is much more cautious in passing judgement about Rugova's sudden turn than his political rivals, Demaqi and Qosja. The latter accused Rugova of collaboration and capitulation in front of Belgrade and Washington.

Demaqi and Qosja are attacking Rugova for three things. First, for having agreed to talk to Milosevic in the first place, before preconditions for negotiations had been met, which the Contact Group had conditioned Belgrade with since its meeting in London on 9 March. Rugova has, indeed, agreed to negotiations without an international mediator and guarantor of a possible agreement. Second, Rugova has accepted talks while war operations are still going on, although the Contact Group demanded previous interruption of operations and withdrawal of military and police units to military barracks. Finally, Rugova had insisted that negotiations be held on a third and neutral ground, and now he has agreed to go "humbly" to Milosevic.

Rugova and his advisors do not give heed to this criticism. As concerning mediation, they believe that engagement of the United States and the negotiating team of special envoys Holbrook and Gelbard, is a bigger guarantee for an agreement than the disunited Contact Group or European institutions. As concerning demands for withdrawal of troops, it is assessed that it has become unrealistic, because of the presence of OVK in the field. The beginning of negotiations cannot be conditioned by withdrawal of Serbian special and other units, but negotiations will at the first instance probably deal mostly with measures which could re-establish and guarantee relative security in the field. Perhaps one of the solutions in the field of security could be to make a part of the current formations of the OVK the core of the future Kosovo police. For application of the package of safety measures, as the important element for continuation of political negotiations, a way and channels must be found for the OVK to proclaim general ceasefire. Establishment of a ceasefire would at the same time be a sign that the OVK accepts Rugova and his negotiating team as its political representative. Only after that, forms of demilitarisation could be discussed, which foreign guarantors could be sought for, primarily the USA and NATO. Only then, serious political negotiations on the status of Kosovo could begin.

Urgent negotiations on security measures are necessary in order to prevent the scenario of 'fait accompli' - the one on forcing violent division of Kosovo. The current war operations might lead to creation of a military border which would leave most of northern Kosovo under control of Serbian troops, while the southern part would be controlled by OVK. It is not impossible that Belgrade regime has conceived the whole operation so as to bring about factual division of Kosovo, similar to that of Cyprus. It would not be the first time for Milosevic to try to effectuate Cosic's national plans. That is why one of the priority stands of the Albanian negotiating team is preservation of the current borders of Kosovo. Protection of the borders of Kosovo is correlated with protection of borders of FRY which the international community insists on.

AIM Pristina

Shkelzen MALIQI