Will Kosovo "Spill Over" to Macedonia?

Skopje May 9, 1998

BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR

Is it possible for the Kosovo problem to "spill over", spread down Sara mountain and flood the "peace oasis" - Macedonia!? There are many who would like the conflicts in Kosovo to extend to this side of the border.

AIM Skopje, 7 May, 1998

That the citizens of Macedonia measure the geographic distance with ethnic emotions was confirmed by the Kosovo events, especially by their reflection on the local public. While the Macedonian media and public are treating the events in Kosovo as something happening somewhere "far away", the Albanian media - those of the second largest ethnos in Macedonia - treat Kosovo as their own, "domestic" tragedy. Offhandedly observed, both might be right from their point of view: the former do not want "to court disaster" and are therefore demonstrating their impartiality, while the latter are reacting to the shedding of blood and a problem that will decide the destiny of their "foster land" where their compatriots and relatives are suffering.

In-between these two "realistic" feelings of citizens of the same state, are local officials who are still searching for a proper way of conduct and who have, at least when it comes to Kosovo, seemingly solved the problem by letting foreign missions and other mediators stationed here, speak for them. However, no matter what are the feelings of one or the other national collective and irrespective of the relations of two parallel publics towards the "silent war" that has already begun in Kosovo, the geographic distance from events there remains unchanged

  • some thirty kilometers from the capital of Macedonia. That in itself raises a question: is there a danger - or indications - of the Kosovo tragedy to "spill over", spread down Mt.Sara and flood the "oasis of peace"

And while the Balkan "seismologists", who feel the need to identify themselves with analysts and well-informed sources, claim that if the tragedy entitled "Kosovo" continues and intensifies, Macedonia will not play only a supporting part, but will be a "star" with a recognizable character, the others argue that the Kosovo drama will unfold "behind the scenes" - i.e. within hermetically sealed borders. Such assumptions are fuelled anew by the local ethnic cartography, i.e. proceed from speculations about possible behaviour of ethnic Albanians, or more precisely, about their possible active support to their fellow-countrymen in Kosovo.

What is more, careful analysts are not losing sight of another, albeit insufficiently examined, very important factor: how might the local Albanophobic centres behave? Namely, it is no secret that they exist, especially after the last year's mass student's demonstrations, when one of the most striking slogans was "Gas chambers for Shqipetars". What's more, could these Albanophobic centres use the Kosovo conflict to "square accounts" with the local Albanians? In other words, those well-versed in the local circumstances point, at least theoretically, that in case of possible spreading of Kosovo conflicts, there would be many who would not mind the "spilling over" of the war conflict to Macedonia.

That schemes to bring Macedonia closer to Kosovo events have already begun, is confirmed by some Serbian media which occasionally quote "unconfirmed" reports that, for example, "tens of thousands of armed Albanians from Kosovo are hiding in Western Macedonia" or that "large shipments of arms have been seized at the Macedonian - Albanian border" or, as it was recently reported, that there are "camps" in Western Macedonia in which "armed Albanian units from Kosovo" are being trained. Naturally, all such reports have been strongly denied by Macedonian officials, but also by the international missions which are practically "covering" the entire Macedonia. Consequently, the news on Albanian training centres in Macedonia sounded as a naively worded misinformation. And all this for a very simple reason that if such camps were located above the ground it would be impossible to hide them from the local police, let alone numerous international observers.

Camps in Macedonia could exist only under the "patronage" of international missions (which borders on science fiction) whose staff in Macedonia, incidentally, equals that of the local police. However, the spreading of such misinformation only corroborates the thesis that the escalation of Kosovo conflict will be followed by a tendency, at least indirectly, to include Macedonia in this disaster. It is not a secret either that such tendencies will continue to come with increased intensity from Belgrade, depending on the situation on the ground. It will be no problem for Belgrade "war workshops to include" Western Macedonia in Kosovo events, either by staging incidents at higher altitudes of Mt.Sara, or by "producing terrorist centres" in these parts of Macedonia. Naturally, again with the assistance of the local Albanophobic centres, which wish that the Albanians in Kosovo "would get the rough end of the stick in their conflict with Serbia", as well as of some other circles in Macedonia, which openly support the current Serbian policy in relation to the Albanians in Kosovo.

Adding to this some open statements of the local Albanian leaders and intellectuals that in case of war in Kosovo, the Albanians would have no choice but to act as a single entity, irrespective of state borders within which they live, then it seems even more probable for a military conflict near Albania to extend to Macedonia. Realistically observed, the local Albanians cannot be indifferent to events in Kosovo for a number of reasons. Apart from widely spread conviction that the Albanian national backbone will be either "broken" or saved in Kosovo, sight should not be lost of the fact that until yesterday these parts constituted a single state whole, and that as a consequence, the local Albanians and those from Kosovo are blood relations. In addition, until recently the Macedonian Albanians considered Kosovo to be "their own" more than the Republic in which they live.

Otherwise, Kosovo was and remained a Piedmont of sorts, at least when it comes to culture and education since every respected intellectual among Macedonian Albanians was educated and brought up in Kosovo.

As things stand now, it is not hard to substantiate the assumption that it will be difficult for Macedonia to remain on the sidelines of Kosovo events. What is worse, if the breaking out of a larger-scale conflict is not prevented in Kosovo, the number of those "interested" in Macedonia for dragging it into the conflict will grow. Without doubt, the international factor will do all that is in its power to keep Macedonia uninvolved and use it as its close "watchtower". But, it is also possible that nothing of this will happen. If for no other reason, then because of the lie of the land on which Western Macedonia borders Kosovo and where a "walk" could be easily created for all those who want to cross the border. This possibility will most probably be used by all interested "walkers".

Observed from any angle, the Macedonian state has a possibility of advocating what other neighbouring countries (for numerous reasons even more then they) should also work for, namely: resolution of the local problem through negotiations and halting of armed conflicts. This is particularly important if internal inter-ethnic tensions are borne in mind. Namely, for several days now, the Albanians have been demonstrating in towns of Western Macedonia and in the streets of Skopje, demanding the liberation of the imprisoned Gostivar Mayor, Rufi Osmani and Government's resignation. In addition to slogans "Freedom for Rufi Osmani" and "Down with the Government", shouts "OVK, OVK" were frequently heard at these demonstrations. By the look of it, it is highly unlikely that the Macedonian - Albanian ethnic tensions will ease as long as the Kosovo issue remains unresolved, irrespective of the fact that some local circles fear this possible resolution as much as the war conflict itself.

This is primarily true of those Macedonians who fear that the resolution of the Kosovo problem might be simply transferred to Macedonia, i.e. that the local Albanians might demand the same things that their compatriots manage to get in Kosovo. All this only confirms how far is Macedonia from some convincing stability and how much, at least when it comes to inter-ethnic relations, depends on the developments in Kosovo. It also shows how little it takes for the "balance" established in the inter-ethnic distrust to be disturbed and events to take an unexpected turn. Simply, things could get out of hand of both local authorities as well as those who came to save Macedonia from the Balkan turbulences and protect it from the misunderstanding of its citizens of other nationalities who have not yet discovered the cohesive force that keeps them together. And perhaps such a "glue" is still unknown to all the Balkan people who are searching for it in vain.

AIM Skopje

KIM MEHMETI